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Abstract 
  
The dynamic landscape and historical legacies of the North Caucasus make it one of the 
world‘s most diverse and interesting regions.  Throughout the region‘s history, its changing 
political geographies have worked to influence local constructs of identity and place.  The 
younger generation today inhabits the North Caucasus in the context of Russian Ethno-
Federalism, providing a variety of meanings regarding ethno-national groups and their territories.  
My aim is to explore how place factors into the construction of ethno-national identity by 
examining the concept of ―homeland‖ (rodina) and the meanings associated with several place-
based and traditional identity factors among young adults in Stavropol Krai and Karachay-
Cherkessia.  I utilized statistical analyses of survey data and a cognitive mapping exercise to 
identify significant differences regarding conceptions of place and ethno-national identity among 
groups of participants based on nationality, religion, and other factors.  Using interview data and 
theory, I explain why these differences exist.   
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Chapter I: 
Historical Contexts Regarding Ethno-National Identity in the North Caucasus 
 
Introduction and Project Goals   
The North Caucasus is a region of physical and societal extremes, where a mountainous 
landscape has led to varying degrees of isolation for its inhabitants in terms of people‘s 
linguistic, ethnic, religious, and political development.  This landscape has resulted in a great 
diversity of ethno-national groups in the region today.  Each ethno-national group‘s development 
has yielded separate languages, cultural customs, and senses of homeland and territorial 
belonging, which have in turn factored in the construction of many unique identities.   
Influences from outside the North Caucasus have historically been present, as various 
powers not native to the region have sought to include it into their imperial folds.  Thus, the 
contemporary cultural and political landscapes of the North Caucasus exhibit Russian, Turkic, 
and Persian legacies, which have in turn influenced identity development (Grant, 2005).  The 
region‘s distinct ethnic, linguistic, social, and territorial identities have traditionally made it 
difficult to subjugate as a unified political entity.   
The ―Question of Nationality‖ (Natsionalnyi Vopros), referring to how various ethno-
national groups would be governed, was a concept that plagued the ruling factions of both the 
Russian Empire and the Soviet Union.  Both governments faced the challenge of exerting 
political and territorial control over multi-ethnic space by utilizing the processes of Russification 
and Sovietization.  The aim of both regimes in this regard was to promote a form of inclusive 
nationalism, allowing for the formation of a common civic identity.  Such an identity would lead 
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to sense of belonging to St. Petersburg or Moscow, rather than to non-Russian or non-Soviet 
affiliations.   
The Soviet Union‘s strategy for ruling the North Caucasus was to create and promote a 
universal civic ―Soviet‖ identity for the entire country by emphasizing a common Soviet culture 
and homeland, rather than groups‘ ethnic differences (Gorenberg, 2006).  This approach was 
implemented through nation building, religious repression, linguistic assimilation, and shifting 
ethnic population dynamics. 
Today, the Russian Federation, as the Soviet Union‘s successor, rules the North 
Caucasus.  Although Soviet legacies are still relevant to how people identify themselves there, 
the current generation of young adults, those individuals between the ages of 16-30 have spent 
most, if not the entirety of their lives in the Russian Federation, not the Soviet Union.  This age 
cohort has experienced the legacy of Soviet nationalities policies but has been directly affected 
by the policies of the Russian Federation.  Russia‘s policies will shape this region in the future.  
Thus, by examining identities of those who have come of age in the region‘s current political 
configuration and policies, it is possible to observe how new identities are being formed and to 
examine how members of multiple ethnic groups relate to and identify territory on several scales, 
ranging from the federal level (the Russian Federation), to regional (the Southern Federal 
District, the North Caucasus, Stavropol Krai and Karachay-Cherkessia), and to local (Stavropol, 
Cherkessk, villages and auls [settlements in Karachay-Cherkessia]). 
 Although all of the previously mentioned spatial scales of place identity are essential, the 
differences in administrative status and political ideology among the territories in which this 
study took place (Stavropol Krai and Karachay-Cherkessia) mean that the regional scale is of 
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particular interest.  Republics within the Russian Federation, such as Karachay-Cherkessia, were 
established on an ethnic basis, thus providing an opportunity for select non-Russian ethnic 
groups to live in some degree of autonomy from Moscow.  Republic status in the Russian 
Federation allows for the local population to have official languages other than Russian, establish 
its own laws, and have named (ethnic) recognition and status for its territory (Constitution of the 
Russian Federation, Article 63).   
Despite special ethno-national privileges for some non-Russian groups, large numbers of 
ethnic Russians still reside in the republics, prompting inconsistencies about the degree of 
Russification (the process by which non-Russians assimilate into Russian society) that still exists 
in these areas.  Ethnic Russians in Karachay-Cherkessia might identify themselves with the 
authority of The Russian Federation before identifying with a territory (republic) that is not 
designated as ethnically similar. However, ethnic Karachays  and Cherkess in Karachay-
Cherkessia might be less likely to identify with the Russian Federation than with their republic. 
 Ethnic Russians are under the control of their own ethno-national group both federally, 
and in the Stavropol Krai; thus one could expect ethnicity, language, religion, or any other 
nationality based factor of identity not to affect how they would relate to the Stavropol Krai as 
opposed to the Russian Federation.  However, place-based factors differ in terms of scale and 
imagined sense of homeland, and as I will show, can have an effect on one‘s sense of ethno-
national identity.  Exploring place-based identity factors, territorial affiliations, and cognitive 
conceptions of homeland illuminates how places are constructed and given meaning in both the 
contexts of the North Caucasus, and in the Russian Federation in general.   
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 The goal of this project is to advance an understanding of place-based identities as well 
as the concept of ―homeland‖ in the North Caucasus.  Examining how members of the young 
generation identified themselves in terms of different scales of territory while also regarding 
gender, religious, ethnic, linguistic, ancestral, and territorial affiliations, makes it possible to 
compare and contrast how different groups responded to various factors of identity.  
Understanding these place identities and their dynamics also helps to clarify potential problems 
in the region‘s political geographies more widely.  Strong identification with Russia at the 
federal level could suggest that certain problems, such as separatism and conflict, are likely to 
diminish in the future.  However, a greater identification with regional elements over the Russian 
Federation could mean the opposite.  Also, affinity for a republic by those citizens who reside 
there without named recognition (Russians or Nogay in Karachay-Cherkessia for example) might 
elucidate the degree to which a Republic has been successful as a legitimate governing body, 
autonomous from Moscow.       
  
Concepts in Political Geography and Territorial Identity 
 The ideas of ―place,‖ ―place based political processes,‖ ―territory,‖ and finally ―place 
based/territorial identity‖ are relevant for studying identity in terms of spatial context.  These 
concepts are vital for understanding how places and their meanings are constructed.  In order to 
explore the notion of homeland, a critical conception for ethno-territorial identity, it is important 
to examine how place and its many meanings can develop into attachments that eventually lead 
to classification and recognition of territory as belonging to a certain group of people or a nation.  
In this study, I draw upon these ideas about place, territory, and homeland in order to evaluate 
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participants‘ place-based connections with the two federal territories being examined (Stavropol 
and Karachay-Cherkessia), as well as their possible affiliations with places at more 
comprehensive scales, such as a possible Caucasian regional, or state-level connection to the 
Russian Federation.  Connections to smaller scale territories, such as cities, villages, and 
neighborhoods are also important to consider, as they may provide a sense of homeland through 
the lived-experience of everyday life.     
 
Ethnicity  
According to Max Weber (1922), in order to create an ethnic identity, groups must 
display a common language, a belief that they are descended from common ancestors, a feeling 
of ethnic affinity, and a shared belief system.  He notes that: 
The belief in common descent, in combination with a similarity of customs, is likely to 
promote the spread of the activities of one part of an ethnic group among the rest, since 
the awareness of ethnic identity furthers imitation.  This is especially true of the 
propaganda of religious groups (Guibernau and Rex, 1997 p.22).   
Weber‘s ideas have been influential in terms of studying how ethno-national identities are 
constructed and develop.  Common language, belief in a common decent or heritage, and the 
effect of religious doctrines on perceived group mentalities and senses of identification can all be 
observed in the context of the North Caucasus.     
Regarding elements of place, Weber (1922) notes that the ―autonomous polity,‖ or 
nation-state, in which a population speaks the same language and has sovereignty over its 
territory, is the ideal environment in which to promote and maintain feelings of national identity.  
However, for ethno-national identities to form and exist, neither a common language, nor a 
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common territory alone is sufficient.  Thus, for ethno-national identities to be maintained, a 
combination of place-based and traditional identity factors must be present in their constructs.     
Smith (1986) writes on the concept of ―ethnie,‖ which are constructed through elements 
such as religion, customs, language, and institutions. He states: 
Ethnie (ethnic communities) may be defined as named human populations with 
shared ancestry myths, histories and cultures, having an association with a specific 
territory and a sense of solidarity (p. 27).  
 
In regard to ethnie and territorial power, Smith (1986) writes: 
If the ethnie in question constitutes a majority of the population of the polity, if, for 
example, it constitutes a patrimonial kingdom or forms the core of a wider agrarian 
empire, then its ethnic myths and symbols will reflect the elements of political 
domination and kingship, and its conduits of ethnic communication will include 
officials, judges and officers alongside the priests and scribes which are common to 
all pre-modern ethnic communication (p. 30).  
However, in the case of ethnic minorities, ideas such as the political kingdom and dynastic state 
are replaced by the concepts of ethnic homeland and the idea of belonging to a particular 
territory with solidarity and a glorious past that took place there.   
 
Territory, Place, and Identity  
Tuan‘s (1974) work Topophilia: A Study of Environmental Perception, Attitudes, and 
Values, examines the notion of sense of place.  Having coined the term topophilia, meaning 
―love of place,‖ Tuan (1974) writes that people from bonds with their surroundings.  These 
bonds are formed through an overlapping convergence of perceptions, attitudes, and values that 
they develop regarding their environments.  People gather perceptions through basic survival and 
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responses triggered by their physical senses.  Over time, perceptions gather together and overlap 
to form attitudes and these attitudes combine to form a culture stance and a world view.   People 
use these elements when establishing opinions about places and when deciding with which 
places they personally identify.   
The ideas of territorial attachment and societal scale are both vital for understanding 
identity and place.  Knight (1982) addresses these concepts in terms of how territory is regulated.  
Territories at any scale are delimited within their bounds, within these bounds rules exist, and 
these rules can be different, depending on the territory. Territorial organization can exist on 
various levels, for example, the local level or the regional level (krais, republics, and federal 
districts in the North Caucasus context).  Although the rules governing territories change at each 
level, they may all join together and become subordinate to a federal structure.  In federal 
contexts, sub-state territories share at least some type of common set of rules.   
Knight (1982) also notes that we can operate on several levels of abstraction at one time, 
but as political geographers have often stated, peoples‘ world view rarely extends beyond local 
limits.  The local is seen as tangible and familiar as broader scales of organization and what they 
represent become increasing less familiar and therefore, to draw from Anderson (1983), 
―imagined.‖  Knight (1982) suggests that society has different meanings at different scales.  To 
be a large scale society implies that the people have conscious relations with one another, with a 
sense of identity that goes far beyond that of a small-scale society.  He points to the fact that 
large empires have existed, but how well people identified with them politically is uncertain.  
Local identities existed in Empires and after their break-up group territorial identities were 
brought back to smaller societies. 
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Medieval territorial identity was closely manifested in one‘s tribe or clan. In modern 
times, the concept of ―nation‖ has become dominant.  Modern Western economic conceptions 
see land not as something to which we are tied, but as a commodity that can be owned, bought, 
and sold.  Although this switch occurred after the renaissance in Western Europe, the peasantry 
in Russian remained tied to land until the mid 1860s.  The idea of a nation brings emphasizes 
idea of unity in a group, usually existing in a defined territory. Thus, socially cohesive groups 
once defined their own territory, but politically bounded territory has come to define ethno-
national groups through bounded space: nation-states or autonomous polities within multi-
national states.  According to Knight (1982):  
In Central and Eastern Europe the nation was defined as a cultural rather than a 
political entity, although once nationhood was achieved in those regions the concept 
of nation-state came more or less to approximate that found in Western Europe 
(p.519). 
Here, Knight argues emphasis on identity has switched from group to territory in the context of 
Eastern Europe as well as Western Europe.  However, the concept of ―nation‖ still retains 
connotations of stronger cultural relevance in Eastern Europe.  This idea is important for the 
Russian context, as the Russian construct natsionalnost retains connotations of homeland, 
culture, language, and ethnicity.  Therefore I suggest that is appropriate to use the term ethno-
national when referring to issues regarding natsionalnost.   
Knight says that, in its most basic form, a state is a legal system of government.  It is a 
bounded container for the contents of a particular area including, people, resources, and means 
for communication, organization, and movement, but it can also be thought of as having 
authority over social order.  Therefore, having territory and a system of government means 
security and opportunity for those who live there.  Citizens of a state all have a sense of 
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belonging, but the scale to which they belong can be problematic.  Regions or certain groups of 
people might be emphasized within a state.  People and places are often defined by a higher level 
of abstraction by governmental factors, regardless of how they viewed locally.   
In his work, Place and Politics, Agnew (1987) proposes three important moments in the 
making of space into place.  First, space must be defined as a bounded physical structure, a 
geographical territory.  This moment is when space becomes a specific territorial unit that can be 
used to answer the question ―where?‖  Next, a specific territory needs a local or associated 
meaning.  Places are made into locales through processes that occur within their own contexts, 
such as politics, work, or the activities of everyday life.  Third, meaning is ascribed through 
sense of place or the emotional attachments people form regarding a specific territory.  Sense of 
place refers to ―subjective territorial identity,‖ or how one feels about the area.  
Agnew (1987) also emphasizes the importance of scale, noting that every political 
geography is comprised of various spatial scales.  He argues that too often attention is paid 
mostly at the state-level.  Meanings of place are also focused at sub-state scales, which provide 
settings for political action as well.  Places at every scale yield some form of politics, which then 
affect the meanings of these places and also wider environments.  He states the relationships 
between federal and sub-federal governments and among ethnic groups as being potentially 
affected.        
Brubaker (1995) speaks of ―nationalizing states‖ and their prevalence in post-communist 
context.  He defines nationalizing states as being considered nation-states while at the same time 
being ethnically heterogeneous.  Elite individuals in these states emphasize citizenship of the 
state, but do so through the language, culture, economic advantage, and political dominance of 
10 
 
the ―nominally state-bearing nation.‖  The Russian Federation arguably fits into this conception 
of a nationalizing state.   
Within nationalizing states, Brubaker (1995) defines national minorities as being self-
aware and able to organize demands for autonomy, thus attempting to avoid complete 
assimilation into the society of the nominally state-bearing nation.  In the North Caucasus, 
essentially every major ethno-national group has exhibited some form of this organization (see 
Chapter 2). 
Brubaker (1995) also states that minority groups with ―external homelands‖ can draw on 
ethnic territory and group members for support across political borders.  The idea of external 
homelands is important in the post-Soviet context because many individuals in the area, 
especially non-Russians, have had some contact with other former-Soviet territories throughout 
their family histories.  Such histories may include forced migrations and refugee status.  This 
idea is especially true for Stavropol Armenians who have immigrated to the North Caucasus both 
for economic reasons and also to avoid ethnic persecution in Azerbaijan.     
Paasi (1996) claims that people are ―spatially socialized‖ through various institutions 
such as symbols and the educational system.  This process leads to the concept of ―institutional 
shape,‖ where elements such as politics, economics, culture, and education are used to establish 
and advance the meaning of territorial boundaries and symbols (Paasi, 1996).  Thus, examining 
attitudes of people in the study area might lead to a better understanding of the area‘s ―cultural 
shape.‖  For example, the idea that Russian territory ends at the Caucasus is something Russians 
would learn from previous generations. However, social, religious, and even educational 
institutions in Karachay-Cherkessia may not emphasize an attitude of Russian dominance, 
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potentially conflicting with the traditions and social connections of the republic‘s ethnic Russian 
population who may identify Karachay-Cherkessia as Russia.    
Paasi‘s (1996) notion of ―identity and territory,‖ where a dominant group controls other 
groups through ―space, boundaries, and various degrees of membership‖ is also important.  
Russians are the dominant group in the study area, being native to no part of it.  However, 
Russians (or pro-Russian Soviet leaders) have been the ones to dictate how these territorial units 
have been formed, thus claiming the Stavropol Krai to be officially recognized as Russian 
territory, and dictating the group dynamics in the republics.  The Karachay and Cherkess are not 
related to each other through common languages nor ancestry.  They share only a common 
religion, Islam, and geographical proximity to one another.  They were grouped together through 
Soviet power, rather than through self-determination. 
On the subject of national identity and territory, Herb (1999) states that territory is vital to 
national identity because it provides ―tangible evidence of the nation‘s existence (p.18).‖  
According to Herb, national identity can exist in ―civic‖ or ―ethnic‖ terms, where the civic 
variant refers to the identification to all the people within a given (state) territory, thus referring 
to a ―civic nation,‖ and the ethnic variant refers to one‘s identification with one group within the 
state, thus referring to an ―ethnic nation.‖  These two forms of national identity were especially 
important in Eastern Europe (Herb, 1999).  They are also evident in the Russian Federation 
today, as the Russian language makes a semiotic difference between words meaning the Russian 
ethnic group (Russkii), and the civic term for a citizen of the Russian Federation (Rossiyanin).   
 It is possible that both residents of Stavropol and Karachay-Cherkessia could hold their 
citizenship or their place within the Russian Federation in higher regard than their ethnic 
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affiliations, meaning that they would have similar identities.  This situation would be ideal for 
stability because ―territorial control by one nation is opposed only when other nations become 
aware of their limited place within the dominant national identity‖ (Herb, 1999).  Uncovering 
feelings of limitation or lack of empowerment in society might be suggestive of future problems.   
 In terms of forming a nation, Herb (1999) proposes three crucial elements: membership, a 
shared past, and a common goal. When these factors culminate in a given territory, a ―collective 
conscience‖ may result, thus leading to the creation of a ―homeland‖ (Herb, 1999).  Herb claims 
that autonomy of the dominant group might be enough to pacify national aspirations. However in 
the case of Karachay-Cherkessia, we observe an interesting scenario in which autonomy of the 
dominant group, the Russians, is had not by a single nation, but by two unrelated ethno-national 
groups together.  There also remains a significant population of ethnic Russians within this 
territory.  The non-Russian groups, as a collective, have autonomy from Moscow but remain 
bound to one another, sharing a territory (homeland).  Also, the large presence of ethnic Russians 
in the Karachay-Cherkessia raises questions as to the actual level of autonomy, as Russians can 
associate with their own ruling group at the federal scale, as opposed to prioritizing a sense of 
regional territorial identity.            
 Kaplan (1999) describes territorial identity in terms of ―geographic scale.‖  National 
identity, in Kaplan‘s view, exists when a group of people is bound within a territory, has cultural 
attributes and political objectives, and develops an identity that differs from that of the state 
(when the group is not dominant); this national identity lies within a ―hierarchy of geographically 
based identities,‖ which may serve to contend for the group‘s adherence (Kaplan, 1999).  Being 
from Russia, the South, the North Caucasus, Karachay-Cherkessia, Cherkessk, or particular 
neighborhood or street, might all play a part in forming the spatial context of a particular 
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individual‘s identity.  Although each place constitutes a different scale of territorial specificity, 
individuals have personal experience with all of them.  Each time we consider a broader scale 
there are more individuals to be included.  All of the participants in the study can potentially 
relate to Russia (as citizens ―Rossiyaniye”), the South of Russia, the North Caucasus, a krai or 
republic, and cities or villages as they are bound to these territories.  However, a particular 
territory might be one to which an individual most closely associates.  For example a Karachay 
from Cherkessk could self-identify as Rossiyanin, Southern, North Caucasian, or as being from 
Karachay-Cherkessia, a region of Karachay-Cherkessia, or from Cherkessk.  Closer affiliations 
with the later three than with the first three could foster Kaplan‘s concept of national identity, as 
different from that of the state.              
Kaplan (1999) also differentiates between ―state identity,‖ involving membership in a 
polity and association with government, state symbols, and social order, and ―national identity‖ 
in association with a cultural group.  ―Sub-state nationalisms‖ are therefore possible when a 
dominant group‘s territory encompasses the entire territory of a non-dominate group, and 
regional autonomy is sought by those in the non-dominant group to preserve national identity 
(Kaplan, 1999).  Potential nationalisms in the context of Karachay-Cherkessia could be 
considered ―sub-state nationalisms,‖ regarding the Russian Federation as the state.  However, 
because of the republic‘s autonomous status, ethnic Russian (or Cossack/Slavic) nationalism 
could also be considered a ―sub-state nationalism,‖ as Russians are a minority within the 
Republic.    
 Kaplan (1999) also suggests that ―border lands‖ exhibit three types of identities: the 
dominant identity, nationalist identity, and a unique ―border identity.‖  Since the Caucasus region 
is indeed a border region, it is likely that all three of these elements are present.  The dominant 
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identity is the Russian civic identity, nationalist identities would be those had by individual non-
dominant ethnic groups (or by those Russians who might advocate for an ethnic-Russian 
nationalism), and an overall Caucasian identity, which could be had by any individual with an 
affinity for the region that is stronger than either his or her affinity to the Russian Federation or 
to his or her own ethnic group.   
Paasi (2003) writes of territories as ―social constructs,‖ having ―shape‖ and ―boundaries.‖ 
These ―boundaries,‖ according to Paasi (2003), are ―lines of inclusion and exclusion between 
social groups.‖  These lines both ―separate ‗us‘ from ‗them‘‖ and ―do not always exist where 
they are identified on maps, often spreading over a greater territorial expanse than is officially 
recognized‖ (Passi, 2003).  This idea is true in the case of Stavropol and Karachay-Cherkessia, as 
official territorial designations do not contain all of the members of any one group.  The two 
titular groups for which Karachay-Cherkessia was named have group members living outside the 
republic and must share their territories with each other as well as with Russians and other 
smaller Caucasian ethnic groups that do not have a named territorial unit.  The border between 
Karachay-Cherkessia and Stavropol Krai creates a symbolic and quasi-administrative break 
between Russian and non-Russian space, however Russians make up the second largest group in 
Karachay-Cherkessia, having a greater presence than even Cherkess, after whom the Republic is 
named.   
Autonomous territorial units can be established to satisfy a group‘s desire for recognition 
and differentiation, their ―identity narrative,‖ which allows them to claim critical elements such 
as a ―homeland‖ and national symbols (Paasi, 2003).  He claims that symbols are often 
representative of the landscape, or space of identity, rather than people.  This idea holds true for 
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Karachay-Cherkessia, as Mt. Elbrus and other prominent landscape features serve this role, 
appearing on the republic‘s flag.  Elbrus is also a popular name for boys in the Republic.   
Lynn Staeheli (2003) argues that place should be considered not only a physical location, 
but also a cultural or social location.  Observing place-related phenomena politically can reveal 
political and social objectives. Hence, groups of people may be considered ―in place‖ or ―out of 
place,‖ depending on particular scenarios.  Placement within such a social scenario may affect 
one‘s propensity and or ability to take political action (titular-status in the Russian Federal 
context).   
   Staeheli defines place as a something that is ―dynamic‖ and ―being constructed and 
changing over time‖ through combining space and social identities (Staeheli, 2003).  By 
observing the level of affinity attached to various places among different ethnic groups based 
upon their geographical location (in Stavropol, or in Karachay-Cherkessia), it should be possible 
to gain insight into the region‘s contemporary meaning, that is to say, how young people view 
these territorial constructions, after their creation and existence through Soviet and Russian 
Federal control.     
  O‘Lear (2007) suggests that one way political legitimacy over territory is gained through 
―the right to make rules.‖  The concepts of legitimacy can therefore be used to measure potential 
state-stability by measuring how well ruling political factions are able to ―secure acceptance, if 
not approval by its populace.‖  She argues that legitimacy is also important for internal 
sovereignty within a state, which is also connected to a state‘s ability to solidify notions of 
national identity.   
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In addition to a sense of national identity‘s importance for stability, O‘Lear (2007) 
suggests that public expectations of future benefits are also important for stability in the greater 
Caucasian context.  She argues that making the populous believe in short-term benefits, 
specifically oil-wealth in nearby Azerbaijan, is an effective short term solution to instability.  
This economic connection between government and the people is also important in the North 
Caucasus, as the economies are not only below the country‘s national averages, but also because 
a large percentage of the republics revenue comes though Moscow based subsidies.  An 
awareness of financial sources might influence both stability, and local identity formation in 
terms of the republics‘ relationships to Moscow.   
O‘Lear (2009) also notes the importance of human security to the Caucasian context.  
She describes the state governments as: 
gate-keepers to economic development and the enhancement of human well-being 
through their pursuit of international aid and trade, the crafting of national economic 
policy, and their maintenance and improvement of national education and healthcare 
systems as well as physical infrastructure (p. 103).    
Thus, the Russian government‘s policy regarding development in the North Caucasus plays a 
major role in security throughout the region.  The level of human security and its perceived 
sources may influence place affinities, and therefore conceptions of homeland and scale of 
political affiliation and preference.   
 
Regarding Cognitive Maps  
 Lynch‘s (1960) The Image of a City, focuses on mental maps and how people form and 
use them within urban contexts.  Lynch (1960) suggests mental maps as being of practical use 
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for recalling spatial information primarily for the purposes of navigation and spatial behavior.    
Lynch (1960) suggests five important elements of a mental map.  Paths, such as trails and roads, 
provide routes for travel.  Edges, such as rivers, buildings, or barriers work to frame the limits 
and boundaries of one‘s mental map.  Districts are formed when one delineates sections of a city 
through forms of identification, such as through economics, recreation, or cohesive 
characteristics.  Nodes may be intersections or other focal points.  These nodes provide 
connections between other constructs.  Finally, landmarks, objects that are quickly and simply 
identified, provide reference points on one‘s mental map.   
According to Peter Gould (1966),  
The human landscape, in reality, or abstracted and modeled as a map, is nothing 
more, but equally nothing less, than the spatial expression of the decisions of 
men…Many of the decisions that men make seem to be related, at least in part, to the 
way in which they perceive the space around them and to the differential evaluation 
they place upon various portions of it (p.2). 
Here, Gould describes cognitive or mental maps that refer to the perceived images of space held 
by individuals or groups.  Theory regarding such images is important to my study in terms of 
exploring imagined conceptions of homeland.  Commonalities (or sometimes the lack there of) 
within groups‘ sketch maps represent the group‘s overall spatial viewpoint.  This shared 
viewpoint, along with mental maps that are constructed to characterize it, represent a 
simplification of that group‘s interpretation of reality; a group‘s mental maps constitute a model 
of its shared spatial conciseness (Gould and White, 1974).   
Mental maps reflect information taken from a participant‘s environment that becomes 
qualified in terms of attractiveness. Aesthetic components such as scenery and climate are 
important for finding a place desirable, as are elements of human activity.  People become 
familiar with their surroundings, which are in turn reflected in their mental maps.  Thus, the 
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longer people remain in the same environment, the more developed their mental maps (Gould 
and White, 1974).   
When individuals from mental maps, they tend to stay within their cultural and linguistic 
comfort zones (Gould and White, 1974).  In this tradition, there are several variables within the 
context of the North Caucasus that might mark these comfort zones, which may exist at the 
federal, regional, and local scales. ―Linguistic comfort zones‖ could mean different things in the 
North Caucasus, depending on the contexts of given languages.  Russian is the lingua franca 
throughout the country and throughout the North Caucasus.  Since almost everyone speaks 
Russian, regardless of their ethno-national languages, Russian linguistic space is more or less 
comfortable for everyone.  Thus, viewing the entire Russian Federation as a Russian linguistic 
zone means that any participant could find this particular sense of comfort in identifying with 
this territory.  However, one might prefer to speak their native language regarding a linguistic 
comfort zone.  In this case, non-Russians become very limited outside areas where their native 
languages are prevalent.  Basically, Karachay and Cherkess would be confined to Karachay-
Cherkessia, making their linguistic comfort zone a regional one.  Smaller ethnic groups, like 
Nogais and Abazins, would be forced to identify linguistically with territory on a smaller scale, 
since their populations are dispersed into villages and local communities throughout Stavropol 
Krai and Karachay-Cherkessia.   
 ―Cultural comfort zones,‖ regarding Russian culture, suggest a similar situation to that of 
the Russian linguist comfort zone.  Because Russians are present throughout the Russian 
Federation, including the autonomous republics, Russian culture, to some degree, is also present 
there.  Since Russian culture is the overall dominant culture in the country, and every citizen is 
equal under the laws of the Russian Federation, there exists the ideal (perhaps a remnant of the 
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Soviet Period), that any Rossiaynin (citizen of the Russian Federation) can be a part of the 
greater Russian civilization, and simply claim the entire country as his or her cultural comfort 
zone.  However, the idea that the Caucasus represents a break between Russian and non-Russian 
space indicates that an inclusive Caucasian identity, a regional scale identity, or as Kaplan (1999) 
would term it, a ―border identity‖ could exist.  The notions of being non-Russian, as well as 
being Islamic, are both factors that play into a collective sense of a Caucasian cultural comfort 
zone, suggesting a connection to the wider region, rather than to a defined polity.   
Again, the concepts of ethno-national territory and titular status are important.  
Obviously, if one is a member of an ethnic group having a territory officially designated to it, 
said individual would likely form some type of attachment.  A Karachay in Karachay-Cherkessia 
exhibits such titular status.  In Karachay-Cherkessia, Karachay culture is widespread, the 
Karachay language is prevalent (being one of the official languages of the Republic), and the 
republic is comprised of mostly Islamic inhabitants.  
 Karachays are also considered to be Kavkazskye (of the Caucasus) and Karachay-
Cherkessia is located in the North Caucasus.  Thus, it is reasonable for a Karachay to claim 
Karachay-Cherkessia as important in terms of his or her identity. The Cherkess enjoy basically 
the same official situation and it would make sense for a Cherkess to do the same.  Since these 
two groups only exhibit such a ―comfortable‖ situation in Karachay-Cherkessia, their mental 
maps should reflect the regional scale. 
Most people have a rather intuitive feel for the core of a country and its peripheries 
(Gould and White, 1974).  The North Caucasus is surely a peripheral region within the Russian 
Federation.  For some, especially non-Russians, having a peripheral location might constitute a 
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comfort zone.  Comfort zones might not exist beyond the local scale for some.  In some small 
scale contexts, physical and social spaces are very tightly linked (Gould and White, 1974).  This 
notion suggests that people might find it easier to identify with tangible space, seeing their 
comfort zone as containing places that they can see and visit on a regular basis.  This idea is 
especially relevant when considering differences between rural and urban populations.  In the 
study area, there are two large urban centers, Stavropol and Cherkessk.  However, many 
respondents indicated that they were born (or even still officially reside) in smaller urban 
environments or villages.     
Analysis of mental maps is done by ordering a set of experiences that appear unique by 
extracting from them their common characteristics (Gould and White, 1974).  After information 
is obtained, is then simplified in order to produce mental maps; analyzing mental maps is a 
useful method for exploring relationships between people and places.  In terms of spatial 
precision in sketch maps, peoples‘ accuracy is always better at smaller scales, and familiarity 
with cartographic perceptions is more evident as the scale is increased (Gould and White, 1974).  
Thus, the willingness to go beyond the local scale when asked to draw a concept like homeland 
is partly contingent upon one‘s spatial conciseness, but also on the confidence to associate with 
territory that is increasingly less familiar.  The larger the scale demanded, the less able people are 
to accurately portray spatial relationships (Pocock, 1976).   
According to Pocock (1976), a mental (cognitive) map is a mental image of an 
environment held by an individual or a group of people.  A mental map is the store of spatial 
information that a person may recall when he or she needs to illustrate a place.  This spatial 
information may include landscape features, different areas, or paths to various locations.  This 
information is gathered either on a first hand basis (when a person comes into contact with his or 
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her environment), from geographical representations such as a map or a globe, or from other 
stimuli that prompt one to consider elements of a particular place, including cultural stereotypes 
of people and landscape. 
The mental map is a product of one‘s ability to visualize space, and general ability to 
perceive and retain information (Pocock, 1976).  The meaning of the information received by 
one‘s environment might be seen as incoming stimuli that must pass through a series of 
perceptual filters including physiological, social, and cultural factors, and personal value systems 
(Pacione, 1978).  According to Pacione‘s model (Figure 1), an image results after perceived 
information has been filtered through each individual‘s unique set of filters.  Since one‘s spatial 
knowledge set is called upon when he or she is prompted by particular stimulus, a particular 
question or instruction given by the researcher acts as this stimulus when drawing a sketch map.   
Therefore, a question such as ―where is your homeland?‖ provides the stimulus necessary to 
invoke a participant‘s value system to define their own spatial definition of homeland, thus 
invoking the spatial knowledge needed to define it.   
When asked to recall one‘s mental map of a particular place, specifically homeland in the 
context of my study, a respondent could consider any kind of spatial information gained from 
observed experience, including personal values and opinions.  However, since no one has ever 
perceived environmental stimulus beyond a very local scale, images and perceptions of larger 
scale constructs, such as borders and territories, must be recalled from other sources, namely 
maps (Pacione, 1978).   
Mental maps can be used to measure participants‘ values in terms of place (Pacione, 
1978).  The content found in sketch maps reflects not only spatial accuracy and awareness, but 
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qualitative elements, such as places and their general significance a given space can be observed.  
Places in one‘s mental map are important in terms of their value and meaning.  Considering the 
places that a participant includes in a sketch map in terms of their overall meaning to the 
geographical area and scale portrayed allows the researcher to make inferences regarding the 
relative importance of a place and about the familiarity of the participant with places in a given 
area.   
A common way to investigate mental maps is through a process called sketch mapping, 
in which a participant draws an image based upon his or her knowledge, and or opinions 
regarding a place.  Every individual‘s own mental map is unique, thus every sketch map is also 
unique.  However, when a number of sketch maps from a particular group of people are 
collected, many responses can be compared and contrasted to analyze the spatial awareness of 
that particular group (Pacione, 1978).   
  
Figure 1: Pacione‘s Model of the Cognitive-Behavioral Process (Pacione, 1978 p. 556) 
 
Because regional environments are assigned various characteristics both by outsiders and 
by residents (Raitz and Ulack, 1981), the North Caucasus is affected both by perceptions from 
other regions of Russia and by local lore.  For many Russians outside the region, the North 
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Caucasus represents something wild and unruly, having been seen as politically and territorially 
problematic for hundreds of years.  People from the North Caucasus, especially non-Russians, 
often face discrimination and stereotypes in the Russian core.  Likewise, Russians from the 
region must deal with the fact that they are ―Southern‖ in terms of their speech patterns and 
behavior.  These stimuli work to reinforce the idea of a collective North Caucasian identity, 
making a sense of identity and place on the regional level most important when considering 
where one native to the region belongs.  Overall group themes can be observed by testing 
whether groups‘ members recognize similar spatial elements and value them consistently (Raitz 
and Ulack, 1981). 
 Mental maps can measure social space, and analyze levels of familiarity.  Places can be 
recalled on cognitive maps due to their functional relationship to behavior (Raitz and Ulack, 
1981).  Because homeland is a social space, sketch maps provide participants with the 
opportunity to express their notions of this space on paper.  Since in this study they were 
prompted to include three places within their homelands most important to them and those places 
close to them on their maps, the places they included represent a high level of familiarity.  For 
example, most any place at the local scale is familiar to any given participant through simple 
personal experience.   
Loyd (1989) claims that cognitive maps differ when gained from actual experience vs. 
cartographic knowledge gained from maps.  When asked to draw one‘s homeland, a participant 
must consider two components: with what particular territory do I identify, and how can I 
represent that territory in the form of a sketch map?  This concept is important for participants to 
consider when they make the decision whether or not to include political borders in their maps, 
and at what scale they wish to define their homelands.        
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Historical Geography and Identity in the North Caucasus 
 Over 400 years of Russia presence in the North Caucasus has resulted in many different 
political and territorial changes in the region throughout recent history.  Interaction between 
Russians and local Caucasian groups has led to conflict, changing borders, and various territorial 
constructs that Russians have utilized while attempting to dominate and administer the area.  
Although the policies of the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union, and the Russian Federation, have 
differed regarding policy, their basic goals have always been to exert control and promote 
political and territorial stability in the North Caucasus.    
 
The Russian Empire 
The Russian Empire was the first successfully to colonize the Caucasus.  The Russians 
accomplished this feat through military, bureaucracy, missionaries, settlers, courts, and schools.  
Where other empires had been content with payments of tribute, taxes and slaves, the Russian 
Tsars wanted to control the Caucasus for strategic geopolitical reasons (Khodarkovsky, 2008).  It 
is important to note that before the Russian Empire succeeded in annexing the North Caucasus 
into its fold through military action, there had been a Russian presence in the region for several 
generations, as Russia attempted to establish colonies in the North Caucasus before a major 
military offensive was attempted (Dunlop and Monon, 2006).     
The Russo-Turkish War (1768-74) may be regarded as the first step in Russia‘s attempt 
to control the North Caucasus.  Russian Imperial forces first entered the conflict in response to 
the request of King Irakli II who controlled territory that exists today in modern Georgia, to be 
protected from the Persians.  Because Russian leaders wanted take control of the Black Sea from 
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the Turks, it made geopolitical sense to gain some influence in Georgia.  However to get there 
meant going through the North Caucasus.  As a result, cities like Stavropol and Vladikavkaz, 
which originally served as fortified settlements, were founded in the mid-1770s.  Soon thereafter, 
Cossack (Russian military) settlements also began to appear along the Kuban River.   
In 1792 Georgia was fully incorporated into the Russian Empire and in 1800, Tsar Paul 
ordered the first Cossack raids on Circassian lands.  1804 marked a general rebellion of all the 
peoples of the Northwest Caucasus when non-Russians demanded the removal of Russian 
military.  Increased conflicts led to the appointment of General Alexei Yermolov who served as 
commander of the Caucasus from 1816 to 1827.  Yermolov‘s offensives against Dagistanis, 
Chechens, and Kabardins earned him the reputation of conqueror and he remains an iconic 
symbol of Russian power of the Caucasus.   
 
Figure 2: Monument to General Yermolov in Stavropol.  Photo: Austen Thelen (2009) 
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Conflict between the Cossacks and Circassians reached its culmination in 1859, when the 
Russians destroyed 44 Circassian villages.  However, plans to deport any Ottoman remnants and 
the Circassians from this newly conquered territory were in place long before final victory; the 
―Circassian Question‖ was debated after the war.  Eventually, the majority of the Circassians 
were forcibly migrated to the Black Sea, and then deported to the Ottoman Empire (Richmond, 
2008).   
Miliutin was one Russian leader who sought to ethnically cleanse the Caucasus and his 
policies ultimately led to allowing for the creation of the Cherkess nation.  First, 30,000 Nogais 
were deported from the area that would eventually become Karachay-Cherkessia in 1858-9 
(Richmond, 2008).  Then, in the early 1860s, around 200 Circassian family units were resettled 
on the Kuban river, where they joined with other Circassians who had historically resided there 
(Richmond, 2008).  These Circassians joined together to become the Cherkess, for whom 
Karachay-Cherkessia is in part named.       
 
Figure 3: The Study Area's Political Borders in 1860.  Source: The Imperial Atlas. ―The Isthmus 
of The Caucasus, and Armenia.‖ No. XLII. Blackie and Son: London (1860).  
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After the war, Russians remained in the Northwest Caucasus and inhabited the best farm 
land, which had been cleansed of the indigenous population.  They advocated for assimilation of 
non-Russians by economic means and sought to incorporate the Russian administrative and 
judicial systems into these new political units.  Russians were seen as occupiers, much like 
previous empires that attempted to control the Caucasus.  Many local peoples saw Russian law 
replacing their centuries-old customs as an attack on their culture, thus criminal action could 
have been considered some form of protest (Richmond, 2008).  
 
Figure 4: Monument in Cherkessk ―400 Years with Russia.‖ Photo: Austen Thelen (2009) 
 
Regional territorial governments in the Caucasus were known as pristavstvos; they acted 
as a go between for the local populations and the Imperial Government.  Pristavstos were often 
unstable.  They split, merged, and changed borders on numerous occasions.  The system of 
government also lacked consideration for the semi-nomadic lifestyle of the local peoples.  The 
Pristav, or leader of the pristavstvo, had the power to conscribe militias, seize personal property 
and land, and to impose fines, and also controlled the courts and trade.  The pristav was himself 
almost always an ethnic Russian.    
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Administration was one of the Russians‘ major goals in the North Caucasus (Richmond, 
2008), but in order to achieve this, many diverse and unrelated local populations had to be 
conglomerated into some type of governable structure.  In 1856, the entire North Caucasus 
region was divided into two units the Left and Right Wings.  These territories became known as 
the Kuban and Terek Oblasts from the 1860s on.  The Terek Oblast was divided into seven stable 
districts of administration (okrugs) and the Kuban Oblast into five; these okurgs were not based 
solely on ethnic boundaries (Richmond, 2008). 
 
Figure 5: The Study Area's Political Borders in 1911. Source: Cram‘s Unrivaled Atlas of the 
World. ―Map of Russia.‖ p. 132-133. Geof Cram: Chicago (1911). 
 
The Russian Empire used two important identity building processes in the North 
Caucasus: ethnification and indigenization.  What Russian Imperial scholars and statesmen 
referred to as scientific ethnification, which meant defining groups by categories of otherness, 
such as language, territory, and religion, was a European invention that proved common and 
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useful for the colonial process (Funch, 1998).  Utilizing this process meant that groups of people 
could be easily classified for administrative purposes, which would eventually lead to groups 
being assigned territory.  When an area was first seen as a frontier with no fixed borders, 
colonizers first created boundaries based on ethnic classifications.   
As Russian settlers began to arrive and claim territory, ―boundaries of otherness,‖ 
especially those cultural in nature began forming (Funch, 1998).  According to Funch (1998, 
p.87) establishing boundaries of otherness: 
extended to not only include the often treated terms of ethnic and national identity, 
but also the creation of local, regional, or indigenous identities, on the background of 
the establishing of boundaries of otherness; partly through cultural boundaries, partly 
through the conflict itself: Us vs. them (free mountaineers vs. Russian army).  This 
meant the creation of an outside-inside-dichotomy of identity production, and a 
‗myth symbol-complex‘ was created and has been in function ever since. 
 
Ethnic groups suddenly began to appear on maps, which portrayed these groups in an 
area, according to how the process of ethnification applied to and defined each one.  In addition 
to the visual representation that maps provide, various symbols and serotypes regarding the 
North Caucasus began to appear in 19
th
 century Russian high culture.  Many Russian literary 
works, from the likes of Pushkin, Lermontov, and Tolstoy, are commonly set in the Caucasus, 
giving the region a special place in Russian national heritage.  Russian authors were fond of 
nature, especially forests and mountains, and the Caucasus were even over-represented in 
Russian imperial lore, as they were given much more attention than either Siberian or Central 
Asian colonies (Funch, 1998). 
The Russification policies in the 1880s mark an important point in the relations between 
Caucasians and Russian.  Russification aimed at forcing non-Russian ethnic groups throughout 
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the empire to become (at least culturally) Russian, through attempts at barring the practice of 
non-Orthodox-Christian religions, and the use of non-Russian languages in imperial institutions, 
especially in education and the print media.  Funch (1998) notes that although attempts at 
Russification were made in the Caucasus, they were relatively ineffective because the North 
Caucasus region had not been ―properly colonized,‖ that is, it remained under military 
administration due to its geopolitical importance to the empire.   
In 1870, Ministry of Public Education first introduced ―Rules on Methods for the 
education of the Mountaineers.‖  Mountain peoples were divided into three types: ―not at all 
Russified,‖ ―those living in areas where there are large numbers of Russians,‖ and ―sufficiently 
Russified.‖  This meant different degrees of Russian language instruction; the goal was to 
Russify the population in one generation, and by 1804, the first school for indigenous peoples 
opened in Stavropol, and by the 1870s Stavropol had 7 such schools and a seminary (Richmond, 
2008).   
 
The Soviet Period 
In order to get the cooperation of the local peoples, the Bolsheviks simply returned land 
given to Slavic colonists in the Tsarist period to their indigenous populations.  The Bolsheviks 
used the imperial government‘s traditional preferences for Slavs and wealthy capitalists as a 
means by which to gain the support of these indigenous peoples (Richmond, 2008).   
The Union of Mountaineers of the Caucasus appeared in May, 1917 and was the first 
serious pan-Caucasian post-imperial political movement.  This group lobbied for the 
independence of the Terek Oblast, as well as some portions of the Stavropol and Krasnodar 
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Krais.  Independence was recognized by Germany and Turkey, but the leaders were forced to 
flee the North Caucasus.  The Bolsheviks considered the region to be overpopulated and decided 
that mass population transfers via forced migration would be the most efficient way to solve the 
problem (Richmond, 2008).  Stalin himself lobbied for the Cossacks to be recognized as a 
counter-revolutionary force to justify their deportation.  However, Cossack deportations did not 
eliminate ethnic conflicts over territorial rights and land use.  The region remained politically 
unstable and problematic for Soviet rule throughout the 1920s. 
A conference was held in Vladikazkaz in September, 1920 with the goal of countering 
separatist movements, some argued for the creation of an autonomous territory which, unlike the 
Terek Oblast, would be divided by national regions assigned to various ethnic groups.  This plan 
came to fruition in December, 1920.  The resulting territory, known as the Mountain Republic, 
remained relatively unstable for the next two years.  Finally, as each group sought to take control 
of more territory, the Mountain Republic was divided into a series of separate autonomous units.  
On the 12
th
 of January, 1922, ―Karachay-Cherkessia‖ became one of the republics resulting from 
delineation of the Mountain Republic.  It had a land area of 11,701 square kilometers with a 
population of 163,000: 71,930 Slavs, 50,740 Karachays, 14,290 Abazins, 13,965 Circassians, 
6,339 Nogais (Richmond, 2008).  Conflict between all of the ethnic groups in Karachay-
Cherkessia continued to be problematic during the Republics early period, and in 1926, ethnic 
tension was cited as the cause for dividing Karachay-Cherkessia into the Karachay Autonomous 
Oblast and the Cherkess National Okrug. 
In April 1925, the Bolshevik decision against the Cossacks was reversed. Some cite the 
reason for this to be a desire for increased industrial production, for which local Russian 
speaking peoples were at a premium, but all Cossack semi-autonomous regions had already been 
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dissolved.  By 1930, the new enemies of the state were Kulaks and Islam; however, Cossacks 
suffered again during ―dekulakization‖ (politcide against rich peasants who were labeled ―class 
enemies‖) and large numbers of each Islamic ethnic groups were deported from the North 
Caucasus.   
 
Figure 6: 1943-57: Stavropol and Cherkessk Autonomous Oblast Post-Deportation.  Source: 
―Political and Administrative Districts of Russia.‖ Chief Administration of Geodesy and 
Cartography of The Council of Ministers, USSR: Moscow.  
 
The Great Terror (Stalin‘s purges) hit the North Caucasus in 1937 when the regions‘ 
intelligentsia were accused of being Trotskyist revolutionaries, and blamed for an anti-Soviet 
uprising that had taken place in 1930.  The entire Karachay intelligentsia were arrested along 
with all the rural officials and 8,000 farmers (Richmond, 2008).  By 1938, all Karachay territory 
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was administered by NKVD officers, none of whom were ethnically Karachay (Collins-
Richmond, 2002).  The Soviets began to destroy national cultural elements such a native 
literature and even Party materials written in the local languages throughout the North Caucasus.  
These policies prompted a call to violence by leaders in Chechnya, and some uprisings did take 
place in Karachay areas.  By the time the Nazis took brief control of the area during WWII, they 
were greeted by a substantial anti-Soviet movement that they sought to utilize.      
Although anti-Soviet sentiment existed in the area, many North Caucasus ethnic groups 
actively backed the government in the war against the Nazis, sending many thousands of their 
young men to the front lines.  However, there were those who understood the defeat of the USSR 
to mean liberation and even independence.  This position was backed up by ex-Soviets who had 
emigrated to Germany and who were subsequently dropped over the Caucasus to spread 
propaganda in February of 1942.  From 1943-1944, 68,938 Karachays, practically the entire 
Karachay population, were forcibly deported from the North Caucasus to a series of 550 camps 
in Central Asia (Collins-Richmond, 2002).  In their absence, some of their land and livestock 
was taken by other ethnic groups who remained in the area.   
In the 20
th
 Party Congress, in February, 1956, Nikita Khrushchev famously spoke out 
against Stalin in what would become known as ―The Secret Speech.‖  He cited Stalin as being in 
violation of fundamental Leninist principals regarding multinationalism, and how it was meant to 
be practiced in the Soviet Union.  Among Stalin‘s wrongs were the forced migrations of several 
North Caucasus national groups, including the Karachays.  The Karachays were repatriated on 
January 9, 1957 by Order 149/12 issued by the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR, ―On the 
Transformation of Cherkess Autonomous Oblast into Karachay-Cherkess Autonomous Oblast.‖  
This new territory was placed under the jurisdiction of the Stavropol Krai for the remainder of 
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the Soviet period.  The population numbers in 1959 were: Cherkess 8.6%, Karachays 24%, 
Abazins 6.6%, and Russians 51%, with ―titular-status‖ belonging to the Cherkess and Karachays 
(Gorenburg, 2001).   
 
Figure 7: Post 1957: Karachay-Cherkess Autonomous Oblast under Stavropol‘s Administration.  
Source: ―Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.‖ Chief Administration of Geodesy and 
Cartography: Ministry of Geology, USSR: Moscow (1967).  
 
All ethnic groups residing in their designated homelands were said to have ―titular-
status,‖ that is, the ability to claim certain rights in their territory and representation in Moscow, 
not afforded to non-titular persons.  By the end of the Soviet period, 93% of all non-Russians 
received homelands, and were thus able to claim titular status somewhere in the country (Roeder, 
1991).  However, by the 1970s, the Russian population began to decrease in Karachay-
Cherkessia due to the fact that Russians had a lower birth rate than non-Russians, and often 
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preferred to move out of the North Caucasus if given the opportunity (Richmond, 2008).  
According to Funch (1998): 
The creation of titular-nationalities and districts upon the break-up of the Mountain 
Republic was an upgrading of the already existing ethnic territoriality, and marked 
an important step in the ethnification of the North Caucasian peoples.  The 
promotion of ethnic identities became a Soviet model for achieving class-
consciousness, and became – as a Leninist supplement to monastic rapprochement of 
the different peoples of the country to become one ‗Soviet people‘ (p.98). 
 
Two key principles provided the basic foundations of Soviet nationalities policies were: 
Socialist Federalism and Korenizatsiya (indigenization).  Socialist Federalism was the Soviet 
Union‘s system of federal administration by which the country‘s territory was divided into a 
hierarchy of federal subjects: fifteen union republics, twenty autonomous republics, eight 
autonomous oblasts and ten autonomous districts (okrugs).  Although these territories differed in 
the amount of autonomy from Moscow they possessed, they were all created in order to serve as 
some sort of national territory or ―homeland‖ for one or more recognized Soviet ethnic groups.      
The term Korenizatiisa comes from the Russian word koren or ―root.‖  This policy, 
which was prevalent in the North Caucasus throughout the mid-1930s, essentially advocated for 
the promotion of local, non-Russian, languages and cultural elements in order to ease the 
transition to Soviet power.  Where tsarist policies of Russification were met with nationalist 
resistance, the Soviet concept is widely believed to promote a sense of national identity for 
indigenous populations, so as to provide a stepping stone to an all inclusive Soviet identity that 
would not be based on ethnicity, thus providing a solution to the national question.   
Korenizatsiia, according to Martin (2001), would 
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address the positive psychological needs of nationalism… It would also likewise 
disarm the negative psychological anxiety associated with the perception of foreign 
rule (p.12). 
Martin notes that both Stalin and Lenin had a deep psychological understanding of nationalism, 
and therefore wanted to make Soviet power seem ―intimate,‖ ―popular,‖ and ―compressible‖ to 
non-Russians, and that in order for indigenous populations to accept Soviet power, they had to 
see it as ―native.‖  Roeder (1991) suggests that the policy‘s real goal was to promote indigenous 
peoples into the Party and use them in administrative posts over their peers, thus creating go-
betweens that could be used in the governing of non-Russian areas.    
Hunter (2006) explains Stalin‘s policies for creating borders in the North Caucasus:  
Stalin adopted a policy of creating territorial units in which territorial boundaries did 
not correspond to ethnic realities and often gathered rival ethnic groups within a 
single political unit… Soviet authorities intentionally drew the borders such that 
ethnic tensions within political units would facilitate Moscow‘s control over the 
region (p. 113). 
 
Titular elites in power were conditioned by Soviet nationalities policies to prioritize 
ethno-cultural development, and in the context of the ethnic group as an organic unit, politicians 
sought to implement cultural revival policies in order to ensure the group‘s collective survival.  
Members of the titular political elite in each region sought to enact laws and adopt employment 
practices that would ensure that political power rested with members of their ethnic group, 
meaning that the territory ―belonged‖ to the titular group.   
It was in the elite‘s best interest not to cause trouble for ethnic-Russians living in their 
region or for that matter cause trouble for Russians in Moscow because they knew the reality was 
that they would eventually need support from Moscow to implement policies that would 
eventually benefit their respective groups (Gorenburg, 1999).  Gorenberg (1999) notes that 
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In all of the republics (including Karachay-Cherkessia), ethnic leaders took ethnic 
revival seriously and developed strategies designed to maximize the extent of ethnic 
revival that could be achieved without alienating members of non-titular ethnic 
groups or frightening the central government (p. 270).   
 
Karachay-Cherkessia is a good example of early Stalinist ethno-territorial policy.  Over 
Stalin‘s first ten to twelve years, nationalities were placed in territories two by two, creating 
potential for inter-ethnic discord (Funch, 1998).  Ethnic groups were also given an official 
hierarchy, which meant that they could be promoted and demoted by Soviet leaders.  Having two 
titular ethno-national groups in one republic mean than nationalism would focus toward one‘s 
own republic when shared titular status exists, rather than toward the country as a whole.   
The construction of ethnic institutions by the Soviet government in the 1920s is a 
particularly clear example of a situation in which institutions are imposed on a 
society according to academic and political considerations that do not take existing 
social networks and identities into account. In many cases ethnic homelands were 
created according to political expediency or the beliefs of Russian social scientists 
about minority ethnic identities (p. 74).  
 
The Soviet education system proved to be one such institution since Soviet power was 
established in the North Caucasus, as it was the primary vehicle by which young members of 
ethnic minority populations could be heavily exposed to Soviet nation-building ideology 
throughout the Soviet period (Gorenberg, 2001).  1960 saw the opening of the first Russian 
language schools, in which non-Russians could receive an education in their native languages.  
The goal of this policy was to create bilingual elite groups that could serve as go-betweens for 
the Soviet government and locals.  Nonetheless, Russian was needed as the language of 
communication among non-Russians, and local languages were again threatened (Richmond, 
2008).   
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 Minority students were separated from Russians in areas where they had titular status, 
educated in their native languages, and taught the culture and history of those whom the Russians 
claimed were of a direct genetic link to the Soviet-recognized modern variant of their group.  
However, by the 1970s, this strategy was almost non-existent in the North Caucasus.  Some 
scholars argue that the Soviet‘s ultimate goal with identity-building policies was to create a 
situation in which educated elites take on a cosmopolitan belief system, resulting in a decreased 
likelihood of ethnic nationalisms.  On the contrary, others argue that educating groups‘ members 
about their history and identity only reinforced a sense of collective exclusion and can lead 
support of nationalism.  According to Gorenberg (2001), 
In the Soviet Union the formation of close ties within particular social groups was 
encouraged by state-run organizations such as academic institutes, communist party 
cells, youth organizations, factories and collective farms.  The density of social ties 
is also closely linked to the strength of collective identity (p.76). 
 
Triesman (1997) suggests a down side to such Soviet education policies and their 
ramifications  because, in his view, traditional factors accentuating ethnic identification in other 
world areas, like modernization, migration, and conflict, were not as important in the Russian 
situation.  He argues that promoting more educated leaders in Republic governments would 
make them more likely to lobby for separatist movements by incorporating exclusive nationalism 
for their entire political units, thus undermining Stalin‘s original intentions for these territories.   
Triesman also notes that the Republics in the North Caucasus would logically be more 
prone to ethnic nationalism and separatism because they have international borders, either with 
Georgia, or with Azerbaijan.  However, inconvenient this geographical positioning might be in 
the contemporary context, it was not a factor in Soviet times, as these two newly independent 
states were then part of the USSR.   
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Ethno-Federalism and Territorial Policy in the Russian Federation  
When the Soviet Union disbanded in 1991, no autonomous republics, districts, or regions 
managed successfully to secede from Russia.  The only Soviet federal territories that gained 
independence were the 15 union republics.  Hale and Taagepera (2002) suggest several reasons 
for this situation.  First, Soviet leaders allocated more ―ethnic‖ resources on the union republics 
than on the autonomous republics due to their administrative rank, therefore Union republics had 
better institutions, their own academies of science for example, which put them in a better 
position to function independently from Moscow.  Second, leaders of the union republics could 
also more effectively mobilize for separatism than leaders of autonomous republics in the 
Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic.  Autonomous Republics were subordinate to the 
RSFSF, which was in turn subordinate to the USSR, therefore Autonomous Republics would 
have had to cut through two layers of state structure to free themselves (Hale and Taagepera, 
2002).   
 
Figure 8: Post USSR: Stavropol Krai and the Republic of Karachay-Cherkessia.  Source:  
National Atlas of Russia. ―The Republic of Adeghya, The Republic of Kabardino-Balkaria, The 
Republic of Karachay-Cherkessia, Krasnodar Krai, The Republic of North Ossetia-Alania, and 
Stavropol Krai.‖ Federal Service of Geodesy and Cartography of Russia: Moscow (2004). 
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Ethno-federalism is the Russian Federation‘s current model of administration, where the 
state is divided into territorial units based on ethnic populations, all of which are under some 
form of jurisdiction from the capital.  Different types of federal subjects exist, and their various 
rights and degrees of autonomy depend upon how they are designated.  For example, krais and 
oblasts have the least amount autonomy, being primarily populated by Russians, where 
republics, which have a majority non-Russian population, have the most autonomy.  Republics 
have the right to use official languages other than Russian and they have the right to their own 
constitutions and legal systems.   
Ethno-federalism was a logical system for the Russians to adopt, as it is quite similar to 
what the Soviets had already established.  Republics seemed potentially useful from the 
beginning because they emphasized political autonomy and culture for indigenous populations 
and soft economic transition for Russians (Bahry, 2002).  Prior republic autonomy under 
communism was the basis for ethno-federalism due to the fact that homelands and ethnic 
hierarchies were already in place, having been administered in such a fashion under Soviet 
Federalism.  However, the breakup of the Soviet Union and the end of communism meant a less 
centrally controlled political situation.  Lack of social control marginalizes the federal 
government as a locus of initiative in regime change, meaning that it essentially gives smaller 
entities or outsiders a way to gain power (Leff, 1999).  Also, the potential for less influence from 
Moscow opened the door both for democracy and local authoritarianism in the republics. 
Autonomous polities, like republics in Russia, are constructed like states, with similar 
bodies of governance and symbolic identity markers, but they serve as compromise that allows 
some kind of minority group to essentially form a nation-state within the territory of a larger 
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group, while at the same time, preserving the territorial integrity of the larger group.  According 
to Cornell (2002), 
When a central government grants autonomy to a given region, it acknowledges the 
devolution of a certain portion of its own sovereignty to the representatives of that 
region‘s population; the central government concedes that it no longer has unlimited 
jurisdiction over the territory – herein lies the essence of autonomy.  At the same 
time, however, the central government emphasizes the subordination of the 
autonomous region to itself in that the existence of the latter in no way compromises 
its own territorial integrity (p. 252).  
 
Russians residing in republics must deal with the fact that they are not in the republics‘ 
ethnic majority; however, they may draw upon the fact that they are still the overall dominant 
group in the Russian Federation as a whole.  Although most local Russians feel a sense of 
collective discrimination in access to government positions and quality jobs in republics, they 
still retain the overall economic advantage over non-Russians; however, titular groups have been 
able to use this special status to sure up political power, and in some cases (like the Cherkess) 
achieve disproportionate representation and advancement of their agendas in regard to their 
population (Bahry, 2002).  Thus, in the Caucasian context, ethno-federal policies have for the 
most part created potential conflicts, rather than preventing them (Cornell, 2002).       
According to Hale (2004), an even distribution of any dominant ethnic group is key in 
avoiding instability, and the chances of avoiding the most horrific large-scale violence and the 
prospects for sustained state unity in divided societies are significantly improved when ethno-
federal systems are crafted without core ethnic regions.  These core ethnic regions can cause 
instability and the breakup of ethno-federal states if they become a rival center of power, which 
is possible due to the dual power idea, crucial to ethno-federalism (Hale, 2005).   
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Two cities in Russia have special political status as ―Federal Cities‖: Moscow and St. 
Petersburg.  They constitute the major power centers of the country.  There is currently no major 
powerful Russian center surrounded by non-Russian federal subjects, suggesting the Russian 
situation to be potentially stable using Hale‘s concept.   
Another key concept for state stability is that the core region must not become a security 
threat to peripheral regions and core ethnic regions must not promote identity-based 
conceptualization of the core groups has having a political status separate from the ethno-federal 
state (Hale, 2005).  The ubiquitous nature of Russia‘s major political party, Yedinaya Rossiya 
(United Russia), is present in the Republics and its presence is sometimes far more noticeable 
than in Russian titular areas in terms of propaganda.   
Cornell (2002) notes that ethno-federal systems work best when civic identities are 
encouraged but the use of ethnicity in politics is discouraged.  The tried and true umbrella style 
civic identity in the Russian Federation is to be ―Rossiyanin.‖  To refer to oneself as Rossiyanin 
implies only to be a citizen of the Russian Federation, not necessarily to be ethnically Russian, 
which would be ―Russkii.‖  This civic identity is an important concept, as it allows any citizen of 
Russia to potentially recognize the entire state as their own, regardless of one‘s ethnicity.   
According to Lynn and Novikov (1997),  
the idea of federalism in Russian remains dominated by a focus on the constitutional 
importance of central state power and the political and economic importance of 
regional and local governments (p. 202).  
Ethno-federalism in Russia is based on a series of treaties and agreements between the center and 
its constituent units rather than on a constitution that binds the center and the regions together, 
which has produced a bureaucratic and asymmetrical system; prior to the Putin era (2000), the 
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Russian Federation did not demonstrate the ability to coordinate central authorities with federal 
subjects effectively, or individual republics to regional governments (Lynn and Novikov, 1997).  
Federalism became about preserving political connections and advantages among elites (Lynn 
and Novikov, 1997).   
Republics‘ actual degrees of autonomy have changed over the course of Russia‘s politics.  
Under Boris Yeltsin, governors could appoint the heads of federal bodies that existed in their 
territories, allowing them to go against federal power when they wanted.  In Stavropol, 
governors appointed security councils, which allowed them to avoid federal security procedures 
and internal affairs investigations in the Stavropol Krai.  At one point, the presidential 
representative (a federal post) was also held the position of deputy governor.  60 % of the 
presidential representatives serving outside of Moscow had to be replaced in 1997, due to the 
fact that they had all developed strong ties and conflicts of interests from their dealing with local 
powerful elites (Ross, 2003).     
According to Cornell (2002), 
The provision of institutional, territorial autonomy for an ethnic minority may cause 
the opposite of its intended effect – it may augment rather than deduce the potential 
for conflict between a minority and a central government (p. 276).  
 
This potential problem has been recognized by Putin‘s administration and been dealt with in his  
reforms.   
Putin, quoted here by Ross (2003), states:  
It is a scandalous thing when a fifth of the legal acts adopted in the regions contradict 
the country‘s basic law, when republic constitutions and province charters are at 
odds with the Russian constitution, and when trade barriers, or even worse, border 
demarcation posts are set up between Russia‘s territories and provinces. 
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Putin‘s reforms created seven new federal super-districts (that number is now eight with the 
recent addition of the North Caucasus Federal District), reformed the federation council, created 
a state council, granted powers to the president to dismiss regional governors and dissolve 
regional assemblies, granted new rights for regional governors to dismiss municipal officials, and 
brought regional legislative and republican constitutions into line with the Russian constitution 
(Ross, 2003).  Although Putin‘s decision regarding the tightening of federal control of the 
Republics received much western criticism,  in Russia the policy was promoted as being 
important for achieving stability; the strive toward stability has proven to be a major element of 
Putin‘s and United Russia‘s rhetoric.   
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Chapter II: 
Study Area, Local Factors of Ethno-National Identity, and Methodology 
 
The Study Area and Its Major Ethnic Groups 
The Stavropol Krai is among those federal territories exhibiting full integration into the 
Russian Federal System.  It is located among nine other Russian federal territories including: the 
Republic of Kalmykiya and the Rostov Oblast to the north, the Krasnodar Krai to the west, the 
Republic of Dagestan to the east, and the Republics of Karachay-Cherkessia, Kabardino-
Balkaria, North Ossetia-Alania, Ingushetia, and Chechnya to the south.  Stavropol‘s landscape 
ranges from flat steppe land in the north to the foothills and Front Range of the Caucasus in the 
south.  The territory has a total population of 2,231,759 (Russian All-Population Census, 2002), 
of which ethnic Russians constitute approximately 86 %.  Other ethnic populations relevant for 
this study include Nogay (20,680), Karachay (15,146), Abazin (3,300), and Cherkess (2,097).   
First established by the Soviets in 1922, the Republic of Karachay-Cherkessia exists with 
the autonomous status granted to republics over other federal territorial units of the Russian 
Federation (Constitution of the Russian Federation, Section 21).  Under Soviet rule, Karachay-
Cherkessia had the status of ―autonomous oblast,‖ which granted it some autonomy from 
Moscow, but not the maximum amount possible.  However, within the Russian Federation, 
Karachay-Cherkessia has ―republic‖ status, which allows it the greatest level of autonomy 
allowed within the country.  The republic‘s terrain is mostly mountainous, extending to the 
slopes of Mt. Elbrus, the highest point in Europe.  Karachay-Cherkessia is bordered by the 
Stavropol Krai to the north, Krasnodar Krai to the west, the Republic of Kabardino-Balkaria to 
the east, and shares an international border with Georgia to the south.  Of the 439,470 people 
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residing in Karachay-Cherkessia, 38.5 % claim their nationality to be Karachay, followed by 
Russian at 33.6 %, Cherkess at 11.3 %, Abazin at 7.4 %, Nogai at 3.4 %.    
 
Major Ethno-National Groups in the Study Area 
Cherkess (Circassians) 
Prior to the Russian conquest of the North Caucasus, Circassians were one of the region‘s 
major ethnic groups.  When the Russian army defeated the Circassians, 90% of the entire ethnic 
group as well as some of their allies were forcibly deported.  May 21, 1864 marked this mass 
deportation of Circassians out of the North Caucasus into Ottoman lands, which today constitute 
modern Kosovo, through Turkey, into Jordan, Syria, Palestine, and Iraq (Hewitt, 1999).  
Currently, around two million Circassians live throughout the Middle East and Eurasia, primarily 
in Turkey, Jordan, and Syria.  These various Circassian groups have managed to keep a strong 
sense of their ethnic identity, primarily through romanticizing their homeland (Richmond, 2008).   
The Circassians who were not exiled became three separate nationalities under the 
Russian Empire and then the Soviets: the Adyghe, Cherkess, and Kabardin nations.  These 
nations‘ members primarily inhabit three North Caucasus Republics in the Russian Federation 
today, Adyghia, Karachay-Cherkessia, and Kabardino-Balkaria respectively.  No completely 
Circassian political unit exists as Adyghia‘s population is around two-thirds Russian, and 
Cherkess and Kabardins both share titular status in their territories with Turkic nationalities, 
Karachay and Balkars respectively (Dunlop and Menon, 2006).  The case of the Circassians‘ 
division into three separate peoples has become known as the Soviet Nationalities policy of 
―divide and rule,‖ of which they are the prime example (Hewitt, 1999).  The Soviets created two 
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distinct Circassian literary languages in addition to dividing the remaining Circassian population 
into the three above mentioned administrative units.  The divide and rule policy eventually 
resulted in problems at the end of the Soviet period that were inherited promptly by the Russian 
Federation in the 1990s (Dunlop and Menon, 2006).  
The Cherkess became a national group when a number of Circassians were relocated to 
an area then known as Kuban Oblast which spanned from Mount Elbrus to the Sea of Azov with 
the capital of Ekaterinador (Krasnodar).  An area stretching from Mt. Elbrus in the south to the 
Kuban River in the north became the homeland for the Cherkess after the Circassians took on 
this name (Richmond, 2008).  According to the 2002 Russian Census, there were 49,591 
Cherkess in Karachay-Cherkessia but there were very few in Stavropol Krai.   
Circassian nationalism has existed in several forms over time, and of the various groups, 
Adyhe Khase, was the most influential (Richmond, 2008).  A ―pan-Circassian movement,‖ the 
group officially registered in Russia in March of 1990.  Their main goal was to reestablish 
Circassian culture, reform agriculture, and combat environmental issues; they also advocated for 
the reunification of all the Circassian peoples living in the former Soviet Union and repatriation 
of Circassians abroad, the descendents of those exiled by the Russian Empire (Richmond, 2008).   
 
Karachay 
Karachays often trace their history in the Caucasus back to the 11
th
 century, after the 
Turkic Kipchaks migrated there from Central Asia and Siberia.  Although they are closely 
related to the Balkars, another Turkic group in the North Caucasus, Karachays have historically 
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preferred to live in highland areas, and have thus remained relatively isolated relying on hunting 
and mining as opposed to agriculture (Richmond, 2008).   
WWII and its aftermath resulted in a great set of challenges for the Karachays after Stalin 
labeled them a ―traitor nation‖ due to alleged collaboration with invading Nazi forces in the 
Caucasus.  In 1943-1944 almost the entire Karachay nation (along with the Balkars) was forcibly 
deported to a series of camps in Soviet Central Asia.  During the ordeal, members of these 
groups were forbidden to exhibit many elements of their cultures, including use of their native 
languages and social customs.  Thirteen years later, the Karachays were granted permission to 
return to the North Caucasus. They faced new challenges of discrimination in their home 
republics after their return, but the deportations did serve to solidify separate identities between 
the two groups (Richmond, 2008).   
The question of how to treat Stalin‘s deportation of the Karachays is still relevant in the 
region‘s contemporary politics.  On April 26, 1991, Yeltsin signed the ―Law on the 
Rehabilitation of repressed Peoples.‖  This policy officially recognized all acts against the 
repressed peoples of the RSFSR by the Soviets as criminal.  The official Russian policy thus 
became the re-establishing of material, territorial, and cultural integrity of all nationalities that 
had been deported, back to the standards existing before the ―unconstitutional politics‖ that 
destroyed their Soviet recognized autonomous political units.  Although the law dictated the 
reestablishment of territories for those nationalities formally repressed, it also stated that no 
peoples who had not been deported, and who were currently residing in these territories, were to 
be disturbed (Richmond, 2008).  This policy is quite contradictory in that it essentially advocates 
for ethnic cleansing of former Karachay territory without authorizing such actions.      
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 In 1993, the ―Republican Commission for the Rehabilitation of the Karachay People‖ 
demanded compensation for historical injustices which totaled over 4 billion rubles.  On October 
30, 1993, a resolution that pledged to support economic and cultural development in the republic, 
especially for Karachays, was passed in Moscow.  Another act by Yeltsin in May of 1994, 
outlined allocation of funds for Karachays, and these two pieces of legislation proved to calm the 
separatist feelings (Richmond, 2008).   
 
Nogai 
The Nogai are a Turkic people native to the steppe lands of the Northern Stavropol Krai 
and the territories surrounding it.  They are thought to be a remnant of the Mongol Golden 
Horde, having split off around 1400.  According to the Russian Census of 2002, 20,680 Nogais 
lived in Stavropol Krai, and 14,870 liven in Karachay-Cherkessia.  Unlike the Karachays who 
have traditionally been highland dwellers, the Nogais traditionally practiced pastoralism and 
were semi-nomadic.  Nogais constituted just 3% of Karachay-Cherkessia‘s population in 1989 
and at that time were underrepresented in government.  They suffered from environmental 
problems, particularly from a water treatment plant located in the territory in which many Nogais 
resided (Richmond, 2008).   
―Birlik‖ (Nogai for ―unity‖) was founded in March, 1990.  The organization lacked 
members, but it had aspirations of uniting with another Nogai organization of the same name that 
existed in other areas of the North Caucasus.  Birlik advocated for the autonomy of Karachay-
Cherkessia from Stavropol Krai.  However, some members wanted a completely autonomous 
Nogai territory, while others wanted to remain an autonomous region within Karachay-
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Cherkessia and maintain ties with Nogai communities in Stavropol Krai.  The group did have 
some success with getting Nogai language taught in a few Karachay-Chekessia schools but 
accomplished little else (Richmond, 2008).   
 
Abazin 
Abazins were also among those deported to Ottoman lands by the Russian Empire after 
the Caucasian War.  Originally native to Abkhazia (Northwest Geogria), they remain an ethno-
linguistic relative of the Abkhaz.  Abazins have some autonomy in Karachay-Cherkessia, a 
response to protests in Cherkessk (Karachay-Cherkessia‘s capital city). However, Abazins are 
the only compactly settled historical population of the North Caucasus without a national 
territory or any kind of titular territorial status (Stepanov, 2000).  The 2002 census cites the 
Abazin population in Stavropol Krai to be 3,300 with an additional 32,346 in Karachay-
Cherkessia.   
Abazins formed a nationalist group called ―Apsadg‘yl‖ (Land of Abaza) in 1992.  The 
group sought to create stronger links between Abazin Diasporas and eventually achieve 
repatriation.  Another goal was to take back farmland that had been collectivized under the 
Soviets.  Having this land was seen as important for preserving ethnic cohesion, as Abazin youth 
who were migrating from rural areas to Cherkessk and strongly assimilating (Richmond, 2008).   
Russian (Cossack) 
Cossacks, known as ―warriors at the service of the Tsar,‖ began settling the Terek region 
in the 17
th
 Century.  They were the first Slavic peoples to inhabit the North Caucasus on a 
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permanent basis and are still viewed by contemporary Russians as a sub-ethnic group.  Some 
Russians simply think of them as mountain Russians or Slavs of the Caucasus.   
Cossacks‘ living areas were called stanitsas.  They lived in these areas by militaristic 
democratic principles and Orthodox Christian values. Adherence to Orthodoxy fueled the 
Cossacks general religious dislike for local Muslims, which meant that the Tsar could effectively 
use them to gain more territory (Yemelianova, 2005).  Modern Cossacks have gained ethnic 
recognition and have begun to take seriously their role as ―the guardians of ‗Christian‘ Russia‖ 
(Richmond, 2008).  A policy called ―On the Settlement of the Foothills of the Western 
Caucasus‖ was a plan in which indigenous peoples were resettled by Russian Imperial forces to 
make room for Cossacks settlers (Richmond, 2008).  Cossacks were favored by the Russian 
government, but the government also wished to destroy the militaristic aspects of their society.   
Under the Soviets, Cossack populations suffered territorial loss.  Favored by the Tsar, 
Cossacks had been given control of the best land in the lowland areas of Karachay-Cherkessia, 
having displaced the indigenous populations (Richmond, 2008).  Early Soviet territorial policies 
sought to rectify these actions, perhaps motivated to punish the Cossacks for their participation 
in the White Army during the civil war of the 1920s.   
In today‘s context, Slavic nationalist organizations claiming Cossack identity have 
emerged in Stavropol and Karachay-Cherkessia, and the increased militarization of these 
organizations has become a source of tension (Stepanov, 2000).  Two main groups have 
emerged: ―Rus‘‖ and ―the Slavs of Karachay-Cherkessia.‖ The Slavs of Karachay-Cherkessia 
sought to rehabilitate completely all who suffered repression under the Soviets.  They lobbied for 
interethnic cooperation, particularly with the Karachays.  Rus‘ in contrast was a very pro-
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Russian group that objected to the Republic being named for Karachay and Cherkess.  They 
gained strong support in 1992, speaking out against discrimination of Slavic peoples in the 
republic in education and the workforce.  After the passing of the Law of the Rehabilitation of 
Repressed Peoples, Cossack populations sought both to get their land back, and to reestablish 
some of the military aspects of their culture, their solution was the formation of local militia 
units.  These militias have set up training facilities and recruited some ultra nationalist members 
but remain relatively small in number.  It is unclear whether or not the particular groups have 
been involved in any legitimate hate crime activity.               
 
Important Processes and Identity Markers 
Language 
 Geographical isolation is often cited as a major reason not only for the Caucasus‘ ethnic 
diversity but also for its linguistic diversity.  Today‘s non-Russian population in Stavropol and in 
Karachay-Cherkessia is largely bilingual, speaking their historical native languages and also 
Russian which serves as the lingua-franca of the entire North Caucasus.  Russian has linguistic 
hegemony in the North Caucasus. It is the language of contact and commutation among all ethnic 
groups and is the native language of half the population of the North Caucasus and 84% of the 
Stavropol Krai (Lazarev and Pravikova, 2005).  Russian is designated as the official language of 
the Russian Federation, and has always been a medium of communication among different 
groups throughout the country.  
In the 1970s government-sponsored education programs resulted in the rise of 
bilingualism and fluency in Russian language among non-Russian groups of disadvantaged 
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status in the Soviet Union including the non-Russian groups in Karachay-Cherkessia (Jones and 
Grupp, 1984).  In the Republic (as of 2005), 42.4% of the population are native Russian 
speakers, and the non-Russian population exhibits what Lazarev and Pravikova (2005) refer to as 
―a symmetric titular-Russian bilingualism‖ (p. 1326).  In this situation, members of the titular 
ethnic groups are usually bilingual, both in their traditional native language, and in Russian.  
Good command of Russian is essential to social mobility beyond village life throughout 
the North Caucasus.  However, retaining knowledge of one‘s native language is also important 
for non-Russians as an identity marker.  In social situations, members of the same ethnic group 
often prefer to communicate in their native languages when in social situations, especially when 
intermixed amongst groups of Russians.  Using non-Russian languages may help to preserve 
ethnic heritage and strengthen social ties within the groups, but it also isolates these individuals 
as ―others‖ in mainstream Russian society.  Thus, non-Russian native languages, and choosing 
their use, can be important for recognizing one‘s own group and also in labeling individuals as 
―others.‖      
 
Migration 
Stavropol Krai is relatively large and stable. It is also the major financial and agricultural 
center of the North Caucasus region (Vendina, Belozerov, and Gustafson 2007).  The North 
Caucasus is one of the only regions in Russia that is not experiencing a decline in population.  
Migration has had a large effect on this fact, as both forced and voluntary migrations have had a 
great impact on the ethnic populations in the North Caucasus territories.  Migration has also 
promoted the growth of urban centers.   
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 Typically, the population of the North Caucasus has been measured by three main ethnic 
classifications: Russians, Caucasian nationalities, and non-Russian groups considered non-
indigenous to the region, such as Armenians, Germans, and Greeks (Vendina, Belozerov, and 
Gustafson 2007).  Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, three major trends in population 
dynamics have taken place.  Russians have seen their numbers decline, due to ethnic violence 
and ethnic policies of the republics that put them at a disadvantage.  Wars in Chechnya have 
created large populations of refugees (Russians and non-Russians) in many areas.  As titular 
nationalities within the Republics have grown along with other non-Russian populations, they 
have begun to migrate into territories that have traditionally been inhabited by Russians.   
 The population can also be described as being lowland or highland. Lowland areas are 
better for agriculture and are home to the all of the region‘s major cities as well as many of the 
larger villages. Karachays have traditionally occupied the highland areas, while Cherkess, 
Nogais, Abazins, and Russians have remained in the lowlands; however, after Stalin‘s 
deportations in the 1940s, the Republics‘ lowland population was around 95% Russian until 
deported nations were repatriated after Stalin‘s death (Richmond, 2008).  Significant economic 
differences between lowland and highland areas remain, and these patterns are similar to the 
discrepancies between urban and rural areas (Vendina, Belozerov, and Gustafson 2007).   
 
Economics 
Economically, Stavropol Krai is better off than all of the North Caucasus republics, 
although monthly incomes there are still just around 65% of the national average (Vendina, 
Belozerov, and Gustafson 2007). Likewise, Russians remain the overall dominant group in terms 
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of economics in the North Caucasus government subsidies play an important part in the regional 
economy in each political unit of the North Caucasus.  Subsidies from Moscow constitute over 
half of the regional governments‘ revenues in the republics; these funds are distributed directly to 
local authorities.  In Stavropol, government subsidies are distributed through several banks, 
including state-owned Sberbank (Vendina, Belozerov, and Gustafson 2007).  Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, Russian economists estimate that the informal sector of the economy in the 
republics accounts for between 60% and 80% of the republics‘ economic activity while only 
constituting 30% of Stavropol‘s. The city of Stavropol itself has also become known as the 
regional center of money laundering (Vendina, Belozerov, and Gustafson 2007).   
  
Heritage and Family  
Human settlement in the North Caucasus traditionally spread throughout the many 
valleys in the region which are relatively isolated.  These geographical conditions have 
historically presented challenges for trade and communication among populations and many 
scholars have cited this fact at a reason for the region‘s great ethnic diversity. This diversity has 
also resulted in some groups taking on tribal (clan) identities and alliances (Richmond, 2008.)   
The family unit has historically been viewed as a source of stability in the Caucasus and 
the identities of young men and women are often built on family ties and kinship.  This is true for 
all ethnic groups to some degree, as is the idea that one‘s blood relatives determine the identity 
of the individual; identifying one‘s-self within a group is secondary to keeping ancestral bold 
lines intact, prompting avoidance of mixed marriages (Rogozin, 2008).  North Caucasian society 
also tends to be extremely patronymic, perhaps partially due to local Islamic beliefs.    
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The Role of Islam in the North Caucasus 
The North Caucasus has historically exhibited great religious diversity through the 
widespread presence of Paganism, Christianity, Judaism, and Islam.  However, since the 19
th
 
century, Sunni Islam has become the North Caucasus‘s major religious movement having been 
strengthened by 18
th
 century incorporation of Islam into a platform for political independence 
(Aliyev, 2004).  Although there are some Shiite populations in the region, primarily those in 
closest proximity to Azerbaijan, Sufism has proven more influential along with Sunni beliefs.   
Sufism, unlike Shia and Sunni Islam, is not centered on the mosque.  Therefore, practicing 
Sufism was advantageous during the Soviet period when many mosques were destroyed, and 
Sufism therefore served to spark religiosity among the North Caucasus‘s national groups 
(Aliyev, 2004).   
 Potentially, religiously based violence in the North Caucasus might have a wider effect 
because there are many regions in Russia with large Islamic population.  The Russian 
government finds it difficult to deal with a situation in which it does not control the Caucasus.  
Its largely unsuccessful military campaign in Chechnya from (1994-1996) and the call for more 
military action yet again in 1999 has become a national embarrassment.  It has likewise given 
hope to other would-be separatists, and also to militant Islamic extremists who might have 
aspirations of manifesting their goals and philosophies in the Caucasus (Baran, 2001).    
Russia has over 14 million Muslims, with increased nationalist propaganda by pro-Slavic 
groups against them. A potential reaction by organized nationalist movements presents a serious 
security concern not only for the Caucasus but for all of Russia‘s Islamic territories (Dunlop and 
Menon, 2006).  However, most Muslims in the North Caucasus hold their local cultures in high 
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regard, and they are not likely to seek contact or identification with broader Islamist movements 
abroad.  An ―isolated Muslim elite‖ has not effectively promoted any kind of serious Islamic 
mobilization (Alyiev, 2004). Perhaps the most imminent danger in the region is a strong weapons 
market, since the dealing of weapons is relatively well tolerated by local authorities (Stepanov, 
2000).  It is also possible to find mercenary soldiers from the local population without recruiting 
militants from foreign Islamic countries (Stepanov 2000).   
  The assimilation of Caucasian Islamic populations into the Russian imperial fold was a 
complex process in which Russian leaders utilized various military, social, and territorial 
elements to maintain control over the region.  Usually, Russian policies involved some 
preservation of Islamic society while at the same time promoting local leaders that were easily 
monitored.  Having Russian-backed local elites in place provided stability. Since Russians had a 
real say in who was chosen to become local Islamic clergy, this situation allowed them to keep 
tabs on the emergence of anti-Russian Mullahs (Richmond 2008).  For example, Russians 
favored Sharia courts (as opposed to Russian Imperial courts) because they could be 
administered by local elites who were endorsed and monitored by Russian authorities.  Russian 
military control was also exercised in the Caucasus.  Russians would also often take hostages, 
convert them to orthodoxy (similar to the Ottoman‘s Janissary core), and then use them in local 
administrative positions, in military command, or as translators (Khodarkovsky 2008).  Another 
primary tool of assimilation used by the Russian Empire, and also later by the Soviets, was 
education.  However, some Islamic leaders were opposed to the Russian educational processes.  
Russian influence was against their way of life and Islamic schools outnumbered Russian 
schools until the Soviet period (Richmond, 2008). 
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After the Revolution in 1917, the Bolsheviks attempted to reach out to the Islamic 
populations of the former Russian Empire by labeling them equals in the workers‘ paradise.  
Muslim ethnic groups were even glad to see the Soviets come to power because of their promise 
of national self-determination (Hunter, 2006).  The Soviets established the Muslim Religious 
Board of the North Caucasus as a main center for local languages and culture.  The Board 
favored mosque worship and discouraged Sufism, but these elites remained relatively 
disconnected from the actual population.  This disconnect has proven advantageous for 
preventing nationalism and has been a common practice in the North Caucasus (Aliyev, 2004).   
Islam in general served as a common identity factor among most of the Caucasian ethnic 
groups.  It was therefore viewed as a potential road block for implementing Soviet anti-religious 
and nation-building policies.  These policies ultimately sought to undermine a shared sense of 
Caucasian Muslim identity thus continuing Russia‘s historical struggle against organized Islam 
(Khodarkovsky 2008).    Having a shared sense of religion in a situation where there was 
supposed to be no religion was though by the communists to lead to nationalism.  Soviet 
Muslims were the descendents of those who had been classified at enemies of Russia for 
centuries, and thus remained an element which marked Muslims as different from the majority 
population (Gorenburg 2001). 
 
National-Cultural Autonomy  
What various Russian scholars, such as Tishkov, refer to as ―national-cultural autonomy‖ 
is essentially the principle of self-determination and self rule of an ethnic group over its own 
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territory (a titular group), while still being under the federal jurisdiction of Russia.  According to 
Tishkov (1994),  
national-cultural autonomy, so conceived, allows us to realize this principle (all must 
benefit from the national-cultural arrangement, both titular and non-titular) to 
overcome limited possibilities for nation state organization (p.36). 
Thus, Republics, such as Karachay-Cherkessia, serve as quasi-nation states, allowing titular 
groups the right to rule themselves to some extent, while protecting the territorial integrity of the 
Russian Federation.   
Tishkov states that Tsarist Russia and the early USSR were somewhat successful in 
providing national-cultural rights on an ―extra-territorial‖ basis.  This process consisted of 
national institutions such as schools, print media, and religious organizations.  In 1920, national 
groups gained representation in state organs of power, including the highest executive entity, the 
People‘s Commission on Nationalities, over which Stalin presided.  Despite a torrid history with 
various invocations of the concept, national-cultural autonomy is regarded by contemporary 
scholars and statesmen as a way to solve ethnic problems at their core.  It allows for the 
satisfaction of cultural and religious demands from different groups and allows them to develop 
and preserve components of their ethnic identities (Tishkov, 1994).   
Another reason why National-cultural autonomy has historically been seen as favorable is 
that fact that it addresses problems of inter-ethnic rivalry such as territorial or border disputes 
(Tishkov, 1994).  However, in Karachay-Cherkessia, where we see two titular nationalities 
presiding over one territory with several other national groups are also present.  In this case, 
national-cultural autonomy has not been successful in preventing ethnic conflict and has even 
promoted it.  The roots of many conflicts in the North Caucasus go back to opposing principles 
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(which the Soviets exploited): the right to self-determination versus the sacredness of territorial 
integrity (Hunter, 2006).   
 
Methodology  
 To explore issues of identity, place, and homeland among the younger generation 
(individuals 16-30 years of age), I utilized a three part mixed methodology using both 
quantitative and qualitative data.  I collected survey data from 357 individuals in Stavropol and 
Cherkessk in which they ranked various factors of ethno-national identity regarding importance.  
I then analyzed group responses for significant differences using multivariate analysis of 
variance.  In the same two locations, I collected 322 free recall sketch maps.  These maps 
provided insight into participants‘ mental images of their homelands.  I coded the maps in terms 
of scale and content and used a chi-squared test to identity significant correlations between 
variables.  Finally, I conducted interviews with 40 participants regarding their opinions on issues 
of place identity and homeland.    
 
Data Collection  
I chose two locations for data collection.  The first is the city of Stavropol, which is the 
capital of Stavropol Krai.  The other was Cherkessk, the major urban center of the Republic of 
Karachay-Cherkessia.  I chose these areas for two main reasons.  First, urban areas provide the 
best pool of potential participants for my study due to their many universities which attract many 
young people from around the North Caucasus region.  Urban populations also tend to be more 
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educated, have had ample contact with other ethnic groups, and are often more aware of their 
identity in general (Botev, 2002).  Although rural residents of the region often make trips to the 
city, urban dwellers rarely leave it.  With limited time and means of travel, collecting data in the 
city provided me with the opportunity to collect data from both urban and rural participants.  
Additionally, because I used Russian for data collection, which is the lingua franca of the region, 
I was able to communicate with all of the participants directly.   
Second, my previous work experience provided me with connections and contacts 
through friends, my employer, and through our company‘s clientele.  These individuals included 
faculty and students at four local universities: Stavropol State University, Stavropol Medical 
College, Stavropol State Agrarian University, and the State University of Karachay-Cherkessia. 
By utilizing these contacts, I used a data collection strategy called ―snowballing‖ (Rivera, 
Kozyreva, and Sarovskii, 2002).   Also called a ―referral sample,‖ snowball interviewing or 
snowballing relies on personal contacts and introductions from participants.  New participants 
are referred to the interviewer by other participants, thus establishing contacts and credibility.  
This technique has been cited as the most efficient way to sample data in Russia (Rivera, 
Kozyreva, and Sarovskii, 2002).   There are several reasons for its effectiveness: there is a lack 
of access to information in Russia which makes locating respondents difficult, many Russians 
are apprehensive toward foreigners and interviews in general, and Russians tend to be suspicious 
of demographically-based questions (Rivera, Kozyreva, and Sarovskii, 2002).  Using snowball 
sampling, I was able to personally interview 40 participants.  Several of my contacts, including 
two university professors, allowed me to conduct my project with their students, providing me 
with a large amount of participants, especially non-Russians.  Several other contacts served as 
proxies, distributing surveys to individuals whom they knew to be in the target age group for the 
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study.  In addition to utilizing my contacts and going through proxy sources, I also personally 
gathered data from over 100 individuals directly through my company‘s clientele base and from 
public interactions in parks or around Stavropol and Cherkessk.   
Because issues of identity are multifaceted, it is impossible to devise a methodology that 
would expose all of the factors that are involved in identity formation.  To understand the widest 
range of factors, I proposed a mixed-methodology approach for collecting them and conducting 
the analysis.  I collected data in three parts: a survey, interviews, and a cognitive mapping 
exercise.  All participants with whom I conducted an interview also took part in the mapping and 
survey exercises.  Surveys and mapping exercises were distributed and collected by proxy 
sources until December, 2009.  Participants having taken part in the study after July, 2009 
responded only to the survey and or mapping exercise.  During my time in the field, I conducted 
all three parts of the study with any person willing to take part and was 16-30 years of age. The 
interviews were digitally recorded, unless the participant was uncomfortable with being 
recorded.  In such cases, notes were taken.    
 
Interviews  
  Speaking with participants one-on-one provided me with the opportunity to gain 
insights into why they answered survey questions and drew their maps as they did.  Interviews 
also provided information about national identity in the context of the North Caucasus that could 
have been missed by the standardized survey and mapping exercise.  Interviews yielded 
qualitative data that was useful in explaining the quantitative data.  I conducted all of the 
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interviews in Russian.  I speak Russian fluently and hold a B.A. in the language from Michigan 
State University.   
Interviews were given only after participants had completed the survey and mapping 
exercises.  I then asked them to elaborate on why they had chosen the values than they did, and 
why they had sketched their maps in the particular fashion that they had.  I also posed two 
additional questions to them.  I asked them whether or not a member of their nation could be 
born outside of Russia and still be considered to be the same as the participants in ethno-national 
terms.  I also asked whether or not one could choose his or her ethno-national identity.   
 
Survey Data 
I gathered quantitative data through surveys, which were I distributed myself during the 
summer of 2009 and throughout the first part of the 2009-2010 academic year with the help of 
colleagues in universities located in the study area.  Surveys and maps were collected by these 
individuals who took an academic interest in the project and agreed to help in data collection.   
In the surveys, I asked the participants to identify themselves in terms of nationality, 
gender, religion, native language, and place of birth and residence (appendix B).  They also 
indicated similar information regarding the background of each of their parents.  Participants 
were asked to use a Likert style scale (5-point), to identify their feelings regarding the 
importance of ten dependent variables to their conception of ethno-national identity 
(natsonalnost).  Assigning a value of ―1‖ indicated a response of ―absolutely not important‖ to 
―5‖ which mean ―very important.‖ 
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I selected the following non-placed based factors for national identity: Religious Belief, 
Native Language, Nationality of One‘s Ancestors (Heritage), Living Among Representatives of 
One‘s Own Nationality, and Living Among Representatives of Different Nationalities.  I based 
these selections on the works of several sociologists that identified these elements as the 
overriding factors important for making individual and group decisions regarding national 
identity. Both Weber (1922) and Smith (1986) recognize the importance of language, heritage 
and the perceived ethno-national identities of one‘s ancestors, and the effects of religion on 
group identification and mentality.  Living Among Representatives of One‘s Own and Other 
Nationalities was important to include based on Brubaker‘s (1995) conception of the 
nationalizing state.  Living among Russians might help spread the culture of ―the nominally 
state-bearing nation,‖ while living among members of one‘s own ethno-national group could be 
important for fostering group solidarity and preserving cultures of national minorities.    
 
Based on the biographical information collected from the participants, I divided them into 
ten binary data categories (0,1), which translated into ten independent variables: Territory 
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(Stavropol and Others vs. Karachay-Cherkessia), Nationality (Russian vs. non-Russian), Gender, 
Titular Status, Religion-Type (Islamic vs. non-Islamic), Practice of Religion, Birthplace (Urban 
vs. Rural), Living Place (Urban vs. Rural), Parents‘ Birthplace (same as participant‘s vs. 
different), and Mixed-Marriage (parents of different nationalities vs. parents of the same).  If 
participants did not complete the biographical information in all categories, their responses were 
not counted in these categories.   
―Territory‖ is an independent variable, dividing the participants into those from Stavropol 
and other territories (N=212) from participants from Karachay-Cherkessia (N=143).  The 
purpose of this category was to examine differences in responses from participants living in a 
republic, with autonomous status, to those living in a krai, which is under more direct federal 
control.  I included respondents who were from territories other than Stavropol or Karachay-
Cherkessia with those from Stavropol in order to keep the data form consistent and because their 
responses were gathered in Stavropol.    
The variable ―Nationality‖ was designed to examine differences in responses from 
Russians and non-Russians.  Self-identified Russians, regardless of any other factor were labeled 
―Russian‖ (N=145), while members of any other ethno-national group were labeled ―non-
Russian‖ (N=212). 
The variable ―Gender‖ was divided simply between males and females.  There were 96 
male respondents and 261 female respondents.  Gender is an important societal and geographical 
factor in the North Caucasus, primarily due to the emphasis of patriarchy in local non-Russian 
cultures (Rogozin, 2008) and due to the widely accepted gender roles in Russian society.   
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―Titular Status‖ was a variable designed to test differences between those living in a 
territory that is officially considered to be their ―homeland‖ in terms of current Russian policy, as 
well as through historical legacies.  Individuals with ―Titular-Status‖ (N=245), were defined as 
those currently residing in their home areas: Karachay and Cherkess in Karachay-Cherkessia, 
and Russians in Stavropol Krai.  Although whether or not Russians can ever really be considered 
a ―titular group‖ is debatable, I chose to include them because the principle is the same; they are 
living in a territory considered to be their homeland, which has been designated for them through 
the ethno-federalist system.  Those individuals with ―No Titular-Status‖ (N=111), are 
participants who do not live in their designated homeland territories.  These individuals included, 
for example: Russians in Karachay-Cherkessia, Cherkess in Stavropol Krai, or Abazins, 
Armenians, and Nogais in any territory. 
―Religion Type‖ was divided into ―Islamic‖ (N=194), and ―non-Islamic‖ (N=163).  I 
divided the data in this fashion due to the fact that the overwhelming majority of participants 
were either Orthodox Christian or Muslim; however, although a small number of participants 
self-identified as atheists, pagan, or another religion, all of them were Russian.  Therefore, for 
the purposes of consistency, the non-Islamic category includes Christians (95%) and others (5%).  
―Practicing Religion‖ was divided into ―Practicing‖ (N=76) and ―non-Practicing‖ 
(N=281).  These divisions were based on whether or not participants indicated going regularly to 
their respective places of worship, in this case either to a church or a mosque.   
―Birthplace‖ was divided into ―Urban‖ (N=97) and ―Rural‖ (N=260).  For the purposes 
of this division, those participants born in the study area were considered urban if they were born 
in Stavropol or Cherkessk.  Those participants born outside of the study area were considered 
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urban if their birthplace held the status of a regional capital (Elista for example), or if their city 
was larger than Stavropol (Volgograd for example).   
―Living Place‖ was also divided into ―Urban‖ (N=186) and ―Rural‖ (N=166), based on 
the same criteria as the previous variable.  The reason for including this variable in addition to 
birthplace was the hope of accounting for the fact that a large number of urban residents 
throughout the North Caucasus have migrated from rural areas (Belazorov, Tinkov, and Panin, 
2008).   
―Parents‘ Birthplace‖ was divided into participants who were born in the same local 
vicinity as their parents (N=180), and those who were not (N= 177).  I included this variable 
because I wanted to explore whether or not having previous generations of one‘s family 
(historical connections) from the same location influenced participants‘ opinions regarding 
place-based identity factors in particular. 
The variable ―Mixed-Marriage‖ was divided into those who had parents of different 
nationalities (N=30) and those who did not (N=327).  The goal of creating this variable was to 
test whether or not having a mixed-ethnic background was important for how one considers both 
place-based and traditional identity factors.       
I analyzed the data collected from the surveys in two ways.  First, I compared the average 
mean scores of the entire sampling group regarding their responses to each dependent variable.  
This simple strategy allowed me to rank the various identity factors in terms of their overall 
importance in the context of the entire study area.  Noting the mean differences between each 
category among the independent variables also allowed me to see which groups prioritized which 
dependant variable and to what degree.  I expected to find higher mean scores regarding Russian 
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territorial constructs, namely ―Living in the Russian Federation‖ and Living in the Southern 
Federal District‖ from Russians.  I expected non-Russians to prioritize the North Caucasus 
because of the large non-Russian population and prevalence of Islam.  I expected Native 
Language to be higher for non-Russians as well as Heritage and Religion because these factors 
serve as distinct identity markers that differ from Russian dominance.  Also, I expected that 
Religion would be more important to those who practice, and that Living in a Particular Krai or 
Republic would be more important to those with titular status, especially in Karachay-
Cherkessia.   
Second, I evaluated the data using multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA), which 
is useful  when testing for significant differences between group responses in situations where 
there are multiple dependent variables, in this case there are ten (Mertler and Vannatta, 2005).  I 
first considered utilizing MANOVA after seeing it used in previous studies to measure variables 
for multi-group identity (Dunbar, 1997).  I performed the MANOVA analysis using the program 
SPSS.  The null hypothesis for MANOVA testing is that there is so statistically significant 
difference between group responses.  Because I deemed each independent variable important 
enough to include in the study, I anticipated possibly rejecting the null in the case of each one. 
However, I most expect to observe significant differences between Russians and non-Russians 
regarding the importance of ―Living in Russia‖ and ―Living in the North Caucasus.‖  I also 
expected Islamic participants to significantly favor the nationality of their ancestors.  I was also 
expected that titular groups would favor their republics more than non-titular groups.   
In order to perform MANOVA, data must meet several assumptions.  One of these 
assumptions is that they are normally distributed (Rogerson, 2001).  I checked the distribution of 
each of the variables for normality based on their standardized skewness scores (skewness 
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divided by standard error).  Any variable‘s distribution having an absolute standardized 
skewness score of greater than 3.09 (p < .001, two-tailed) was considered not to be normally 
distributed and therefore needed to be transformed in order to conduct analysis.  
The distributions of ―Birthplace‖ showed positive skewness, while the distributions of all 
of the other variables exhibited negative skewness.  The variables ―Birthplace,‖ ―Living in the 
Southern Federal District,‖ and ―Living among Representatives of Other Nationalities‖ were all 
normally distributed.  The other (non-normally distributed) variables were transformed so as to 
improve normality.  The square root transformation was applied to ―Living in The Russian 
Federation‖ and ―Living in a Particular Krai or Republic.‖ The logarithmic (base 10) 
transformation was applied to ―Living in The North Caucasus.‖ ―Living Among Representatives 
of One‘s Own Nationality (Living Among Own)‖ underwent the inverse transform.  The 
variables ―Religious Belief (Religion),‖ ―Native Language (Language),‖ and ―Nationality of 
One‘s Ancestors (Heritage)‖ were dichotomized because no mathematical transformation could 
normalize these data‘s distribution. 
 
Cognitive Mapping Exercise  
The third element of data collection in my project utilized a technique known as ―free 
recall sketch mapping.‖  Free recall sketch mapping is a participatory mapping exercise in which 
research subjects are given a blank sheet of paper and asked to draw a cognitive map that is 
prompted by a question or instruction (Pocock, 1976).  Participants in my study were given this 
instruction: ―Schematically sketch your homeland, and label within it the three places that are 
most important for you and those close to you.‖  I expected to collect information on the territory 
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that a participant considers to be his or her homeland.  In total, I collected 322 sketch maps. This 
number differs from the number of survey participants due to the fact that not every participant 
chose to draw a map.   
I coded the maps in terms of 11 binary categories (―included‖ vs. ―not included‖) that 
occurred commonly or seemed to explain participants‘ conception of homeland.  The 
percentages of maps that included examples of each category were graphed compared to the 
percentage that did not include the same elements.  These percentages were then categorized 
according to the same list of independent variables used to analyze the survey results.   
First, I coded the sketches in terms of how they represented homeland.  If participants 
provided some kind of map with borders, thus thinking about homeland in terms of bounded 
territory, I considered that to be a map.  Other responses that did not include bounded territory 
showed various places, but not any certain territorial boundaries.  I also coded for cartographic 
accuracy, that is, whether or not participants those participants who sketched maps with bounded 
space made an attempt to draw descriptive borders, not just simple circles or squares.   
The next three groupings were based on borders.  I coded the maps for borders at three 
different scales: Federal, Regional, and Local.  Federal Scale borders are those of the Russian 
Federation.  Regional borders were those that represented either a concrete regionally 
administered territory, such as a krai, republic, or federal district, or a sub-regional border, such 
as ―The South‖ or the North-Caucasus region.  Local borders were bounded space around a city, 
village, or neighborhood.   
I also coded for places using the same three scales.  Federal places, or places important to 
The Russian Federation, not located in the study area, such as Moscow and St. Petersburg were 
71 
 
noted in this category.  Regional places were places located within the study area, such as 
Stavropol, Cherkessk, or particular villages.  Local places were those denoted within city of 
village settings.  These places included schools, places of work, and parks.   
The next three categories reflected certain kinds of places that appeared on the sketch 
maps.  Religious places were noted when the participant depicted a church, mosque, or holy site.  
Physical features in the landscape were coded for important places like mountains, rivers, and 
forests.   Finally, ethnic symbols were coded as either places important to national heritage that 
were not religious, such as monuments or memorials, or national symbols included in the 
sketches, such as a Russian flag, or the flag of Karachay-Cherkessia.   
I then conducted a chi-squared test, using SPSS to cross tab the same categorical 
variables I used for the survey data: Territory, Nationality, Titular-Status, and so on, with the 
eleven coding classifications of the sketch maps: ―Map,‖ ―Cartography,‖ ―Russian Federal 
Border,‖ ―Regional Border,‖ ―Local Border,‖ ―Federal Place,‖ ―Regional Place,‖ ―Local Place,‖ 
― Religious Place,‖ ―Landscape Feature,‖ and ―Ethnic Symbol.‖   
I selected a chi-squared test because I wanted to test for significant correlations between 
groups in including the examples of these various categories in their sketch maps.  The data, 
being entirely binary in this case, met all of the assumptions for conducting a chi-squared test 
(Rogerson, 2001).  I conducted the analysis with SPSS, reporting not only significant chi-squared 
values, but also the Mantel-Haenszel Common Odds Ratio Estimate, which describes the likely 
hood of one categorical sub-group including one of the mapping categories on their sketch versus 
the other.  For example the likelihood of Russians including the borders of the Russian 
Federation as opposed to non-Russians.   
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Overall, I expected to that Russians would draw the borders of the Russian Federation 
more often than non-Russians because Russians can logically invoke both the concepts of civic 
and ethno-national identity when considering federal scale conceptions of Russia as homeland.  I 
expected non-Russians to be more focused on regional or local constructs. Regarding the 
differences between Stavropol Krai and Karachay-Cherkessia, I expected to see participants from 
the republic to be focused more on Karachay-Cherkessia than on Russia, and I expected non-
titular groups to focus on the landscape, rather than on political borders.  I expected participants 
from urban environments to use borders and cartographic accuracy more than rural participants.  
I also expected non-Russians, especially Islamic participants, to include symbols and landscape 
features more than Russians and expected to see religious places appear more frequently on the 
maps of those who practice their religion.   
 
 
73 
 
Chapter III: 
Examining Factors of Ethno-National Identity in the North Caucasus 
 
 In this chapter, I highlight and discuss various elements of ethno-national identity as they 
were considered by the participants in my study.  One of my main objectives in this study is to 
explore how place-based identity markers (birthplace, and living in Russia, the Southern Federal 
District, a particular territory, or the North Caucasus region)  factor into the participants‘ 
conceptions of ethno-national identity.  Another goal is to examine how place-based elements 
compare with other, non-place-based (language, heritage, religion, living among one‘s own and 
different groups) components of ethno-national identity.  I asked respondents to rank each 
element in terms of its overall importance to his or her personal conception of ethno-national 
identity (natsionalnost) on a five-point scale.  The scale measured importance with an answer of 
―one‖ meaning ―absolutely unimportant,‖ to ―five,‖ meaning ―very important.‖  Choosing to 
rank an element with a score of ―three‖ showed that it was neither particularly important nor 
unimportant.  I compared the mean average rankings of all the elements so as to present an 
overall ranking of them in terms of the entire study area.   
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Figure 9: Average Means Scores Regarding the Importance of Each Dependant Variable. 
 
 I wanted to examine place-based elements of ethno-national identity in terms of how they 
form a spatial or territorial context for ethno-national identity.  Being from somewhere is a 
potential component that everyone can consider regarding how one self-identifies.  I intended to 
explore what living in certain places meant to participants in terms of their own personal and 
perceived group attachments.  I also wanted to check whether some territorial distinctions were 
more meaningful that others.  Political boundaries for example reflect scales of territory and 
authority in Russia, therefore different territorial delineations (the Russian Federation, federal 
district, krai or republic) hold potentially different meanings among the various groups in the 
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study.  All boundaries are constructed to include some and exclude others, the scales to which 
participants ascribe points to territorial scales at which they consider themselves included.   
 Elements of ethno-national identity that are not based on place, such as language, 
religion, and heritage, cannot be completely separated from it.  All of these components exist in 
some spatial context but are also able to transcend territorial boundaries.  However, by asking 
participants to rank them using the same sale as place-based elements, it is possible to compare 
how they factor into conceptions of ethno-national identity.  Non-place-based elements, 
especially language and religion, are important for one‘s moral character, and even how one 
thinks.  Heritage is important because it factors into one‘s conception of his or her historical 
homeland, as well as providing historical justification for associating with a particular ethno-
national group.   
 Using multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA), I was able to identify several 
statistically significant differences in how various groups of participants ranked elements of their 
ethno-national identity.  Through interviewing participants regarding their responses, I gained 
insight as to why these differences may have occurred.  I also attempted to prompt participants to 
consider ethno-national identity in the context of homeland.  I did so to explore their views on 
whether one who exhibits non-place-based identity factors alone constitutes a member of their 
group.  I now present the results of the MANOVA analysis and show how they relate to 
important theoretical concepts in political geography.   
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Place-Based Elements of Ethno-National Identity 
In Knight‘s (1982) discussion of identity and territory, he writes of territorial regulation, 
suggesting that society has different meaning at different scales.  He claims that the main aspect 
for territorial acknowledgment is the establishment of authority over social order.  All of the 
places with which people can identity have their own positions in the Russian federal system, but 
can be inclusive or exclusive to certain groups of people.  Karachay-Cherkessia has meaning 
because authority exists over its space and social order.  However, whether Moscow actually 
represents a higher form of authority in the minds of the populace there may be disputable.  This 
is not to say the residents of the Stavropol Krai, a Russian territory, automatically recognize 
Moscow.     There are many place-based elements that an individual or group could factor into 
their conceptions of identity.  I identified five such factors that are important to consider in the 
context of Russian ethno-federalism, and specifically in the North Caucasus: Birthplace, Living 
in the Russian Federation, Living in the Southern Federal District, Living in a particular Krai or 
Republic, and Living in the North Caucasus.  These places all constitute possible territorial 
contexts to which an individual or group could relate.   
The meanings of spatial scales can differ greatly.  As Kaplan (1999) suggests, people in a 
given region form hierarchies of geographically based identities. Such hierarchies are important 
in the North Caucasus because it constitutes a distinct physical and cultural region that exists 
among various political territories. Some groups might be more likely to affiliate with their 
birthplace rather than with their Federal District, while others might consider their identity in a 
federal sense, as having an overall Russian civic identity before associating with their city or 
region. 
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  When considering identity in terms of place, it is important to remember that all other 
factors of identity, whether they are language, religion, or any other, exist within some kind of 
spatial context.  This notion is especially true when considering the idea of a nation.  As Herb 
(1999) reminds us, territory provides tangible evidence of a nation‘s existence.  One‘s living 
place also provides a set of environmentally-based perceptual filters that can influence all of the 
other elements of identity.  Therefore, whether or not place-based identity factors are as highly 
regarded as traditional non place-based factors, it is helpful to consider place, scale, and spatial 
context when considering identity.   
 
Birthplace 
Birthplace is perhaps the most intimate and concrete place-based identity factor.  Where 
one is born often determines his or her citizenship, and therefore his or her civic identity.  Being 
from somewhere automatically puts a person, to draw from Staeheli (2003), ―in-place‖ or ―out of 
place.‖ This designation depends on particular meanings of the place in which someone was born 
and also on characteristics of the individual.  People are likely to carry with them the stereotypes 
associated with their birthplace, and perhaps also its accents, and customs, and even mentality.  
Birthplace can bring with it social expectations especially in a cultural crossroads like the North 
Caucasus. 
Birthplace received an overall mean average of 3.42, making it the seventh most 
important factor of identity and the fourth most important factor out of the five place-based 
identity factors.  Differences in how groups responded regarding birthplace were significant 
between those with titular status (including Russians in Stavropol and other Russian territories) 
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and those without.  Significant differences also existed between those born in the same place as 
their parents and those who were not.   
 Participants with titular status, meaning that they are living in a territory designated for 
their group, reported an average mean score of 3.52, while those without titular status reported an 
average mean score of 3.17.  One reason for the importance of birthplace to those with titular-
status might be linked to old system of internal passports in Russia, where an individual‘s 
nationality is listed in his or her official documents noting the importance of civic identification.  
This theme appeared common throughout the interviews.  Participant 146, a Russian man from 
Stavropol, said: 
Birthplace is very important.  For example, if you were born in the territory of a 
European country, you would have citizenship in the EU, if you had Russian parents, 
you would get dual citizenship. If you were born in the Russian Federation, but then 
live in any other country you would continue to be Russian. 
Participant 144, a Russian woman from Stavropol, said: 
The nationality of one‘s parents is a more important factor than birthplace, but by 
law, if you are born outside of Russia, you are not Russian.  Well, you are not 
Russian by passport, but you are by nationality. 
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Figure 10: Average Mean Scores Regarding the Importance of Birthplace between Titular and 
Non-Titular Participants. 
  
Considering birthplace important for the purposes of documentation, citizenship or titular-
status supports the idea that one is born into a particular nationality. Having the right birthplace 
can thus provide someone with all of the civic elements of nationality important for membership 
in most nation-states.  While some participants admitted that they saw one‘s nationality as a 
choice, others stated that everyone is born into a certain nationality, seeing it as something that 
cannot be changed.  This variety of opinions illustrates the confusing issue of civic identity 
versus ethnic identity and how in the Russian context these two ideas are easily confused.  Some 
participants also equated being born into a certain nation as having both physical and 
metaphysical importance.   According to participant number 38, a Russian woman from 
Stavropol: 
People do not pick their nationality, it is from God.  We do not have a choice, our 
nationalities are predetermined.  
According to participant 32, an Armenian woman born in Armenia but living in Stavropol: 
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Well, maybe the soul of a person can become someone else, but physically, by one‘s 
roots, one cannot change his or her own history.  If one‘s grandfather is an Armenian 
or a Greek, he cannot change that.  Maybe God can change it, but people cannot!   
 
 
Figure 11: Mean Averages Regarding the Importance of Birthplace between Participants Born in 
the Same Place as Their Own Parents and Those Not. 
 
There was also a significant difference between participants from the same place as their 
parents (M=3.74), and those born in a different place (M=3.08).  The interviews echoed this 
theme, as being born in an ethnically Russian territory possibly served as a determinate for one‘s 
nationality.  Participant number 40, a Russian woman born in Stavropol said: 
Birthplace in my view completely matters for my nationality and for my behavior.  I 
am Russian.  Well, my dad was born in Stavropol Krai, in the city of Stavropol, but 
all of his family has roots native to the republic of Mordovia, so therefore you could 
technically designate his nationality as Mordvin.  He does not use their language, he 
can only slowly pronounce a couple of words.  
Participant number 41, a Russian woman from a small village in Stavropol Krai, said:  
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I believe that one‘s birthplace is important not only for distinguishing his or her 
nationality, even more so than by living in another place.  Even if a Russian person is 
born outside our borders, if he were born here, he is Russian.   
 
Something important to consider regarding one‘s birthplace is that many of the participants 
were in fact born not in the Russian Federation, but in the Soviet Union.  Because all of the 
participants‘ parents were born in the Soviet Union, their parents‘ conceptions of birthplace fall 
into a different territorial and political context.  However, many of the territorial boundaries and 
places names within the former RSFSR remained the same after the collapse, allowing Soviet 
Stavropol to be considered as the same entity as contemporary Stavropol.  The discrepancy 
between Soviet and post-Soviet birthplaces was a concern primarily to those who were born 
outside of the RSFSR.  Participant 57, an Armenian born in Baku, said:  
I was born in Baku, part of Azerbaijan, but when I was born it was still the Soviet 
Union, so it (nationality) did not matter very much. 
According to Participant 36, a Russian: 
I was born in Kazakhstan, in the Soviet Union.  So, it does not bother me to live in a 
federal district, or abroad.  It is not important where one lives in order to have a 
Russian soul. 
Here Participant 36 has been forced to consider her ethno-national identity more in terms of non-
place-based factors due to the fact that she sees herself as not having been born in Russian space.   
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Living in the Russian Federation  
 
Living in Russia as a place-based identity factor relates to recognition of Russian society 
at the state-level, representing what Knight (1982) would call a high level of authority over 
social order.  Federal authority is the highest level of social order within the Russian state.  
Living in Russia also matters in terms of human-security.  As O‘Lear (2007) suggests, state 
authorities are ultimately responsible for making policy and decisions that will directly affect 
that human security of the populace of the state.  In an area prone to ethnic violence like the 
North Caucasus, security constitutes a legitimate concern.  The deployment of OMON (special 
purpose police unit) security forces, a federal service, is a typically response to such threats.  
Moscow is also responsible for providing economic security in the North Caucasus, as half of the 
republics‘ income is received in the form of federal subsidies (Belozorov, Tinkov, and Panin, 
2008).  Therefore, protection and economic welfare provided from Moscow might work to 
solidify the conception of Russia as being important for the well being and security of one‘s 
ethno-national group.  However, participants ranked living in Russia as one of the lowest overall 
identity factors.   
Despite being the only identify factor to which every participant in the study could relate, 
―Living in Russia‖ was only the sixth overall most important identity factor with an average 
mean score of 3.52, and it ranked third in importance among overall place-based identity factors 
to ―Living in the North Caucasus‖ (3.64) and ―Living in a Particular Krai or Republic‖ (3.58).  
Russia has borders, print-media, national broadcasting, currency, law, and citizenship.  Perhaps 
more importantly, the Russian Federation represents space that is not hostile to Russians, 
suggesting Passi‘s (1996) concept of meaning in terms of ―cultural shape‖ and Staeheli‘s (2003) 
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being ―in place‖ or ―out of place.‖ Theoretically, Russians could likely feel ―in place‖ in Russia, 
where their cultural shape exists. Non-Russians may not recognize their own cultural shape in all 
of Russia, causing them to be ―out of place.‖  Republics in Russia and the concept of national 
cultural autonomy constitute a territorial and political compromise on this issue.      
 The possibility of equating one‘s own sense of ethno-national identity with the grandeur 
of the state is clear.  The extent to which state symbols and propaganda in the Russian Federation 
are targeted toward ethnic Russians (Russkiye) as opposed to the entire citizenry is contentious.  
However, most scholars agree that in post-Soviet space, the abundance of exclusive nationalist 
movements has increased, and many critics have accused government figures of playing into the 
hands of the pro-ethnic Russian agenda.  Therefore, when thinking about Russia as an entity and 
a place at the federal level, ethnic Russians have the possibility to fuse their nationality and their 
citizenship, while non-Russians must rely solely on their status as citizens of the country.  It is 
perhaps not surprising that the analysis showed a significant difference in the responses of 
Russians and non-Russians regarding the importance of living in The Russian Federation to their 
sense of national identity.  Russians, with a mean value of 3.89, prioritized living in Russia to 
non-Russians, with a mean of 3.26.   
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Figure 12: Mean Averages Regarding Living in the Russian Federation Between Russians and 
Non-Russians. 
 
Russian interview participants provided much insight into how they relate to the role of 
living in Russia regarding identity.  Many respondents prioritized Russia at the federal scale to 
regional or local scales in terms of importance.  Participant 176 said,  
―To be Russian, a person has to be born precisely in Russia.  A person must also be 
raised here in order to be considered Russian.‖  
Participant 154 commented:  
For the purposes of national identity, I think it is important to live in a particular 
country, different regions are interchangeable.  Many people change regions for 
work, or to study, so that is why living in a particular region is not so important. 
According to Participant 146,   
―Local places are completely unimportant, Russia is big.‖  
These comments emphasize size and mobility.  Russia‘s territory is the most expansive in the 
world, and Russian citizens are for the most part free to move around within it, meaning that any 
part of Russia is their potential living place and thus part of their ―imagined community‖ 
(Anderson, 1983).  Participant 151 stated: 
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Homeland plainly singles out nationality.  Living in the Southern Federal District 
also does not really mean much.  I have lived in Moscow.  Living in the North 
Caucasus is the same, and living in a particular Krai or Republic also.  What is 
important is that it is in Russia.   
 
Many Russians indicated that it is imperative for a Russian to live in Russia, suggesting 
that someone who was born outside of the Russia was not completely Russian. This emphasis on 
the territory of the Russian Federation shows that the idea of Russia as a nation-state is taken 
seriously in terms of identity.  Herb (1999) reminds us that defined territory is an important 
identity marker for a nation because it provides tangible evidence for the nation‘s existence.  Not 
being born in Russia may already be grounds for being an ―other,‖ lacking the specific cultural 
context of Russia and not being connected to Russian territory as a tangible entity.  Participant 
34 commented on the Russian cultural context by saying:  
Living in Russia helps a person understand the traditions and culture of Russia, 
especially in the middle of Russia, in the villages where they can get their 
information. 
 Participant 76 said:  
It is more important to socialize with Russians, even outside the border… but then, 
well they [Russians abroad] lose something Russian (Rossiskoe).   
His use of the term Rossiskoe indicates that he is referring to a sense of civic belonging in the 
Russian Federation, rather than belonging to the Russian ethnic group.  In other words he feels as 
though Russians outside of Russia, although having similar identity factors, religion, language, 
are lacking a social and cultural context that is exclusive to the Russian Federation as a country, 
and therefore to Russia as a tangible place.  Participant 42 added: 
Living in the Russian Federation plays a role, Russians in America for example are 
not completely Russian.   
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All of the non-Russian participants in the study are either members of nations that exist 
primarily within the Russian Federation, have large Diasporas in Russia, or have republics within 
Russia.  All of them have had historical experience with both the Russian Empire and the Soviet 
Union.  Therefore, living in Russia could have some meaning to their ethno-national identities.  
However, non-Russians preferred to identify more closely with regions that were closer to their 
particular nation‘s perceived native land.    
Another significant difference appeared among Islamic and non-Islamic respondents.  
Non-Islamic participants averaged a mean score of 3.75, while Islamic participants had a mean 
score of 3.13.  The similarities between Islamic and non-Islamic and Russian non-Russian are 
great in this study due to the fact that these groups only differed by 18 individuals, most of 
whom are Armenians living in Stavropol.  Nevertheless, it appears that living in Russia is an 
element favored by those who do not claim Islam as opposed to those who do.  This distinction 
reminds us that the North Caucasus not only demarcates Russian space from non-Russian space, 
but also Islamic space from non-Islamic space.   
 
Figure 6: Average Mean Scores Regarding the Importance of Living in Russia between Islamic 
and Non-Islamic Participants. 
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―Living in Russia‖ was also significantly more important to those individuals born in the 
same region as their parents and previous generations of their family.  These participants 
averaged a mean of 3.67, while those with parents born in places different than their own 
averaged 3.37.  As was the case with all of the place-based identity factors, those with previous 
generations of relatives from the same regions as themselves averaged a higher mean than those 
who did not.   
 
Figure 7: Average Mean Scores Regarding the Importance of Living in Russia between 
Participants Born in the Same Place as Their Parents and Those Not. 
 
Living in the Southern Federal District 
The Southern Federal District (SFD), or Yuzhnij Federalnij Okrug, is one of the seven 
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when I was collecting data in 2009, both Stavropol Krai and Karachay-Cherkessia were part of 
this district.  However, in the Fall of 2009, Russian president Dmitry Medvedev announced the 
formation of a North Caucasus Federal District to which both Stavropol and Karachay-
Cherkessia were assigned.  Perhaps the fact that the SFD was a relatively new construction, and 
as stated by the actions of the Russian government, not a particularly useful one, explains why 
this was the identity factor that the participants found least important overall.  Living in the SFD 
received a mean score of only 3.33.  However, an average over 3.00 does indicate that more 
participants found it relatively more important than unimportant, showing they were not neutral 
regarding even the least important place-based identity factor.        
Some of the interview participants responded to the SFD mostly in aesthetic terms, most 
likely equating this category to ―The South of Russia,‖ rather than with this particular political 
entity.  Participant number 64, a Russian woman from Stavropol, said: 
It [the SFD] is not really important because there are many beautiful places in the 
North and in Central Russia.  
Participant 65, another Russian woman from Stavropol, said: 
 I look at living in the south not from the viewpoint of living among many 
nationalities, but in terms of comfort factors.  We have better weather here (than in 
the North).   
 
Most of the interview respondents seemed indifferent about living in the Southern Federal 
District.  However, one participant, number 10, noted a spatial divide in Russian culture by 
saying:   
The Southern Federal District is important because someone who has lived here long 
enough understands how southern culture differs from other regions of Russia. 
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Despite its poor ranking compared to the other identity factors, there were two significant 
differences between groups regarding living in the SFD.  Islamic participants (M=3.64) favored 
it over non-Islamic participants (M=2.97).  Interestingly, the difference between Russians and 
non-Russians was not significant regarding this factor.  The differing opinions of Islamic and 
non-Islamic respondents might reflect how each group views the SFD as a political and or 
territorial entity.  Because it is a federal district the SFD is under the direct subordination of 
Moscow, acting as the first line in the regional chain of command post-Putin.  Therefore, if the 
SFD were recognized in terms of authority it is more likely that Russians would have prioritized 
it higher than non-Russians.  However, the reasons why Islamic respondents found the SFD more 
favorable are likely linked to the fact that the entire North-Caucasus sub-region was located 
within the SFD, giving this district a relatively high percentage of Islamic residents compared to 
some other Federal districts. Population dynamics may have lead to The SFD being viewed as 
Islamic space, within Russia. The cultural shape of this territory is more important to Islamic 
participants in terms of federal political territories.    
 
Figure 8: Average Mean Scores Regarding the Importance of Living in the Southern Federal 
District between Islamic and Non-Islamic Participants. 
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Living in a Particular Krai or Republic   
 The identity factor “Living in a Particular Krai or Republic‖ received the second highest 
mean average (M=3.58) of the place-based identity factors and it was the sixth most important of 
the ten total factors.  Although there were significant differences among two of the dependent 
variable groupings, Islamic versus non-Islamic and Same Birthplace as Parents versus different, 
there were no significant differences between participants from Stavropol Krai and Karachay-
Cherkessia.  This lack of a significant result is important because it shows no significant 
difference in how the residents of these two different federal territories view Stavropol Krai and 
Karachay-Cherkessia in terms of ethno-national identity.  In other words, the participants‘ 
responses from Stavropol Krai did not differ from those taken from Karachay-Cherkessia, 
suggesting that living in either a Krai or a Republic significantly differ to their respective 
populations in terms of importance.     
 Being born in the same place as one‘s ancestors is significant.  Such participants 
averaged a mean of 3.83, while participants not born in the same place as their parents answered 
with an average of 3.34.  Participant 65 commented  
―Here (Stavropol Krai) is important because my family lives here, my ancestors lived 
here.‖ 
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Figure 9: Average Mean Scores Regarding the Importance of Living in a Particular Krai or 
Republic between Participants Born in the Same Place as Their Parents and Those Not. 
 
There was also a significant difference between Islamic and non-Islamic participants.  
Islamic participants favored living in their krai or republic, averaging a mean of 4.13, to non-
Islamic participants, who averaged a mean score of 2.97.  The fact that a significant difference 
appeared in this variable in accordance to religion and not to ethnicity again reinstates the 
concept of the break between Christian and Islamic space.  There are perhaps enough non-
Russians in Stavropol to skew the results away from a significant finding for either the variables 
―Nationality‖ or ―Territory,‖ but not enough Russians or other Christians from Karachay-
Cherkessia to sway the data from the republic.  The non-Russian titular groups in republics have 
a very limited amount of territory that they can officially claim as ―their own,‖ making them 
likely to associate themselves with their republic.  Minority groups with no titular status 
technically have no territory to claim, leading them to associate with non-place based identity 
factors.  In this case, the association is with their religion, specifically Islam.     
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Figure 10: Average Mean Scores Regarding the Importance of Living in a Particular Krai or 
Republic between Islamic and Non-Islamic Participants 
 Russians were rather indifferent in their answers regarding this factor.  In fact, living in a 
particular krai was the second least important factor for Russians as a group, more important 
only than living in the North Caucasus.  This result is perhaps not surprising because Russians 
have many federal territories in which they are the majority ethnic group and which are officially 
considered Russian territory: krais and oblasts.  Participant number 64 commented:  
I could easily live comfortably in any place in Russia, like Krasnodar Krai, or 
Moscow, in St. Petersburg, in Kamchatka.  
She emphasizes here that the particular type of territory is not important, as long as it is some 
kind of Russian federal territory.  Participant number 66 said:   
Living in Stavropol Krai is important to me, but to our brothers elsewhere in the 
country it would not make a difference.  A Russian could come from any given krai 
or republic.  
Here, republics are grouped together with other territories under the term Russian, implying that 
it is not important whether a Russian comes from ―Russian territory.‖ 
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Although Russian respondents tended not to care about being from Stavropol Krai, except for 
family connections and aesthetic elements, several respondents did make clear distinctions 
between Stavropol (and other Russian territories) and Republics.  According to Participant 59:  
Russia is a very big country, I am proud that I was born in Stavropol Krai.  
Therefore, it is important to me.  If I had been born in another Krai or Republic, like 
in Karachay-Cherkessia for example, it would make a difference.  The differences 
would be primarily physical.  They are darker there.  In Stavropol Krai, people are 
different.  I think Karachay-Cherkessia and the republics are Russian.  Actually, The 
Caucasus region is Russian. 
The opinion of this participant definitely illustrates the opinion that physical characteristics are 
part of one‘s nationality, suggesting a primordial meaning, not separating place from physical 
characteristics of certain ethnic groups.  He also believes that growing up within the context of 
Stavropol had an effect on who he is.  His response also demonstrates an opinion held by many 
Russians: the Caucasus region is part of Russia, including the ―dark-skinned‖ nationalities that 
live there.      
 Participant 78 is a Russian from Karachay-Cherkessia.  Having lived 17 years of her life 
in the republic and only 3½ years in Stavropol, she had this to say:  
I am from Karachay-Cherkessia, but I do not really like it there.  I like it here better, 
in Stavropol.  I was born in Stavropol, but we moved to Karachay-Cherkessia when I 
was half a year old, so I actually consider myself to be from Stavropol. 
Hesitating to claim that one is fully ―from Karachay-Cherkessia‖ is not uncommon among 
Russians in Stavropol.  Because Karachay-Cherkessia was under the administration of Stavropol 
during most of the Soviet Period there remains a sense among Russians that the republic is still 
theirs, more so than other republics.  However, being from a non-Russian territory is seldom 
glorified. Russians from Karachay-Cherkessia were either indifferent about issues of national 
identity or eager to draw on links to ―Russian territory,‖ such as Stavropol.     
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Living in the North Caucasus 
With an overall average mean score of 3.64, ―Living in the North Caucasus‖ was the 
most important place-based identity factor.  It was the fifth strongest identity factor overall.   
Association with the North Caucasus region illustrates Kaplan‘s (1999) notions of border 
identity.  According to Kaplan, unique identities are found in areas where a dominant nationalist 
identity meets other distinct identities.  In such situations, members of all national groups can 
ascribe to the border identity.  The North Caucasus is a borderland as it marks the break between 
Russia‘s federal borders to the south, encompasses several autonomous republics and two krais, 
and demarcates where majority Russian and Christian populations end and majority non-Russian 
and Islamic populations begin.  Here we see the dominant identity, Russian, meeting other 
identities.  We indeed observe members of all ethno-national groups eager to associate with the 
North Caucasus before other territorial contexts.       
 There were two significant differences between groups regarding the importance of living 
in the North Caucasus: Islamic vs. non-Islamic and titular status vs. non-titular individuals.   
Both of these differences indicate the tendency to associate with a wider sub-region than with 
definite territorial constructions with defined borders, such as the Russian Federation, the 
Southern Federal District, or a krai or republic.   
 Living in the North Caucasus was more important to Islamic participants, who averaged a 
mean score of 4.29, than to non-Islamic participants, who averaged a score of 2.88.  The 
distinction between religious groups illustrates again the concept of Islamic vs. non-Islamic 
space.  Living in the North Caucasus was the highest place-based identity factor among Islamic 
participants. It was the lowest among non-Islamic participants.  Additionally, non-Islamic 
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participants‘ mean average below 3.00 indicates that living in the North Caucasus is actually 
unimportant.  This fact is further evidence of the region‘s overall cultural shape, and how Islam 
may be considered ―in place.‖   
 
Figure 11: Average Mean Scores Regarding the Importance of Living in the North Caucasus 
between Islamic and Non-Islamic Participants. 
  
Russian interview participants consistently rated living in the North Caucasus lower than 
the other place-based identity factors.  The typical response to this issue was exemplified by 
participant 66:  
―I do not think that living in the North Caucasus indicates that I am Russian.‖ 
  Participant 34 stated:  
Living in the North Caucasus does not play a very important role in the makeup of a 
Russian person. 
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Such an attitude toward the North Caucasus, as shown by Russians giving more importance to 
Birthplace, Living in Russia, Living in a Krai or Republic, and Living in the SFD, suggests that 
they prefer to relate to concrete federal territories rather than to a somewhat ambiguously defined 
sub-regional construct.  However, some Russians gave this particular factor higher rating stating 
often that the region‘s diversity leads to a social environment in which people become more 
tolerant of other nationalities, and less focused on their own.  According to participant 38: 
The North Caucasus is important to me first of all because I live in a region where 
many diverse cultures exist.  It causes you to become more tolerant, you meet people 
of many different mentalities here, of different cultures.  It is all very interesting and 
it results in one treating other nationalities with tolerance, therefore it seems very 
important to me. 
Participant number 40 rated living in the North Caucasus 5 because she felt that the idea of the 
Caucasus was often used in local culture, society, and government.  She said:  
The North Caucasus is important because everyone emphasizes this fact here.  They 
always say that we are in the Caucasus.  This is our place… where we live. 
Some Russian participants also associated with living in the North Caucasus due to aesthetic 
preferences, particularly a love of the area‘s nature.  Participant 20 said:  
I love the mountains, nature is beautiful there (Dombay).  I really like to relax, and 
Dombay is a very relaxing place.  
 
For Islamic participants, the North Caucasus often represents not only a strong-hold for 
Islam, but also an environment in which their ancestor and ethno-national groups have an 
established history.  Islamic participants on the whole associated more strongly with the wider 
North Caucasus region than even with a particular republic.  This fact might show a prioritization 
97 
 
of family and social connections that exist throughout the region, as opposed to borders or 
political territorial units.  Participant 192, a Muslim woman from Stavropol, said:   
For me, it is really important where I was born, but living in the Russian Federation 
is not so important.  The Southern Federal District is also not very important, but 
living in the North Caucasus is very important!  It is where my family is from, and I 
have got a large circle of acquaintances there.  
It is important to note that she considers living in Stavropol to mean living in the North 
Caucasus.  Although this fact is not often debated, it is interesting that living in ―non-
Islamic space‖ does not seem to factor in to her feelings about Stavropol.  She instead 
prioritizes family connections.   
Participants without titular status, including non-Russians in Stavropol Krai, and non-
Karachay/non-Cherkess in Karachay-Cherkessia, prioritized living in the North Caucasus 
(M=3.83) to those with titular status (M=3.57), who prioritized territories with precisely defined 
political borders.  Examining the responses from three groups in Karachay-Cherkessia further 
illustrates differences between titular and non-titular groups.  Here, non-titular participants 
ranked living in the North Caucasus the highest (M=4.17), as they have no special status, or 
official claim to homeland, in any particular politically defined territory.  Russians, with an 
average mean of 3.00 were indifferent, treating it as any other region of Russia.  The titular 
nationalities in Karachay-Chekessia are both considered to be North Caucasian nationalities, thus 
they are able to relate both to their Republic and to the sub-region  averaged in-between the other 
groups (M=3.79).     
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Figure 12: Average Mean Scores Regarding the Importance of Living in the North Caucasus 
Between Titular Status and Those Without. 
 
Figure 13: Average Mean Scores Regarding the Importance of Living in the North Caucasus 
among Groups in Karachay-Cherkessia. 
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non-Russians.  Russians from Karachay-Cherkessia favored the Southern Federal District, the 
territory that should be considered to be the most ―Russian,‖ perhaps due to its direct political 
subordination to Moscow.  Next, Russians identified with the North Caucasus, which is a sub-
region having some ambiguity in terms of its status as Russian vs. non-Russian.  Finally, their 
lowest scores went to living in the republic where they do not have titular status.  Non-Russians 
from the republic both prefer living in the North Caucasus and living in a republic to living in the 
SFD, showing preference to areas that could be considered to be more non-Russian.  However, 
those with titular status give a higher score to their defined territory, whereas the non-titular 
individuals prefer to relate to The North Caucasus as a sub-region.   
 
Figure 21: Comparing Average Means Regarding Three Place-Based Identity Factors Among 
Groups from Karachay-Cherkessia. 
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Other Identity Factors in Context of the North Caucasus 
Native Language  
The identity factor ―Native Language‖ was given the highest overall rating on the five-
point scale, receiving an overall mean of 4.59.  This result is perhaps not surprising.  Anderson 
(1983) states that since the use of vernacular languages in print media became common, native 
language has replaced religion as the simplest way for people to identify members of their own 
ethnic groups and members of other groups.  Participant number 158 stated:  
A person could be Russian without Orthodoxy and without the Russian language, I 
think that in our times it is possible.   
High regard for native language was exclusive to no individual group in the study.  Participant 
number 61 said:  
I believe that any person of any nationality has to have command of his own 
language, it is obligatory.   
According to Participant 32:  
I believe that every Armenian must have command of his or her own language.  
Participants stated several many reason for giving their native languages a high rating among the 
list of identity factors.  A pronounced idea was that one‘s native language puts restrictions on his 
or her thought process.  That is, if one speaks Russian, he or she is essentially forced to think like 
a Russian, thus Russian language would have an effect on one‘s mentality.  Participant number 
40 noted that:  
Not having Russian language would be very problematic, it is connected to one‘s 
mentality.  Russian language, in my view, is a designating factor. 
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Because Russian is the lingua franca in the North Caucasus, non-Russian languages are 
important for identification and preserving one‘s national culture more than for communication.  
Groups of non-Russians often gather in Stavropol and converse in their native languages, 
sometimes for the purposes of excluding non-group members.  Russians, however, rarely have 
this luxury, as nearly all of the area‘s population speaks Russian.  Therefore, non-Russian 
languages also work to identify non-Russians as ―others‖ in Russian society.  In Karachay-
Cherkessia, Russian persists due to the fact that there are many ethnic Russians living there, but 
also due to the fact that the native languages of the local population, with the exception of 
Karachay and Nogai (both Turkic languages) are not mutually intelligible. In areas where 
populations are mixed, such as in Cherkessk, Russian becomes the language of communication, 
not only for non-Russian to Russian interactions, but also for interactions between members of 
different non-Russian groups.  Areas that are more ethnically homogeneous, like the auls 
(villages in Karachay-Cherkessia), tend to favor non-Russian languages.   
All of the non-Russians that I met in Stavropol were bi-lingual, at least to some degree.  
Additionally, when a person was of mixed ethnicity with one Russian parent, they always self-
identified as Russian if they identified their native language as Russian.  Use at home and use 
with members of one‘s own ethnic group provide the only opportunities for non-Russians to 
utilize their native languages.  Participant number 21, a Cherkess woman from Stavropol, said:  
We speak Cherkess at home, but it is about half and half.  We also use Russian.   
Scenarios such as this one seemed to be common.  This case also seemed to be the norm 
regarding Stavropol Armenians who are more isolated from their national areas than are the 
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nationalities of Karachay-Cherkessia.  Participant number 57, an Armenian living in Stavropol, 
said:  
My native language is Armenian, but I can speak Russian.  I know them both the 
same, I just cannot read Armenian.  
Participant number 56, an Armenia woman living in Stavropol, said:  
My first language was Armenian, but I speak clean Russian.  I can tell you that I do 
not really know which one is my native language.  
 
Language was also considered by many to be important for the preservation of culture 
and national ideas able to transcend place.  Traditions and national histories all exist in the native 
languages of the North Caucasus‘ nationalities, regardless of whether or not they were influenced 
by other forces, namely Soviet nationalities policies.  Such cultural elements definitely exist in 
the context of the North Caucasus, in wider Russia, and where ever a Diaspora of a particular 
group of speakers presides.  Participant number 193 explained these ideas: 
I consider native language to be more important than living somewhere.  Native 
language is the language of one‘s ancestors and a way to keep one‘s culture.  It is the 
language of one‘s national literature, in which ancient stories and poems are written.  
We have got a huge number of great writers who wrote in Russian.  As far as I know, 
there are more great writers from Russian than anywhere else. 
Although native language is often considered requisite for belonging to a national group, it is not 
the only important factor.  The concept of ―the Russian Soul‖ is very important in Russian 
traditions.  It is widely believed that without the Russian language, it is impossible to possess this 
crucial element needed to be Russian due to the necessary understanding and expression of the 
Russian language. Participant 193 added:    
To be Russian, one must speak Russian.  However, one can speak Russian without 
being Russian.  If someone immigrates from abroad and learns Russian language, it 
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does not make him Russian just due to language.  One‘s soul needs to be Russian.  If 
he has Russian language and a Russian soul, and considers himself Russian, then he 
can be.  It does not matter even if he is black or white.  
 
 
Religious Belief 
 
Religious beliefs are often important when considering identity, but such beliefs are 
especially vital within the context of the North Caucasus because the region serves as a religious 
borderland between Christianity and Islam.  Religion is often important to identification with a 
certain ethnic group or nationality throughout all of Russia.  For example, Russians are an 
Orthodox Christian people, Karachays are Muslims, and Kalmuks are Buddhists.  Such opinions 
can be noted by the fact that even non-religious participants rated religion well above 4 on the 5-
point scale.  Participant 177 stated:  
By nationality, I am Russian.  That means my religion is going to be Orthodoxy, and 
my language Russian.  
The data indicated that religious belief is more important to residents of Karachay-Cherkessia 
than residents of Stavropol.  It is also more important to non-Russians than Russians, and to 
those born in an urban area to those born in rural areas.  However, a statistically significant 
difference between group responses regarding the importance of religion appeared only between 
those who claim to practice religion (M=4.47) and those who do not (M=4.29).     
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Figure 14: Average Mean Scores Regarding the Importance of Religious Belief between 
Participants who Practice their Religion and Those who do Not. 
 
Religion and place are intertwined in the North Caucasus, and just as the area serves as a 
break between Russian and non-Russian space, it can serve the same role in terms of 
differentiating Christian and Islamic space.  Participant 158 offered:  
I do not consider myself to be very religious.  Orthodoxy is not important if someone 
lives in Russia and has the mentality of Russian (Rossiskiye) people. 
For Participant 16 and many others, religion was a factor about which they thought when 
defining their national identity, but it was one of many important factors found within the 
Russian cultural environment.  That is, living in Russia is most important for being Russian, but 
Orthodoxy can serve as a path toward getting the Russian mentality if one is not in Russia.   
The fact that only 23 % of Russians said that they went to church regularly suggests being 
Orthodox does not play a major role in the personal lives of the majority of young Russians.  It 
does however allow them to feel a connection to a greater sense of belonging and gives them a 
sense that is facilitated by religious places throughout the landscape.  Churches and other holy 
sites serve as a constant reminder that they are in ―their own‖ (Orthodox Russian) space.  The 
only mosque is Stavropol has been turned into a museum, but there are many churches.  Despite 
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the fact that there is a significant Islamic population in Stavropol, Muslims there must leave this 
Christian-dominated environment in order to worship.  Christians in Karachay-Cherkessia do not 
face this problem, as there are both many mosques and many churches in the Republic.  Being 
part of Russia means that Russians in Karachay-Cherkessia can be connected to the greater sense 
of Christian Space, they can also lobby to Moscow for funding support in building churches. 
Islamic participants in Stavropol provided insight into the issue of Christian vs. Islamic 
space.  Participant 21 said: 
I am a Muslim and I think I could live in some other countries.  Because of my 
Religion, living in Russia‘s not that important.  I could live in the United Arab 
Emirates or in Turkey for example.  As far as living in Russia goes, it‘s better to live 
in the Southern Federal District, because of all the regions, it is the best for my 
religion.   
Here Participant 21 is clearly thinking about Russia in regional terms and in terms of where she 
is mostly likely to find the cultural environment friendliest to her religion.  She is also thinking 
about where her religion can be facilitated.  Islam in Karachay-Cherkessia is present in the 
landscape, as Mosques dot the mountain sides.  However, the sense of Islamic identity is much 
more focused on personal connections to god and to the family unit than in Orthodox 
Christianity, which is heavily dependent on the Church hierarchy (Aliev, 2004).  According to 
Participant 128, a Karachay man from Karachay-Cherkessia: 
My belief in Islam is important for who I am.  It is important for who my family is, 
and for determining what kind of man I will be.  I know who I am, and I do not need 
to go to a Mosque to find out. 
 
When is membership in a religion obligatory for membership in a nation?  This question 
has been a common one throughout various currents of Russian thought (especially in the Tsarist 
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period).  Various scholars and writers have asked: can a person truly be Russian without being 
Orthodox?  In the context of the North Caucasus, where there are several major religions, all of 
whose members suffered serious persecution under 70 some years of Soviet rule, one might 
expect varied responses. However, the resurgence of religious institutions in both popular culture 
and in politics have exposed the young generation to much religious material.  Participant 158 
said:  
A person could be Russian without Orthodoxy and without Russian language. I think 
that in our times it is possible. 
I posed the question to the interview participants of whether or not one can be Russian without 
Orthodoxy and their responses were varied.  Some believed quite strongly in the obligatory 
status of Orthodoxy for being Russian.  Participant 43 offered: 
A person has to be Orthodox to be Russian.  Lots of people have different 
understandings, but to be Russian you have to have our understanding.  
This comment suggests the effects that Orthodoxy has one one‘s mentality, therefore if Orthodox 
mentality is synonymous with Russian mentality, the two cannot be separated.   Participant 40 
echoed this belief saying:  
It is very doubtful that I could ever change my religion…It (being Russian without 
Orthodoxy) is not possible, however a person can be orthodox and not be Russian.   
When I asked participant 64 if a person could be Russian and not Orthodox, she replied:   
No, not really, but they could maybe be of another nationality. 
Because different religions have different rites of passage, participating in religious rituals, 
educational institutions, and social gatherings act as a homogenizing force that may work to 
solidify links either between members of a single nationality, or between several nationalities 
that adhere to the same religion. This way of shaping the cultural landscape is what Paasi (1996) 
107 
 
has termed ―spatial socialization.‖  Differences in religion are an easy way to differentiate some 
groups and their places from others.  For example, Christian Russians may see divisions between 
themselves and the North Caucasian nationalities, the majority of whom are Muslim Karachays, 
Cherkess, Nogais, and Abazins, may see a shared adherence to Islam as a reason for potential 
unification and cooperation. It also means that these groups are likely to relate to Islamic features 
in the landscape, namely mosques.   
Although many of the participants in the study indicated that they did not attend a place of 
worship on a regular basis (78.7 %), only .02 %, seven out of 357 respondents self-identified as 
atheists.  This observation suggests that identifying as a member of a particular religion is 
important for identity.  According to Participant 176:  
Religion is very important for me, because I myself am Orthodox, and it is important 
for me to support it for my own self understanding.  However, every person has their 
own understanding of religion, and everyone can choose what they believe.  Religion 
does not necessarily dictate how someone is, everyone reacts to religion differently, 
and it does not matter which religion. 
Religion may also be considered important for ethno-national identity because of the role it can 
play in the family unit.  Religion is associated with a value system, and if one is raised to adhere 
to these values, his or her upbringing will influence relationships with others, as well as self-
identification.  According to participant 34: 
Of course, the number of true believers here is small, but it plays an important role 
because it matters for the interworking of the family and relationships among family 
members.  
Still, some participants maintained that Orthodoxy was not critical to their sense of ethno-
national identity at all. Participant 67, a Russian man from Stavropol, said:  
As for religion, a Russian can be a Muslim. 
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This is an interesting comment because it goes against established stereotypes and links that exist 
between ethno-national groups and specific religions.  It backs the idea that religion is a personal 
choice and is not determined by one‘s nationality.   
 
Ethno-National Heritage (The Nationality of One’s Ancestors) 
The identity factor that received the second highest overall mean score was ―The 
Nationality of One‘s Ancestors,‖ or ethno-national heritage, with a value of 4.41.  Unlike native 
language, with which there were no significant differences in how the various groups responded, 
there were three significant differences regarding heritage.  Heritage was significantly more 
important to non-Russians than Russians, to males than to females, and to participants having the 
same birthplace as their parents.      
 
Figure 15: Average Mean Scores Regarding the Importance of Heritage between Russians and 
Non-Russians. 
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Non-Russians (M=4.64) considered ethno-national heritage to be significantly more 
considerable to their identity than did Russians (M=4.08).  The interviews provided some insight 
in to why the difference between Russians and non-Russians may have occurred.  First, Russians 
in general recognize the effects of a widespread imperial history on the Russian Federation‘s 
contemporary ethnic geography, acknowledging their populations‘ mixing with other ethnic 
groups.  Most of the Russians that I interviewed said they were either unsure of the nationality of 
their ancestors, or were fairly certain that they were not all Russians.  According to Participant 
177: 
Speaking about the nationality of my ancestors, pure blooded people never occur 
among us.  There will of course be different nationalities amongst our ancestors. 
Therefore, it does not play the most important role. 
Participant 65 said:    
In principle, the nationality of my ancestors is not so important, in general they were 
Russian, but there were some Ukrainians. 
According to Participant 67: 
Nationality of one‘s ancestors is important, but not one hundred %.  If I were to have 
ancestors that were Jewish, or Tatar, who knows I might… but I was born here and 
speak Russian, so I consider myself Russian.  
 Participant 172 commented:  
If someone has Ukrainian ancestors for example, then they can be Russian in some 
sense, but not through historical lineage.  
Participant 64, who rated this factor 5 out of 5 said:  
I relate to my ancestors because they were Russian.   
When I asked her if her ancestors had all been Russian, she replied:  
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Well, I do not think that there were only Russians.  We have got Russians, but also 
other nationalities. 
 
However, she did not label certain nationalities by name.   The fact that she is not aware of 
which other nationalities exist in her own ethnic background means that a Russian identity is her 
only logical choice based on her ancestry.  I then asked her if all of her ancestors to her 
knowledge had lived in Russia, and if that was important to her.  She confirmed that to her 
knowledge that they all had, and that because they lived in Russia, she considered them to be 
Russian.   
The North Caucasus‘s ever changing historical geographies have resulted in remnants of 
many different civilizations left throughout the landscape.  Participant 58 said:  
My distant relatives were from some kind of Persian country, but it was a long time 
ago, very distant.  But after that, they were all Russian. 
 
For many self-identified Russians, other ethnicities appear in their lineage in only the previous 
generation.  People who are of a mixed-ethnic background, with one parent who is Russian and 
the other non-Russian, claim Russian as their nationality but do not use ancestry as the deciding 
factor in determining their own ethno-national identity.  Participant 151, a woman from 
Stavropol with parents of different nationalities said this:  
My father is Armenian and Mother Russian, but the deal is that my father‘s family 
speaks in Russian and finished Russian school.  Therefore, I see myself as Russian.    
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Figure 16: Average Mean Scores Regarding the Importance of Heritage between Males and 
Females. 
 
Figure 25: Average Mean Scores Regarding the Importance of Heritage between Participants 
Born in the Same Place as Their Own Parents and Those Not. 
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Non-Russians, especially males from Karachay-Cherkessia, tended to be extremely self-
aware of their ethnic heritage in terms of ancestry.  Participant 128, a Karachay man from an aul 
in Karachay-Cherkessia, had this to say in regard to ancestry: 
We Karachays consider that to be one of us, a person needs to have seven 
generations of Karachay ancestors, this is with no exception.  For example, I know 
for a fact that for at least seven generations of my family, we have been fully 
Karachay.  This is the reason why it is very important for me to marry a Karachay 
woman.  I want my children to be Karachay like me.  It is very important to me and 
to the rest of my family. 
The response of Participant 128 also suggests why males may have prioritized ancestry 
significantly higher than females: patriarchic traditions.  Such traditions are rather common 
throughout the Caucasus region, and especially among Islamic populations (Rogozin, 2008).  For 
example, needing to find a Karachay wife in order to preserve his ethnic family legacy implies 
that his selection of possible choices is rather limited, and may be a factor in his preferences 
regarding his living place.  Males were significantly more likely to prioritize ethno-national 
heritage over females and averaged a mean score of 4.72, to females‘ 4.30.  Those participants 
with the same birthplace as their parents‘ also gave ethno-national heritage significantly higher 
scores, averaging 4.46 to 4.37.  These differences indicated that the individual most likely to 
equate ethno-national heritage to national identity is a non-Russian male from the same place as 
the previous generations of his family.   
Among nationalities with relatively small consolidated populations, like the Karachays, 
the availability of ethnically acceptable spouses can become an issue.  Fathers and husbands also 
have a say in where their daughters will study and eventually live, and because of the 
cohesiveness of their family units, young women are likely to stay in the North Caucasus at least 
until marriage.  Therefore, leaving Karachay-Cherkessia or the North Caucasus region creates 
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problems for young and unmarried people encouraging those who value the ethnic purity of their 
family lines to stay in the republic or migrate somewhere not far from their ethnic base.   
 
Living and Socializing among Representatives of One’s Own or Other Nationalities 
 
The notion that being either around other members of one‘s nationality, or around 
members of other groups, might make someone more aware of their national identity were 
explored with two categories in the survey.  Living among members of one‘s own nationality 
could be considered important because a common culture is represented, meaning that someone 
would learn the cultural mannerisms of his or her own nationality.  Living among members of 
other nationalities might be important in terms of measuring one‘s national identity compared to 
others.  For example, a Karachay might feel especially Karachay around a group of Russians, in 
which he stands out.   
 Living among members of one‘s own nationality received the fourth highest overall 
means score (3.82) among all participants, while living among others received the lowest overall 
mean score of all the categories (3.22).  In terms of significant group differences regarding these 
categories, only the practice of religion made a difference when comparing living among others.  
This difference may be due to the fact that religion is an especially clear and exclusive identity 
marker.  That is to say, non-Russians often speak Russian, but they are very rarely members of 
the Russian Orthodox Church.  Even Armenians, also Christians, belong primarily to the 
Armenian Apostolic Church, which differs in structure and hierarchy and dogma.   
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Figure 17: Average Mean Scores Regarding the Importance of Living among Representatives of 
Nationalities Other than One's Own Between Religious and non-Religious Participants. 
 
In the context of the North Caucasus, interaction among many nationalities is common 
place.  Therefore, many of the interview respondents commented on this aspect of their 
environment.  Participant 193, as Russian from Stavropol, stated:  
We live in a region where there are many nationalities.  As long as they behave 
civilly, it makes no difference for me who they are. 
 The idea that personality is considered more important than nationality in terms of choosing a 
friend-base or social interactions was also common among interview participants.  Participant 33, 
an Armenian living in Stavropol said:   
Living among my own or other nationalities is not important to me at all.  It is not 
important who or where.  I interact with absolutely different circles, Russian, 
Armenians, Muslims.  For me it is absolutely not important.  It is important that a 
person be a person.  
Overwhelmingly, the participants stated that they did not care whether or not their friends were 
of their own nationality.  I asked participant 64 if being around other nationalities made her feel 
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Well, not really.  I have actually thought a lot about this question, but in general, it is 
not really important… someone‘s nationality. It does not bother me, it is more 
important that they are a good person.  It is not important whether they are Russian, 
Abkhazian, Georgian, Karachay, or anyone in particular. 
 
Self-identified non-Russians tended to show a bit more longing for being around 
representatives of their own group but still did not regard being around others to be particularly 
important for making them aware of their own national identity.  Participant 32, an Armenian 
from Stavropol, stated:  
If I had a good circle of friends of my own nationality, it would be good, but if not, 
well, I feel neutral about it. 
 I then asked her if she felt more Armenian when around non-Armenians and she replied: 
No way, I am not a nationalist.  I have friends of many different nationalities.  Being 
a particular nationality does not depend on with whom someone socializes. You do 
not become another nationality just because you are friendly with them.  You do not 
just become Karachay if you socialize with them.  
Most non-Russians did agree that being around members of their own nationality was important, 
and although not statistically significant at the 95% confidence level, non-Russians did favor the 
category ―Living among Members of Your Own Nationality‖ (M=4.07) to Russians (3.44).  
Participant 57, an Armenian said:  
It is important to converse with members of my national group to support my 
language and not forget it.   
 
This line of thinking is especially key for those who do not live among many representatives of 
their own nationality, living instead in a majority Russian population.  Participant 151, and 
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individual from Stavropol of mixed Russian and Armenian descent, gave this statement 
regarding her Armenian heritage: 
I truly do not feel Armenian because I was born here (Stavropol) and have never 
socialized with Armenians at the appropriate level that would be needed.  And at 
home we all spoke Russian language and all of our traditions were Russian.  
 
Comparing Place-Based Identity Factors and Other Traditional Factors in a Hypothetical 
Situation 
 A question that I posed to the interview participants was: ―If a person is born abroad to 
parents of your nationality, and he speaks your native language at home, is he the same 
nationality as yourself?‖  This question was designed to prompt participants to take place-based 
identity factors into consideration when evaluating a situation in which other identity factors 
would potentially remain the same.  Responses were varied, with emphasis paid either to 
environment or upbringing.  Those participants who valued environment answered that someone 
born abroad would not be the same as members of their nation born in their homeland.  
Participant 154 said this: 
He (a Russian born in America) will not be fully Russian by his environment, by 
how he thinks, or by his mentality.  Even if he returned to live in Russia, it would be 
hard for him to live here.  It would be hard to adapt to Russian traditions and norms.  
But it my view, he would not be native to America either.  His children would 
already be fully American, but he is something in the middle.  He is certainly non-
Russian. 
According to Participant 149:  
No, he (a Russian born abroad) is not Russian.  If he is born abroad he lives with 
different values.  A different country means different values… different people, 
different laws, different everything.  I think he would be a citizen of that country, 
with primarily that mentality. 
  
According to Participant 41: 
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I think if you have to classify factors regarding their importance to one‘s nationality, 
the first two would be the nationality of one‘s ancestors and one‘s birthplace.  
Language is already less important.  Religion is also not as important.  For example, 
in Germany there a lot of ―Russian-Germans,‖ as they call themselves.  They have 
Russian parents, who had them here.  However, they moved to Germany.  Their 
native language is Russian just the same, but they socialize and study now in 
German.  They work using German and they live in Germany.  However, they 
consider themselves Russian first of all, and at home they communicate in Russian 
amongst themselves.  But about religion, many of them are already Catholics 
because of being there.   But all in all they are Russian.  They have Russian parents 
and from the start, Russia was their homeland.   
There were some opinions that took the Russian environment into consideration in terms of 
Russia‘s historical influence.  Participant number 62 considered a Russian born in Ukraine to be 
Russian, due to the fact that the idea of Russian space extends even into contemporary Ukraine.  
He said:  
He (a Russian born abroad) is Russian; it is absolutely unimportant whether or not he 
was born here (in the Russian Federation).  This is because during different time 
periods, Russia had different territories.  Suppose a person were born in Ukraine (v 
Ukrainye)… well in the Ukraine (na Ukrainye) as it is called… that territory might 
have been Russian, so I consider him to be Russian. 
Some Russian participants seemed to prioritize upbringing and the role of one‘s parents in 
determining one‘s national identity.  These individuals claimed that Russians born abroad would 
be the same as themselves, dependant not only on the fact that they received the non-place based 
identity factors from their parents, but also on whether or not the individual felt Russian and 
considered him or herself to be Russian.  Participant 38 said: 
Everything depends on upbringing.  It is possible to raise a child so that he forgets 
his roots.  It is not even so much about the culture, or about the language, but 
whether or not he considers himself Russian.  I think it would be possible to raise a 
child in America so that he orients himself to Russian culture.  All of this is very 
important, and it comes from one‘s parents first of all. 
According to Participant 40:   
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I think it all depends on his family.  If his parents live abroad, but consider 
themselves Russian, then the child will also consider himself Russian.  It depends on 
how he regards himself.  A lot of different situations occur, many he was born in 
some other country, or his parents are from another country.  He must take one come 
kind of culture and some traditions.  Naturally, he may choose them for himself.  
  
All of the non-Russian participants seemed unconcerned with place-based identity factors 
regarding a member of their nation being born abroad.  They preferred to focus again on the role 
of parents and upbringing, and also on nationality transferred through ancestry.   
According to Participant 192:  
I think someone could be Nogai, having been born abroad.  I also think that someone 
can choose their nationality.   
Participant 21 added: 
I think a person needs to feel his or her nationality most of all.  I am Cherkess not 
only because my parents are Cherkess, but rather because I hold our principles 
myself.  I think that is the most important. 
Participant 21‘s comment emphasizes the importance of personal connections to an ethno-
national group.  Having all of the other factors might not make someone belong to a given 
group.  It is also necessary for that person to believe that he or she belongs.   
 
Conclusion 
 The first significant trend that stood out in the MANOVA analysis was the fact that 
people born in the same place as previous generations of their family were more likely to hold 
place-based identity factors in higher regard than those who were born in different areas than 
their ancestors.  These individuals also prioritized heritage.  This group was the only one to 
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significantly favor four of the five place based elements at the 95 % confidence level and the 
other element, ―Living in the North Caucasus‖ was significant at the 90 % confidence level.  The 
trend of favoring such elements illustrates the importance of family connections and historical 
lineage in terms of place and identity.  Sense of place is also an important aspect for people born 
in the same area as their ancestors.  Spending the formative years of one‘s early life in a 
particular place provides an environment out of which they gather their first sense of place.  
Although one will likely establish his or her own sense of place, he or she also takes information 
and perceptions for family members.  Those with an established history in an area are likely to 
hold very deep feelings regarding their environment, including those memories and pieces of 
information they have received from previous generations.  Thus, having family members form 
the same place helps to cement one‘s feelings of historical lineage in a particular place.  The fact 
that this trend proved significant suggests that sense of place can transcend political boundaries, 
as all of the participants ancestors were born in the USSR, not in Russia.   
Another commonly recurring theme throughout this project was the idea of being in place 
or out of place, particularly regarding Russian space.  The idea that Russians are in place in 
Russian space is especially important in terms of one‘s birthplace.  Because citizenship plays a 
role in the Russian federal context, being born in Russia is important for ethnic Russians.  Again, 
it is interesting to note that even though most participants were born in the RSFSR during soviet 
times, they equate this political territory with the Russian Federation in contemporary context.  If 
being born within Russian space is important and Russian participants believe that they were 
born in Russian space, then the USSR constituted Russian space.  Living in a territorial context 
that one considers to be his or her own is important.  Russia represents a safe place for Russians, 
a territorial context in which their culture is prevalent and considered to be normal or even 
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preferable to others.  Thus, ethnic Russians are more apt to prioritize living in Russia.  For some, 
living in Russia provides a context that is necessary for being Russian.  Here again we see the 
importance of Russian civic (Rossiskaya) identity.  Everyone born in the Russian Federation, or 
in a territory that would become it, has this legal Russian citizenship.  However, Russians tend to 
factor this civic element into their overall sense of ethno-national identity more than non-
Russians.  The facts that ethnic Russian culture, language, and Orthodox Christianity are all 
dominant the Russian Federation, and that the country‘s leaders and federal authority figures 
consistently self-identify as ethnic Russians, mean that the idea of Great Russian power extends 
to civic identification with the Russian Federation as a state.   
In terms of being raised as a Russian, most ethnic Russian participants mentioned that 
upbringing and parents‘ attitude would make the most difference in their child‘s self-
identification.  Although, when asked to evaluate situations where all of the non-place-based 
elements of identity were present, participants overwhelmingly signified that without the cultural 
context found specifically in Russia, the child would not be the same in terms of nationality. This 
trend suggests that there is something about being Rossiskye that is important for their 
conceptions of being fully Russkii in the minds of many young Russians.     
It is also important to consider the idea of Russian versus non-Russian space when 
examining non-place-based elements of ethno-national identity.  Language, heritage, and 
religion, were the three overall most important identify factors in the study.  Elements such as 
language and religion were especially important to those individuals who considered them in 
terms of their influence on one‘s mentality.  Indeed, Orthodox Christianity and Islam provide 
particular guidelines for morality, as do many religions.  Believing that such a moral code is 
necessary for being Russian makes Orthodoxy vital.  Having a particular native language 
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presents a similar argument.  The logic here is that one is restricted in his or her thought process 
by the linguistic limits of his or her native language.  Therefore, since all people think within the 
parameters of their languages, they share a common mentality.  However, many participants 
were of the opinion that identifying someone with a particular ethnic group due to their language 
and religion was an outdated concept.  They also noted that it is possible to change some 
elements of one‘s nationality by converting religions or choosing to speak another language.  
Although, simply changing some elements of nationality would not change one‘s nationality.     
Heritage was important for Russians and non-Russian but in different ways.  Russians, 
unlike non-Russians, tended not to be focused on blood lines in terms of their ethno-national 
identity.  They generally recognize the fact that the throughout the history of the Russian empire, 
many different ethnic groups merged together and that claiming to be purely Russian through 
blood is rather meaningless.  However, territorial heritage was important to Russians.  The sense 
of Russia and Russian space as one‘s historical homeland is a way to justify ethno-national 
identity through a form of lineage.  Although one‘s ancestors might not have been ethnically 
Russian, they lived in Russian space and in a Russian cultural context, therefore they became 
Russian and their ancestors would also be Russian if they remained there.  Living in the same 
region as one‘s ancestors especially facilitated this line of thinking.  It is possible to draw 
connections to lineage in a particular place through receiving information from previous 
generations.           
 The trends for Islamic and non-Russian participants showed that these groups felt 
stronger than Russians about all the elements of identity except for ―Living in Russia.‖ Most of 
the participants who self-identified as non-Russian and non-Islamic were Stavropol Armenians, 
who tended to draw on previous territorial associations in Armenia and Azerbaijan when 
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considering place-based identity factors.  Other non-Russians, who overwhelmingly self-
identified as Islamic, preferred to associate with smaller scale territories, especially the North 
Caucasus region.   Just as the idea of Russian space is important, so is the idea of Islamic space.  
Islamic participants tended to see the North Caucasus, Karachay-Cherkessia, and the Southern 
Federal District as more conducive to their religion and for their ethnic populations than The 
Russian Federation in general.  This trend is likely due to the fact that all of these ethno-national 
groups are either native to the North Caucasus region or have the majority of their ethnic 
populations currently in this region.  Also, the republics‘ populations are majority Muslim.   
 Finally, one point on which almost every participant commented was the fact that the 
entire North Caucasus region is extremely ethnically diverse.  This diversity, in their opinion, 
leads to tolerance and a multi-national landscape.  Most agreed that living around representatives 
of their own ethno-national groups was important for preserving their cultures.  This trend was 
especially true for non-Russians.  Being from the North Caucasus meant different things to 
different people.  There was a definite sense among Russians about the distinctiveness of the 
North Caucasus.  Although many of them said that the region was Russian overall, many also 
noted that the republics were somewhat different than the rest of Russia.  While some ethnic 
Russians spoke favorably about the republics, they did so primarily about the region‘s aesthetic 
qualities rather than its culture.  Most of the positive comments related to the mountains and 
resort areas, as opposed to villages and cities in the republics.  Russians from Cherkessk also 
tended to mention connections in Stavropol or other parts of the country, and if they said they 
liked Cherkessk, they were often at a loss to explain why.  Cherkess and Karachay participants 
also noted the region‘s beauty and resort areas but they also focused more on family connections 
and historical lineage both in Karachay-Cherkessia and throughout the region.  They were also 
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more positive about Cherkessk as a city, saying that they enjoyed living there, emphasizing that 
despite its violent reputation, it is actually a very peaceful and beautiful place to live.  Life in 
Karachay-Cherkessia, especially in the auls, is more traditional.  Heritage and family blood lines 
are more important to these groups than to non-Russians.  Even those not from Karachay-
Cherkessia still felt connections with the republic because of their roots and their family 
histories.   
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Chapter IV: 
Cognitive Images of Homeland and Their Meanings in the North Caucasus 
 
 
 The purpose of having participants sketch mental maps of their homeland was to explore 
the areas with which they identify in terms of scale, content, and symbolism.  The term 
homeland can have various meanings, which is why the maps I collected vary so greatly.  
However, when examining the idea of identity in terms of place, one‘s conception of homeland 
is vital.  Homeland‘s importance becomes especially clear when exploring the identity of a 
nation, as it provides tangible evidence for a nation‘s existence (Herb, 1999).  I expected 
participants to consider both their personal experience and ideas of ethno-national territory when 
sketching their maps.   
Although the conception of homeland can be complex, everyone has an idea of his or her 
homeland in some sense.  Homeland, rodina in Russian, can have multiple meanings.  Rodina 
with a capital R refers to one‘s country, specifically the Russian Federation, but rodina with a 
small r can be translated as birthplace, or homeland in and individual or personal sense.  That is 
not to say one is not able to think of his or her rodina and Rodina in the same light.   
When examining the concept of homeland, it is important to think about Agnew‘s (1987) 
concept of subjective territorial identity, where one factors in location and sense of place to 
determine meaning and feelings about a place.  When examining sketch maps in order to view 
participants‘ mental images of homeland, it is important to understand that although they have 
been prompted by a question, each participant processes the conception of homeland through his 
or her own unique set of perceptual filters, value systems, and aesthetic preferences (Pacione, 
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1977).  Homeland is a subjective place. When homeland is considered, one cannot help but draw 
on sense of place when defining it. 
The sketch map is a way to measure one‘s conception of homeland (Pocock, 1976).   
Participants provided windows into their own mental images by drawing the territory to which 
they most strongly associated.  By sketching their homelands, participants were forced to 
consider many options: scale, individual places, borders, aesthetic features, and so on.  Although 
each individual‘s sketch map is different, it is possible to compare the maps of participants from 
similar groups, so as to analyze common themes and trends (Raitz and Ulack, 1981).  To draw 
their sketches, participants must apply filters, such as the ones I have identified in this study: 
―Territory,‖ ―Nationality,‖ ―Gender,‖ ―Religion,‖ ―Birthplace,‖ ―Living Environments,‖ and 
―Heritage.‖ Examining group characteristics based on these variables provides insight into 
Paasi‘s (1996) conceptions of ―cultural shape‖ and ―identity narrative‖ regarding homeland.  It is 
also shows what Herb (1999) calls ―collective consciousness in homeland.‖   
Free recall sketch mapping was the appropriate technique for this project because it 
prompts participants through instructions to think in terms of an important concept when 
sketching their responses.  In this case the concept was homeland.  Participants were forced to 
evaluate their own personal ideas about where they and those close to them would be ―in place.‖ 
Evaluating where one feels ―in place‖ involves establishing limits concerning boundaries of 
otherness in terms of selecting comfortable territory to which one can personally associate.  If 
one can associate with all of Russia, then he or she will logically draw the entire country.  If one 
feels that his or her boundaries of otherness lay at the edge of a particular city, then he or she will 
emphasize the local scale.   
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I was interested in evaluating various elements of geographical perception, namely seeing 
if some participants would draw conventional maps with borders, as opposed to displaying their 
mental images of homeland in the form of landscape-style drawings.  Whether or not one decides 
to include bounded territory sheds light on ideas of scale and borders.  Drawing a large territory 
as a landscape is not possible. Therefore, participants that strongly associated with their local 
environments could depict their homelands without borders, allowing them more freedom to 
include important landmarks and symbols. I was expecting to see monuments, parks, popular 
local places, and landscape features, such as the Kuban River or the mountains.  I also expected 
religious participants to include their respective places of worship.   
I also wanted to see the degree to which established political borders appeared on the 
sketch maps.  Political borders are often represented through maps and are therefore familiar.  I 
wanted to discover which political borders participants selected for the sketch maps, and if there 
were any particular patterns between group affiliations and the borders that group members 
selected.  I hypothesized that Russians would draw federal borders more frequently than non-
Russians because they can think of this space in both civic and ethno-national terms.  Non-
Russians would have to rely on civic notions of homeland rather than ethno-national territory 
when drawing Russia‘s borders.  I also expected the residents of Karachay-Cherkessia to draw 
the republic‘s borders.  I thought that Karachay-Cherkessia‘s borders would be more common 
than those of Stavropol Krai or other regional territories. I also expected urban participants to 
draw large scale maps because cities constitute larger local communities than villages, meaning 
that participants‘ experience would be focused in a larger setting.          
Individual places, like political borders, can be conceived in terms of scale and I also 
wanted to see if places important to the federal, regional, and local scales would be included.  I 
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was expecting Russians and people from Stavropol to include cities that are important to their 
ethno-national history and to the country in terms of governance and economics, namely St. 
Petersburg and Moscow.  I expected Islamic participants and non-Russians to focus their 
attention on places at smaller scales, like Stavropol, Cherkessk, and other places in the study 
area.   
 
Maps (Bounded Spaces) and Cartographic Detail 
 A distinctive feature of the sketches was whether or not participants included borders.  
While 71 % included an overhead representation of their homeland with traditional elements of a 
map, others drew sketches that more resembled a painting. These representations showed a scene 
with no clear detail to the amount or type of territory they were including in their sketches.  
Because participants were instructed to schematically sketch their homeland, they were free to 
represent their mental images however they saw most appropriate.  For instance, if a sketch 
represented a landscape seen and was labeled ―Russia,‖ I considered it to show the federal scale, 
otherwise such sketches were considered local.    
Sketch maps were counted as having cartographic detail if they represented bounded 
space (all of these sketches were also counted as maps) and the participant attempted to shape the 
borders in a fashion resembling typical cartographic representations of the given territory. 48 % 
of the participants attempted to draw an accurate border, rather than drawing a standard shape, 
like a circle or square, or a scene with no bounded space.   
Results of the chi-squared analysis showed that
 
there is a significant association between 
Russians vs. non-Russians and drawing a map with some kind of bounded space (2 = 5.41, p < 
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.05), as opposed to a picture with no clearly defined borders. More specifically, the odds of 
drawing a federal place are 1.81 times higher for Russians than for non-Russians.  77.86 % of the 
sketches drawn by Russians represented some type of bounded space, while 65.97 % of non-
Russians did so.  
 
 
Figure 18: Percentages of Russians and Non-Russians that Included Borders in their Sketch 
Maps. 
 
There was a significant association between nationality (Russian vs. non-Russian) and 
drawing a map (2 = 7.35, p < .01).  Russians were 1.86 times more likely sketch a map with 
attention to cartographic detail than were non-Russians.  57.25 % of Russians attempted to use 
some element of cartographic accuracy, as opposed to 41.88 % of non-Russians.  These 
differences are likely due to the fact that Russian tended to focus on federal scale borders and 
places more so than non-Russians.  Because images of Russia are often portrayed through media 
in the form of maps, people are more familiar with the shape of Russia itself than with various 
other territorial delineations.  Also, if participants chose to identify with some arbitrary portion 
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of territory, at the local scale for example, they would likely not have been exposed to 
cartographic representations of it and find it simpler to represent it with standard shapes and 
labels.   
 
 
Figure 28: Percentages of Russians and non-Russians that Attempted Cartographic Accuracy in 
their Sketch Maps. 
 
Conceptions of homeland representing large amounts of territory were sketched both in 
great and poor detail.  Participants that attempted to accurately draw the shape of the Russian 
Federation, or even a regional border, did so by recalling maps and images of these territories 
while those who kept their responses on a more local scale were able to rely on their own 
perceived experiences and perceptions of their daily realities. 
Both cartographic detail (2 = 4.07, p < .05) and the propensity to draw a map (2 = 6.92, 
p < .01) are significantly associated with Religion Type (Islamic vs. non-Islamic).  Non-Islamic 
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participants were 1.65 times more likely to draw a map than were Islamic participants, with 
76.35 % of non-Islamic respondents drawing a map and 66.09 % Islamic participants sketching 
one.  Non-Islamic participants were also 1.81 times likelier than Islamic participants to attempt 
cartographic detail, rather than a basic shape such as a simple circle.  56.08 % of non-Islamic 
sketch maps displayed this element, 41.38 of Islamic maps did as well.  Again, because Islamic 
participants were less likely to associate with federal scale constructs and were more locally 
based, their spatial awareness regarding areas they chose to represent is better done through 
landscapes rather than borders. 
 
 
Figure 29: Percentages of Islamic vs. Non-Islamic Participants Including Bounded Spaces in 
their Sketch Maps. 
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Figure 30: Percentages of Islamic vs. Non-Islamic Participants Attempting Cartographic Detail. 
 
There is a significant association between being the child of two different nationalities 
that is, being of mixed-ethnicity and using borders to detail one‘s map (2 = 4.55, p < .05).  
Participants of mixed ethnic heritage were 2.33 times more likely to attempt accurate 
cartography on their sketch maps than were participants having parents of the same nationality.  
While 83.33 % of the participants from mixed-marriages drew a map with bounded space, only 
69.52 % of those with parents of the same nationality drew maps.  Again, individuals from 
mixed-marriages were likely to associate with federal scale constructs.  This trend is perhaps due 
to the fact that they consider their Russian citizenship to be more important than their ethnic 
affiliations in terms of homeland, favoring a larger scale territory rather than a smaller scale 
ethnic-homeland.   
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Figure 31: Percentages of Participants of Mixed vs. Traditional Marriages Including Bounded 
Spaces in their Sketch Maps. 
 
There is a significant association between being from a particular territory and the 
propensity to use a map with bounded space rather than an artistic drawing (2 = 7.51, p < .01).  
More specifically, participants from Stavropol and other territories were 1.97 times more likely 
to draw a map than those from Karachay-Cherkessia.  Maps from Stavropol appeared 76.41 % of 
the time, while maps from Karachay-Cherkessia appeared at a rate of 62.20 %.  Since Stavropol 
is a krai and not a republic, this territory is fully integrated into the Russian political system, 
suggesting yet again that participants from Stavropol would be more likely to associate with 
Russia at the federal scale, and would have been exposed to a wider range of cartographic 
images regarding the shape of Russia‘s borders.   
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Figure 32: Percentages of Participants from Stavropol Krai vs. Karachay-Cherkessia Including 
Bounded Spaces in their Sketch Maps.  
 
As expected, there is a similar significant association regarding the propensity to use 
cartographic detail and being from a particular territory (2 = 15.29, p < .01).  Participants from 
Stavropol and other territories were 2.49 times more likely to pay attention to cartographic detail 
than those from Karachay-Cherkessia.  Stavropol maps showed this detail on 56.92 %.  
Karachay-Cherkessia maps showed it on 34.65 %.   
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Figure 33: Percentages of Participants from Stavropol Krai vs. Karachay-Cherkessia Attempting 
Cartographic Detail. 
   
The Federal Scale 
The borders of the Russian Federation were sketched by 31.31 % of the participants.  
Russia‘s borders mean different things to different people, but based on the instructions of the 
exercise, including them on one‘s sketch map illustrates recognition of Russia, not only as an 
entity, but also as homeland.  When examining Russian borders, we should draw on Paasi‘s 
notion of ―lines of exclusion and inclusion.‖  Russia‘s borders serve the purpose of defining 
Rossiyani, Russian citizens, from inostrantsi, or foreigners.  Here Russian citizens are included; 
foreigners (even though they might be ethnic Russians themselves) are excluded.  Ethnic 
Russians might be apt to see the ideas of Rodina and rodina as the same concept, as they could 
perhaps logically draw claims to all of Russia as their own.  This feeling could exist for two 
reasons.  First, Russians are far and away the largest nationality in the Russian Federation and 
their population extends throughout the country‘s territorial divisions.  That is to say, a Russian 
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could go anywhere in the Russian Federation and find both other Russians and also Russian style 
institutions and symbols.  In contrast, non-Russian populations typically exist in large numbers 
only within their designated homelands. Therefore, non-Russians are not likely to find their own 
specific cultural shapes apart from their specific territories and are likely to identify their 
homeland on regional or local scales.      
The association between nationality and including the borders of The Russian Federation 
on one‘s map was significant (2 = 23.89, p < .01).  Ethnic Russians were 3.29 times more likely 
to draw federal scale borders than ethnic non-Russians.  This large discrepancy illustrates the 
connection between Russians and the Russian Federation and being a positive environment for 
them as an ethno-national group.  Russian Federal borders appeared on 47.33 % of Russians‘ 
sketches and on 21.47 % of non-Russians‘ maps.   
 
Figure 34: Percentages of Russians vs. Non-Russians Drawing Federal Borders. 
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The association between religion type and drawing the borders of the Russian Federation 
was also significant (2 = 24.53, p < .01).  Non-Islamic participants were 3.37 times more likely 
to signify Russia‘s borders than were Islamic participants. This difference mirrors those between 
Russian and non-Russian participants.  Just as Russia can be seen as Russian space in ethno-
national terms, it can also be seen as Christian space in religious terms.  Islamic participants are 
not likely to see Russia as a space of inclusion in regard to their religion. 
 
Figure 35: Percentages of Islamic Participants vs. Non-Islamic Drawing Federal Borders. 
 
There was also a significant association between being born in an urban environment and 
drawing the borders federal borders (2 = 8.46, p < .01).  Those participants born in a city, rather 
than in a village, an aul, or in the country side were 2.06 times more likely to include Russia‘s 
borders.  Urban-born participants drew Russia‘s borders on 42.86 % of their sketches, while 
those born in rural areas drew such borders on 26.73 % of their sketches.  The two large urban 
centers in the study area, Stavropol and Cherkessk, are both regional centers of commerce that 
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do business with other cities in Russia, particularly Moscow.  This experience with places in 
other regions of Russia could have influenced participants‘ decisions to include all of Russia in 
their sketch maps.    
 
Figure 36: Percentages of Urban vs. Rural Participants Drawing Federal Borders. 
 
There was also a significant association between living urban and drawing a federal scale 
border (2 = 7.39, p < .01).  Urban dwellers are 1.95 times more likely to draw such a border 
than those participants currently not living in cities, as they included the borders of Russia on 
38.51 % of their sketches, while those living in rural areas did so on 24.32 % of their own. 
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Figure 37: Percentages of Urban vs. Rural Living Environments Regarding Russia's Borders. 
 
Having parents of different nationalities and drawing a federal scale border are also 
significantly correlated (2 = 4.93, p < .05).  Participants of mixed-ethnicity were 2.32 times 
more likely to draw the borders of Russia than those who were not of mixed-ethnicity.   While 50 
% of those respondents from mixed marriages drew Russia‘s borders, 30.14 % of non-mixed 
participants did so.   
 
Figure 38: Percentages of Mixed vs. Traditional Marriages Regarding Russia's Borders. 
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 When thinking about homeland in ethno-national terms, individuals of mixed ethnic 
background essentially have a choice as to which territories they could associate.  We see here 
that when they have the opportunity to choose, they choose Russia.  I suggest that this trend is 
due to the fact that most of these participants were born in Russia and have been raised in the 
Russian social context.   
Being from Stavropol or Karachay-Cherkessia and the inclusion of Russia‘s borders are 
also significantly correlated (2 = 16.52, p < .01).  Participants from Stavropol and other 
territories were 2.92 times more likely to include borders of the Russian Federation than those 
from Karachay-Cherkessia.  While participants from Karachay-Cherkessia drew the borders of 
Russia on 18.90 % of their sketches, participants from the other territories drew them on 40.51 % 
of their own. 
 
Figure 39: Percentages of Participants from Stavropol Krai and Karachay-Cherkessia Regarding 
Federal Borders. 
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Again, we see the reoccurring theme of Stavropol being connected to the rest of Russia, or being 
within Russian space.  Although participants in Karachay-Cherkessia could also claim the entire 
country as their homeland due to their Russian citizenship, they tend to choose to associate with 
their ethnic homeland at the regional and local scales instead.  
 
Federal Places 
Federal places are those important for the Russian Federation, but not located in the study 
area.  Moscow and St. Petersburg were two popular federal places chosen.  Association with 
them could mean a variety of different things.  Some might sketch Moscow due to the fact that it 
is the country‘s capital city or because they spent time there or have family and friends there. 
Both Moscow and St. Petersburg are popularly associated with power and money.  They are also 
considered to be important historical places for the Russian nation, as well as beautiful examples 
of Russian‘s grandeur and glorious past.  Including such places in one‘s homeland represents 
respect for Russia as a state, much like drawing federal scale borders.   
 There was a significant association between nationality and including places important to 
Russia at the federal scale (2 = 38.16, p < .01).  Ethnic Russians were 4.78 times more likely to 
draw federal scale places (primarily Moscow and St. Petersburg) than were ethnic non-Russians.  
Russians sketched federal places on 48.09 of their maps, while non-Russians sketched such 
places on 16.23 % of their own.    
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Figure 40: Percentages of Russians vs. Non-Russian Including Places Important to Russia at the 
Federal Scale. 
 
Places important to Russia at the federal scale, like Moscow, are arguably familiar to 
every participant in my study.  Moscow serves as the country‘s major media and political outlet 
as the capital of the Russian Federation.  Regardless of whether they had spent time in Moscow 
or not, each participant has been exposed to Moscow, be it though education and media devices 
or through personal experience gained through travel.  Moscow represents power in the Russian 
context.  It, along with St. Petersburg, also represents wealth and opportunity.   
Other cities appearing on the sketch maps are more likely there due to a given 
participant‘s given family connections or personal history.  The cities Perm and Arkanglsk both 
appeared on sketch maps, but these two places are both far from the North Caucasus.  The fact 
that such connections exist helps to emphasize the notion that Russian civilization exhibits 
continuity on the federal scale.  According to Raitz and Ulack (1981), mental maps are likely to 
include the areas with which people are most personally familiar.  The more people travel or 
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migrate, the more new impressions and experiences they gather and the more diverse their 
mental maps become.  Someone who has lived in many different regions of Russia is likely to 
feel at home in all of them and thus at home in the Russian Federation.  To invoke Anderson‘s 
(1983) concept, travel and experience in different areas can work to develop one‘s sense of his or 
her ―imagined community.‖   
Perhaps logically, there is a similar association between Religion type and the propensity 
to include a place that is important to Russia at the federal scale (2 = 34.25, p < .01).  Non-
Islamic respondents, a majority of whom are Orthodox Christians, were 4.50 times more likely to 
include a federal scale place than were Islamic participants.  Places important at the federal level 
were included by 45.95 % of non-Islamic participants and by 20.11 % of Islamic participants.   
 
Figure 41: Percentages of Islamic Participants vs. non-Islamic Including Places Important to 
Russia at the Federal Level. 
  
One explanation for this difference is the fact that for Russian Orthodox Christians, most of their 
holy places are located within Russia.  Moscow serves as important religious place since it 
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houses many important churches and holy sites.  Islamic people in Russia do not associate with 
federal cities for religious purposes.  However, several Islamic participants did include religious 
places outside of the Russian Federation in their homelands, including Mecca in Saudi Arabia.  
Participants in urban and rural environments also approached federal places differently.  
There was a significant association between being born in an urban environment and drawing a 
place that is important to Russia at the federal scale (2 12.18, p < .05).  Those born urban are 
2.41 times more likely to include a place like Moscow or St. Petersburg within their perceived 
homeland than those participants who were not born in the city.   
 
Figure 42: Percentages of Urban vs. Rural Participants Including Places Important to Russia. 
 
The inclusion of federal level places is also significantly related to territory (2 = 25.35, p 
< .01).  Participants from Stavropol and other territories were 4.22 times more likely to include 
places important to the Russian Federation than those from Karachay-Cherkessia.  Participants 
from Karachay-Cherkessia included a federal scale place in 13.38 of their maps.  Participants 
from the other territories included such places on is 39.48 % of their own maps.  Again we see 
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evidence that people in Stavropol see themselves as more integrated into the Russian Federal 
system than in Karachay-Cherkessia in terms of homeland.   
 
Figure 43: Percentages of Participants in Stavropol vs. Karachay-Cherkessia Including Places 
Important to Russia. 
 
 
The Regional Scale 
 
The regional scale in this study includes all areas within Stavropol Krai and Karachay-
Cherkessia and those in reference to The Southern Federal District or to the North Caucasus 
region in general.  Borders of any of these territories were counted as regional borders and places 
with in these territories were counted as regional places.  Such places, like Stavropol and 
Cherkessk, were the most popular element included on the sketch maps, as 75.08 % of them 
showed some regional place.  Regional borders were the second most popular element, appearing 
on 43.77 % of the sketch maps.   
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The only significant difference between groups on the regional scale was an association 
between being born urban and including a regional place (2 = 5.48, p < .05).  Urban participants 
were 2.02 times more likely than those not born in the city to include such places.  83.81 % of 
those born urban included regional scale place, while 71.98 % of rural born participants did so.    
 
Figure 44: Percentages of Urban vs. Rural Participants Including a Place Important to the 
Region. 
 
 The overall lack of significant differences on this scale shows that Russians and non-
Russians view their regions and territories with the same importance.  Although Russians are 
more likely to associate with federal scale constructs, regional scale constructs are also important 
to them.   Regional scale places and borders are also more personally familiar to participants than 
those on the federal scale, but they provide a larger scale than local.  
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The Local Scale 
 
The local scale refers areas or features within cities, villages, auls, and parts of the 
countryside.  These places could be schools, buildings, parks, and other local establishments.  
15.65 % of the participants provided a local border, enclosing their local scale sketch with a 
boundary. 37.39 % made some reference to a local place without necessarily including a border.     
Gender and drawing of a local scale border were significantly associated (2 = 5.29, p < 
.05).  Men were 2.08 times more likely to draw such a border than were women.  22.7 % of male 
participants drew a local border.  12.39 % of female participants drew a local border.   
 
Figure 45: Percentages of Male and Female Participants Including a Local Border in their Sketch 
Maps. 
There was also a significant association between being born in the same place as one‘s 
parents and including a local scale place on one‘s map (2 = 4.06, p < .05).  Those born in the 
same place as their parents are 1.60 times more likely to designate a local scale place on their 
sketch maps than those whose parents were born in a different place. Participants with the same 
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birthplace as their parents drew local places on 42.58 % of their maps, while those who were not 
drew local places on 31.73 % of their own.   
 
Figure 46: Percentages of Participants with Parents of the Same Birthplace as Themselves vs. 
Different Birthplaces Including Local Place. 
  
This difference demonstrates how familiarity and ancestral legacies affect one‘s sense of 
place.  When someone has connections to a place through multiple generations, they are likely to 
be exposed to a deeper knowledge of that place‘s geography and history.  When one is born in a 
place different to that of his or her parents, he or she would be exposed to their parents‘ sense of 
place, which already be a secondary situation, rather than where they grew up.    
There was also a significant relationship between territory and the propensity of including 
places on the local scale (2 = 6.83, p < .01).  Participants from Karachay-Cherkessia were 1.85 
times more likely to draw local scale places, including them on 45.67 % of their sketches, 
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participants from Stavropol and other territories included local places on 31.28 % of their own 
sketches.   
 
Figure 47: Percentages of Participants in Stavropol vs. Karachay-Cherkessia Including Places 
Local Places. 
 
 
Landscape Features 
 
Landscape features are defined as any kind of attribute found in nature, such as rivers, 
mountains, and forests.  As Gould and White (1974) claim, mental images of homeland often 
contain positive environmental factors such as pleasant landscape.  The North Caucasus is 
considered to be one of Russia‘s most beautiful places and has long been a popular destination 
for tourists from the north due to its mild climate, mountain vistas, and mineral water springs.  
Many of the participants expressed their appreciation for their natural environment in the 
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interviews saying that they regarded the south of Russia to be favorable to the north due to its 
climate and natural environment.  The mountains are important in the cultures of both Russians 
and non-Russians.  Many famous writers spent time in the Caucasus including Lermontov and 
Tolstoy.  The Karachays have traditionally settled the slopes of Mt. Elbrus, which holds a special 
place in their culture.   
The association between nationality and including a physical feature from the landscape 
in one‘s map was significant (2 = 5.08, p < .05).  More specifically, non-Russians were 1.76 
times more likely to include a landscape feature in their maps than were Russians.  While 36.32 
% of non-Russians included a landscape feature, only 24.43 % of Russians did. 
 
Figure 48: Percentages of Russians vs. non-Russians including Landscape Features. 
 
 Aesthetic values of the North Caucasus region are important regarding one‘s conceptions 
of homeland.  Many participants, especially those who did not provide concrete borders on their 
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sketch maps, included elements of nature and landscape.  Although both non-Russians and 
Russians could logically include landscape features in their conceptions of homeland, almost the 
entire non-Russian population lives within mountainous of semi-mountainous areas.  Most of the 
Russian participants live within an environment where they are exposed to flat steppe lands or 
rolling hills rather than dramatic mountain landscapes.    
There is also an association between religion type and the drawing of a landscape feature 
(2 = 4.27, p < .05).  Islamic participants were 1.66 more likely to include a landscape feature in 
their maps than were non-Islamic participants.   36.42 % of Islamic sketches included a 
landscape feature as did 25.68 % of non-Islamic offerings.  
 
Figure 49: Percentages of Islamic vs. non-Islamic Participants Including Landscape Features. 
 
Gender and the propensity to include physical features in the landscape were also 
significantly associated (2 = 9.46, p < .01).  Women were more likely to include a landscape 
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feature (most often images of mountains) by 2.53 times.  Women sketched physical features 
important to their idea of homeland on 36.32 of their drawings, while 18.39 % of men did so.    
 
Figure 50: Percentages of Male and Female Participants Including Landscape Features. 
 
Religious Places and Ethnic Symbols 
 
Places important specifically for religious purposes were the second least popular 
appearing on only 8.63 % of the sketch maps.  Only elements representing ethnic symbols, which 
appeared on 7.76 % of the maps, were fewer in number.  Although these categories were not 
extremely popular, they were still present.  Also, the fact that there were no significant 
associations between the group designations and these elements shows that all of the various 
groups considered them to be of equal importance.   
 Religious places included churches, mosques, and holy sites.  Stavropol has many 
churches and several Orthodox Christian holy sites, but no mosques. However, Christians have 
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multiple churches in Cherkessk.  The presence of these religious places in the landscape is likely 
not to be cause for their sparse appearance on the on Christian participants‘ maps.  Their absence 
is more to do with the fact that over 70 % of the participants indicated that they did not attend a 
place of worship regularly.  Islamic participants in Stavropol lack religious places, but there are 
Mosques in Karachay-Cherkessia.  Their lack of religious places maybe due to the fact that such 
places are not of personal value.  Aliyev (2004) notes the influence of Sufism in the North 
Caucasus, which emphasis personal spiritual expression rather than the mosque.  He notes that 
Muslims who practiced this strain were more successful during the Soviet period, when mosque 
worship was often not an option.   
 Ethnic symbols consist of monuments to writers or national heroes and of images that are 
traditionally associated with a particular ethnic group including specific landscape features, such 
as a birch tree, or Mt. Elbrus.  A possible explanation for the lack of such elements on sketch 
maps would be that they are difficult to include beyond the local scale.   Another reason could be 
that most of the monuments in the study area were constructed in Soviet times and represent 
Soviet achievements.  The young generation may not relate to these symbols as much.    
 
Map Descriptions from Interviews 
  
The following maps are all examples collected during the summer of 2009.  I chose to 
include these maps because I feel that they represent typical elements exhibited by many of the 
participants and because these participants also provided interviews explain their maps.  The idea 
of homeland is complex, but several key themes stand out in these participants‘ sketch maps.  
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First, participants drew territory in which they felt the most comfortable or they considered to be 
comfortable for their ethno-national groups.  Non-Russians rarely represented their conceptions 
of homeland on the federal scale with no mention of other places or parts of Russia.  Islamic 
participants often included places outside of the Russian Federation that were important for 
Islam.  Many Russians were comfortable incorporating at least some part of The Russian 
Federation beyond their immediate surroundings but not all of them considered the entire 
country to be their homeland, citing differences in regional culture.  Second, family connections 
are very important.   Participants often commented on ideas of their historical homelands, from 
where their ancestors originated, in addition to their contemporary conceptions of homeland.  
They also tended to draw places that were important to family members, such as their mother‘s 
birthplace, to which they had no direct association themselves.  Third, scale is important in terms 
of borders and places, and how people related to them politically.  Participants who chose to use 
political borders on their sketch maps more often than not drew the Russian Federation, and thus 
included places like St. Petersburg and Moscow.  These two places appeared on many maps 
when participants had no personal connections to these cities.  They were included as symbols of 
Russia and because they are economically prosperous.  Fourth, natural sites and landscape 
features were prominent along with cities in the region that are commonly associated with 
beautiful nature or resorts.  Positive environmental factors, like the sea side or sunny weather, 
also prompted participants to include places to which they had no personal connections.  Finally, 
attention to everyday life was important for many participants.  These people tended to see their 
homeland on the local scale, preferring to association with familiar environments with which 
they have intimate personal experience.   
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Figure 51: Map of Participant 65. 
  
This sketch by participant number 65, a Russian woman from Stavropol, shows a clear 
attempt to include all of Russia in her map.  She included three cities, Moscow, St. Petersburg, 
and Stavropol, in their relative geographical proximities.  When I asked her if her map included 
all of the Russian Federation, she confirmed it.  She then confirmed that most important place of 
the three was Stavropol, saying ―  
because it is where I was born, and where I live.‖ 
 Moscow was included ― 
Because it is the capital.‖   
She then said that she had included St. Petersburg: 
Because it is a very beautiful city and is considered the pride of Russia. I would like 
to live there if it were possible.   
  
Map number 65 exemplifies several important trends. First, as was the case with 75.08 % of the 
sketch maps, the participant included a place that is significant at the regional scale.  In this 
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situation it was Stavropol, which is also important because it happens to be this participant‘s 
place of residence.  Stavropol is also the regional capital of her home region.  Her choice to 
include Stavropol was motivated both by familiarity and by symbolism.   
 Drawing the border of the Russian Federation indicates affiliation with the entire territory 
of the country and including Moscow and St. Petersburg suggests that the participant used a 
similar thought process to select federal scale places they are both widely familiar and symbolic.  
While Moscow may have been selected due to its administrative power and as a symbol for 
Russia, St. Petersburg was selected due the participant‘s affinity for the city.  This choice is in 
keeping with what Gould and White (1974) propose regarding place affinities: people‘s mental 
maps are more likely to contain places with which they associate positive attributes.    
 
Figure 52: Map of Participant 66. 
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Participant number 66 self-identified in almost an identical faction to number 65, except 
for the fact that she practices her religion: Orthodox Christianity.  Although she included the 
same three cities (Stavropol, Moscow, and St. Petersburg) on the map, her map differs in that she 
did not draw the entire border of the Russian Federation when attempting to represent the 
territory that she considers to be her homeland.  Regarding this decision she said: 
I did not draw in all of Russia, although it is all important for Russians.  I included 
Stavropol because I was born here and have lived here my whole life, Moscow 
because it is central to Russia, being the capital, and St. Petersburg because it is also 
a powerful city.  I consider my homeland to be all of Russia of course, but if I have 
to choose the places most important to me, there are all here in central Russia. 
 
This map is an example of where one‘s own sense of homeland is not consistent with his or her 
imagined homeland in terms of political borders.  A lack of geographical familiarity for the 
eastern part of Russia means that this participant did not include this area in her map.  However, 
she acknowledges that this area is important for Russians as an ethno-national group, of whom 
she considers herself.  Another notable element in this response is that participant 66 used the 
term ―Central Russia,‖ rather than ―Western Russia‖ (which is essential what she drew with an 
attempt at accuracy: Russian territory west of the Urals), illustrating her lack of familiarity with 
Siberia and the Russian Far East.  For most people, neither Stavropol, which is part of the North 
Caucasus, nor St. Petersburg, which is located in northwestern corner of the country on the Gulf 
of Finland, would be considered Central Russia.   
This sketch map says something about Participant 66‘s sense of core and periphery.  
Although St. Petersburg is not central to Russia‘s geography, it is central in importance to 
Russian identity.  Since this participant considers herself Russian, placing Stavropol centrally 
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within Russian space and including it along with the major centers of power in the country 
emphasis territorial affiliation on the federal scale and association with traditionally Russian 
space and Russian places.    
 
Figure 53: Map of Participant 64. 
 
Participant number 64‘s background differs from the previous two examples in that she 
indicated spending part of her life far away from The South of Russia and from The North 
Caucasus region in the Russian Far East.  In addition to including Stavropol on the map, she also 
drew Moscow and Khabarovsk.  When asked why she chose these two cities, she responded:  
I have many relatives in Moscow, and it is important because it is the capital of 
Russia.  Khabarovsk is there because I lived there, and that is where I grew up. 
 
In this response we again see connections to family and personal experience factor into one‘s 
choices regarding important places in his or her homeland.  An attempt at cartographic accuracy 
is also present in the Russian Far East, presumably due to the fact that participant number 64 has 
direct experience with this region.   Another point of interest in this map is that Stavropol is 
equidistant to Moscow and the Southern border.  Khabarovsk is also located firmly inland, not 
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presumably in close proximity to China.  Again, we see spatial preferences leaning toward the 
core as opposed to the periphery.   
 
 
Figure 54: Map of Participant 67. 
 
Participant number 67, a Russian man from Stavropol, drew three map units, representing 
three separate examples of bounded space at different scales.  We see part of Stavropol, with his 
home street and his apartment building.  He also chose to identify the south of Russia with two 
cities: Stavropol and Rostov-on-Don.  Rostov-on-Don is the largest city and the capital of the 
Southern Federal District.  He explained: 
I drew Stavropol because I live here.  I have lived here for 25 years.  And here is The 
South of Russia… well, the Southwest, also the sea, and The Caucasus.  The North 
Caucasian Republics are not here, I do not consider them to be my homeland.  I do 
not really consider all of Russia to be my homeland.  But, this is just for me…this is 
what I call homeland.    
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The fact that Participant 67 includes places in the Caucasus, but does not consider the republics 
part of his homeland shows his awareness of the break between Russian and non-Russian space 
in the cultural landscape.  This distinction is more important to his conception of homeland than 
the political boundaries that indicate that these territorial units are indeed part of Russia.  The 
break is notable due to his rather accurate depiction of Stavropol Krai and accurate positioning of 
Stavropol within it indicate that he has a good awareness of political boundaries in the Region.   
 
Figure 55: Map of Participant 76. 
 
This map, drawn by Participant number 76, shows a common theme exhibited by rural 
respondents who were born in the same place as previous generations of their family.  Participant 
76 is Russian male from the village of Novotrostkaya.  His emphasis is on a very local area, with 
little attention paid to scale beyond his own neighborhood.  When asked to describe his map, he 
said plainly: 
It is my countryside.  Well, you could call this a street… it is more of a road.  This 
place is called Novotrostkaya, it is in Stavropol Krai.  It is nearby here.   
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Outside the village, he wrote the word ―steppe‖ and added an exclamation point.  This indication 
shows an affiliation with the local landscape.  Although Novotrostkaya is technically located in 
the North Caucasus region, this area is some of the last steppe land before one reaches the rolling 
hills that lead to the Caucasus to the South.  Identifying with the steppe, rather than with the 
Caucasus exemplifies place affinity, as it points out a choice to associate with regions to the 
north, which extend far into Russia and into Kazakhstan.  The steppe is also important for 
agriculture, and therefore its presence might be due to its role in village livelihood.     
 
 
Figure 56: Map of Participant 78. 
 
Participant number 78 is Russian woman born in Stavropol who grew up in Karachay-
Cherkessia.  The three places that she chose to include on her map, Moscow, Stavropol, and 
Cherkessk, are all bounded by territory on a greater scale presumably their oblast, krai, or 
republic borders.  I make this assumption because these cities are all the capitals of their 
respective territories.  This is how she described her map:   
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On my map, I drew Moscow, Stavropol, and Cherkessk.  I am from Karachay-
Cherkessia, but I do not really like it there.  I like it here better in Stavropol.  I was 
born in Stavropol, but we moved to Karachay-Cherkessia when I was half a year 
old… so I actually consider myself to be from Stavropol.  My parents live in 
Stavropol, but my dad is in Moscow now.  I am often in the Moscow Oblast. 
 
One particular point of interest on this map is the fact that Moscow and Stavropol are connected 
with a line, again showing the connection between Stavropol and power federal cities.  Also, the 
territory that is presumably Karachay-Cherkessia appears to have been included on the map after 
the Stavropol territory was drawn. Here we see a good example of one‘s decision making 
regarding a mental map.  Stavropol is where she would like to associate, but she cannot leave out 
Karachay-Cherkessia due to her life experience there.   
 
Figure 57: Map of Participant 20. 
 
The map drawn by Participant number 20, a female from a small town in the Volgograd 
Oblast, does not specifically depict the area where she was born.  She indicated that she has lived 
in Stavropol for four years, and Stavropol Krai (as an entire territory) is the most important place 
to her in terms of homeland.  She clearly identifies with all of Russia because she managed to 
include what appears to be Kaliningrad Oblast, which is a Russian exclave in Europe between 
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Poland and Lithuania.  Moscow and the Moscow Oblast also appear on her map.  Another point 
of interest on her map is the town of Dombay, which is a popular resort area in Karachay-
Cherkessia.  She stated in regard to Dombay:  
I love the mountains, nature is beautiful there (Dombay).  I really like to relax and 
Dombay is a very relaxing place. 
  
Here again, we observe place affinity due to positive environmental factors.  It is especially 
important to consider that participant number 20 is relatively new to the North Caucasus region.  
Living in Stavropol, she has likely had little first-hand experience either with Dombay or 
Karachay-Cherkessia.  In general, her map displays factors of power, familiarity, and aesthetic 
value all influencing her mental image of homeland.   
 
 
Figure 58: Map of Participant 87. 
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Participant number 87 self-identified as a Karachay female born in Karachay-Cherkessia.  
Her sketch represents a popular approach taken by many participants, especially from the 
mountainous regions of Stavropol Krai and Karachay-Cherkessia.  In this drawing, we do not 
observe a map per se, as there are no borders delineating specific territories.  What we do 
observe however are several places important to this participant‘s conception of homeland: 
important physical features in the landscape, one of which (Mt. Elbrus) is a symbol of particular 
importance to the Karachay people.  There is a mosque, which is significant for the Karachays‘ 
Islamic heritage.  The mosque serves as an identity marker, showing the area as Islamic space.   
Because there are no borders included in this sketch, one is left to consider the entire page as 
the participant‘s homeland and is this forced to interpret the participant‘s idea of territoriality 
through the symbols and individual places included.  She said:  
When I think about homeland, I think about the Republic of Karachay-Cherkessia 
(not Russia).  All of these things I drew are important to me.  Here is Elbrus, which 
is very important, so is the waterfall, and even so is the cable car line.   
 
In this sketch, we see essentially no connection to the idea of ―Russia.‖ All of the place-based 
elements that Participant 87 included are either local, or specifically linked to Karachay-
Cherkessia, rather than to overall Russian Federal identity.  Even the cable cars are actually very 
important because they are a means by which people are able to explore the mountains, and thus 
better connect with them.  Elbrus, too, is drawn in a very particular fashion, resembling the garb 
in the center of the flag of Karachay-Cherkessia.  
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Figure 59: The Flag of Karachay-Cherkessia.  Source: www.circassianworld.com 
 
 
 
Figure 60: Map of Participant 86. 
 
When I asked Participant 86 to explain her map, this is what she said:  
I drew all of Russia, the borders of the country.  I drew Izibilni (a small town in 
Stavropol Krai) because I live there and I was born there, and I drew Stavropol, the 
other city where I live… I drew the mountains of Lagonaki because I often go there 
with my parents on vacation.  It is important that it is warm here, I like the conditions 
in the Southern Federal District.  
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Like many others, Participant number 86‘s image of homeland has also been influenced by 
pleasant environmental factors and through family connections.  Here we see elements of power 
and a sense of overall Russian identity through including all of Russia.  I found it interesting that 
she did not include Mt. Elbrus on her map but rather some lower mountain nearby.  When I 
asked her why she left out Mt. Elbrus, she told me that she had not drawn it because it was not 
Russia.  I asked her why she thought this and she replied: 
Well, because it is not located in Russia… is it?  I do not really know, I am not really 
sure. 
 
This response points again to the importance of identity and place as we see the concept of ―non-
Russian space‖ dictate this woman‘s perception of Mt. Elbrus. Mt. Elbrus is in fact fully within 
the borders of the Russian Federation, but the area is inhabited primarily by Karachays (on the 
slopes in Karachay-Cherkessia) and Balkars (on the Mt. Elbrus‘s slopes in Kabirdino-Balkaria) 
(Richmond, 2006).     
 
Figure 61: Map of Participant 38. 
 
According to Participant 38: 
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For as much as I live in the North Caucasus, I prefer to relate to the Black Sea.  I like 
to relax there, and I have got a lot of good memories there from my childhood.  It is 
all because it is close to Krasnodar Krai.  Pyatigorsk because my grandma and 
grandpa are from there and so is my dad. My childhood memories are also connected 
to Pyatigorsk.  I am obsessed with Sochi, everything is happening there now.  Soon 
we will have the Olympics there in 2014.  And here is St. Petersburg.  I have got 
many friends there.  It is the second capital of Russia, and it is really the cultural 
capital of Russia.  It is a symbol of Russia, it is everything for us! 
 
Participant number 38, a woman from Stavropol, demonstrates how one can filter place-based 
identity factors to construct a conception of homeland that is more idealistic than local.  Rather 
than including her birthplace or the area in which she lives, she chose to draw three places that 
are all fairly universally considered to be romantic by the Russian people:  The Black Sea, St. 
Petersburg, and Pyatigorsk.  Pyatigorsk holds importance in the literature of several famous 19
th
 
century Russian authors. The local landscape around it is also quite beautiful, its name literally 
meaning ―five mountains.‖  The Black Sea also appears on the sketch.  Interestingly enough, the 
sea is almost entirely enclosed by the borders of the Russian Federation.  Sochi, too, is 
referenced, as it is one of the few areas (along with Moscow and St. Petersburg) to greatly 
benefit from the Putin era‘s economic reforms.  St. Petersburg is also present on the map: well 
within Russia‘s borders and not near the Gulf of Finland.   
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Figure 62: Map of Participant 34. 
 
Participant number 34, a woman from Stavropol, sketched a small box, labeling it 
―Russia‖ paying no attention the idea of the mountains of the sea as something inherently ―non-
Russian.‖  She explained that: 
This is Russia, with Stavropol, the mountains, and my house.  Stavropol, my home, 
and the mountains are all connected to me.  I was born here and have lived here all 
my life.  This is Zhersk.  My dad lives there and I like that city.  Here is Sochi on the 
black sea.  My aunt lives nearby there and I cannot live without the sea! 
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Figure 63: Map of Participant 21. 
 
Participant number 21 is Cherkess, but she was born in Perm, a city near the Ural Mountains.  
Interestingly, the places in her map are focused on the south.  She correctly points out the close 
proximity of Cherkessk and Stavropol and distances them both from Moscow.  When I asked her 
why she chose these three places, this was her reply: 
I drew Stavropol because I have lived here the longest.  Cherkessk is here because I 
am there a lot.  You could say that my roots are from Cherkessk, although I have 
basically never lived there.  Moscow, I simply love that city, and I hope that it will 
be my future living place. 
I then asked her what she thought about Karachay-Cherkessia in terms of being ―Russian‖ 
(Rossiskyi).  She answered:   
I consider Karachay-Cherkessia to be part of Russia, why would it not be?  Well, 
actually I probably feel that way because I have lived in Stavropol Krai for so long, 
around a predominantly Russian population.  I have really gotten used to it here, so 
when I go back there, I do not notice any huge differences.   
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Clearly, she is aware of the effects of living around representatives of another nationality in 
terms of national mentality.  She was born in Russian space and has lived her entire life in 
Russian space.  In fact, individuals such as this are becoming more common among the young 
generation from Karachay-Cherkessia, as their parents have moved away for economic reasons, 
but kept ties with the Republic.  Leaving Karachay-Cherkessia is sometimes an option  for the 
young generation, especially university students.  Being exposed to Russian culture and having 
command of the Russian language can open doors of social mobility in other regions, and not 
considering ―Russian space‖ to be foreign or somehow uninviting means that out-migration is an 
option.  This woman‘s description of Moscow does not glorify it as a symbol of Russia, but 
rather as an economic or aesthetic goal.  She later explained to me that she wanted to live in 
Moscow especially for the material advantages, the higher salaries, and the city night life.  These 
elements are simply not available in the North Caucasus on a scale grand enough to satisfy her.  
 
Figure 64: Map of Participant 32. 
 
Participant number 32 is an Armenian woman.  Although she was born near Yerevan, she 
spent most of her life in Russia, having moved to Stavropol after the collapse of the USSR.  
Stavropol‘s Armenian population is quite pronounced.  The local airport for example offers two 
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direct flights: Moscow and Yerevan.  The Armenian population is somewhat divided however.  
Some of the Stavropol Armenians are from Armenia proper, such as participant 32, while others 
are from Baku, having immigrated to Stavropol as refugees due to the unstable conditions 
relating to the Nagorno-Karabakh war in Azerbaijan.  Although they recognize each other as 
Armenian, they tend not to socialize with one another.  Yerevan Armenians in Stavropol have 
retained a strong sense of homeland regarding all that is Armenia.  This is what Participant 32 
said about her map: 
Ah, we can say a lot about the map!  Well first of all, Mt. Ararat is ours!  Wherever it 
stands makes no difference (it is currently within the borders of Turkey), I consider it 
to be ours.  Also Servan is very important, it is the only place that is really left… 
well were we can really go to sit in the sun.  Then there is Yerevan, I do not know if 
I drew it right, maybe it is supposed to be over here… it is where my dad was born, 
and where I spent my childhood… well, a part of my childhood…summers.   
 
Here we see a great sense of pride for one‘s birthplace and historical conception of 
homeland.  Even though this woman has spent the majority of her conscious life in Russia, she 
does not consider it her homeland.  Ararat is also important, just as Mt. Elbrus is for the 
Karachay.  However, like with most of the other examples, family connections and 
environmental aesthetics influence her decision.  
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Figure 65: Map of Participant 33. 
 
Participant number 33 also considers herself to be a ―Yerevan Armenian,‖ but was born 
in Stavropol.  This is how she described her map, a map of Armenia:  
Yerevan is my favorite city in Armenia.  This is Nebryan, that is where my relatives 
live from my father‘s line.  Berekomovan is a village where I spent my childhood, 
where my father was born. 
 
I mentioned to her that I was curious as to why she drew Armenia, not Russia, as her homeland.  
This was her response:  
That‘s my homeland.  I have never really lived there, but all the same my homeland 
is Armenia.   
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Figure 66: Map of Participant 132. 
 
Participant number 132, a Russian man, drew the border of the Southern Federal District 
as his homeland.  I found this to be particularly interesting because the Southern Federal District, 
as a political entity is a relatively new concept having appeared as one of the seven federal 
districts created during Putin‘s federal reforms of the mid-2000s.  In describing his map, he said: 
This is my homeland, the Southern Federal District.  In it there is Stavropol, one of 
the places that very important to me… and in Stavropol, here is my house and my 
sister‘s house, they are very important to me…I have never been anywhere.  I was 
born in Norilsk, but I was there two months.  I do not really know anything about the 
rest of Russia.  I consider that for me, the south is really the end of Russia. 
On this map we observe both the regional and local scales.  When asked to choose three places, 
this participant seems to have relied heavily on familiarity rather than an imagined sense of 
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greater Russia when defining his own image of homeland, including his birthplace, with which 
he is not familiar, nor Moscow (St. Petersburg) with which he is also not familiar.      
 
 
Figure 67: Map of Participant 152. 
 
On this map, Participant 152, a self-identified Russian male from Baku, having an Armenian 
father and a Russian mother, relies on both political borders and personal familiarity when 
considering his homeland.  He explained: 
I drew Russia because it is the place where I live now, and because my language is 
Russian.  The Azeri SSR is the exact place where I was born.  The North Caucasus is 
where I am currently living. 
His connections to Azerbaijan, Russia, and the North Caucasus are all present on the map, 
however Azerbaijan is drawn in detail, including the Azeri exclave of Naxcivan.  Although he is 
half Armenian, like many Baku Armenians in Stavropol, he shows little reverence or affection 
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for the Armenian state, nor did he mention anything to do with the Armenian nation further in his 
interview.          
 
Figure 68: Map of Participant 149. 
 
Participant number 149 is a Russian man from Stavropol.  He drew the Stavropol Krai 
with good detail, including the city of Kislovodsk, a mountain resort town in Stavropol Krai.  I 
also included Moscow on the map, but made sure to let me know that it was outside the borders 
of his homeland.  He said: 
This here is the Stavropol Krai.  And here is Moscow, but I just thought to draw it 
actually.  It is of course a small homeland, yes.  Stavropol Krai is a small homeland.  
Moscow is there because it is the capital.  It [Moscow] is not my homeland.  From 
there they rule!  Homeland is here.  We could talk about the city of Kislovodsk.  
They have great weather there and beautiful mountains, it is possible to relax there. 
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Clearly this man views Moscow as an important source of authority, but not as somewhere he 
feels a personal connection in terms of homeland. However, its appearance on the map is 
important as he recognizes its connections to Stavropol Krai, the area that he does consider to be 
his homeland.    
 
Figure 69: Map of Participant 144. 
 
Participant number 144, a Russian woman from Stavropol, included two very important 
ethnic-Russian symbols in her sketch: the matroshka (nesting doll) and the birch tree.  She also 
very clearly provided the borders of the Russian Federation in her map.  Her main criterion for 
defining homeland was birthplace, as she explains: 
 This is Stavropol, it is my birthplace.  This is Yessentuki, it is my dad‘s birthplace 
and a large portion of my relatives live there.  And Rostov is my mother‘s birthplace. 
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Figure 70: Map of Participant 151. 
 
Participant number 151, a woman from Stavropol, also self-identified as Russian, having 
a Russian mother and an Armenian Father from Baku.  Although she was sure of his Armenian 
roots, she doubted his connections to Armenian culture, saying that he was basically Russian.  
This is how she described her map: 
Here is the map, it is supposed to be a map of Russia, but three places that are 
important to me and those close to me are Stavropol, where I live, Moscow, it is the 
capital and the administrative center of the country, and the city of Taginrog, because 
my parents are divorced and my father lives there.  My Grandma lives there…that is 
the majority of the relatives from my father‘s side.  So, naturally I often end up in 
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that city, therefore it is important to me… In general I have got no connections to 
Armenia… I have got some very distant relatives there, but I have never been there. 
Again, we see personal experience with a places and connections with family members 
emphasized over possible conceptions of homeland based on notions of national historical 
territory.   
 
 
Figure 71: Map of Participant 42. 
 
This sketch was done by participant number 42, a woman born in the town of Mineral 
Waters in the mountains of southern Stavropol Krai.  Note her use of the entire page to represent 
her homeland, similar to the example drawn by participant number 87.  However, rather than a 
Mosque in front of a mountain landscape, we see very clearly an Orthodox Church.  She noted: 
 This is my homeland, the Caucasus.  I love the Mountains.  
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Figure 72: Map of Participant 41. 
 
Note Participant 41‘s (a woman from Stavropol) placement of the North Caucasus and 
Stavropol above and to the west of Moscow.  This participant sketched the map from top to 
bottom, first sketching the border of the Russian Federation, next drawing the mountains, then 
Stavropol (which in reality is north of the mountains), then Moscow as her third choice.   
Here is the North Caucasus, Stavropol, and Moscow.  The North Caucasus is here 
because I was born here, I imagine myself here.  Moscow because it is a symbol of 
Russia, it is the capital, there is Red Square and all of that.  And Stavropol because I 
live here…There are many other places that also symbolize Russia.  One could 
include the Orthodox Church, the Golden Ring, St. Petersburg… even Lenin, oh yes 
Lenin, everyone needs to see him.   
It is also notable that she included the Mountains completely within Russian Federal 
Borders, representing either a break between the North and South Caucasus, or seeing all 
of this territory as Russian space.   
 
179 
 
 
Figure 73: Map of Participant 162. 
 
Participant number 162 is a Russian woman who was born in Cherkessk, studied in 
Stavropol, and returned to live in Cherkessk.  Her sketch shows a triangle of important places.  
Again, she selected them based on familiarity and aesthetic value.    
Stavropol, Cherkessk, and Dombay are my most native places.  I studied at Stavropol 
State University, I like to rest in Dombay, and I live in Cherkessk, I love this city.  I 
do not know why, but I love it. 
This is a Russian from Karachay-Cherkessia.  She has had little personal experience with areas 
Russia outside the North Caucasus.  Thus, understandably she does not associate with Russia on 
the federal scale and she chose to represent her homeland on the regional level, but without 
designating specific territorial borders.  Putting Stavropol, Cherkessk, and Dombay together in a 
triangle presents them as one contagious spatial unit, demonstrating that Russian vs. non-Russian 
space did not factor into her mental image enough to merit such delineation in her sketch.  It is 
also important to note that regarding her nationality she is basically indifferent, having married a 
non-Russian and considering her own child‘s nationality to be non-Russian.   
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Figure 74: Map of Participant 57. 
 
Participant 57, an Armenian man from Baku, chose to sketch the environment in which 
he spent the early years of his life, rather than either his birthplace, or his living place.  Here we 
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see homeland associated most of all with positive environmental experiences and pleasant 
memories.  He said: 
On the map, I drew you my childhood.  It was the best time in my life.  It took place 
not in Baku, but in Turkmenistan.  The city is called Krasnoyotsk.  Now, it is called 
Turkmen-Bashi… they changed how it is called.  Here is my grandma‘s house, the 
Caspian Sea, and the place where my grandfather worked.  We went there every day 
by motorcycle. 
 
 
Figure 75: Map of Participant 62. 
 
182 
 
Participant number 62 is a Russian man born in Nalchik, the capital of Kabardino-
Balkaria.  He does not include Nalchik on his sketch map, favoring instead three distinctly 
Russian places, two of which are important symbolic places beyond the regional level.  
Cartographic accuracy is good, showing his conception of homeland includes all of Russia, 
including the Sakhalin Islands in the Russian Far East.  However the south is slightly out of 
proportion, indicating familiarity.   
This is the Russian Federation.  I want to go to Lake Baikal.  It is beautiful It is a 
symbol of Russia‘s nature.  There are lots of beautiful ancient sites there.  Moscow is 
the capital of our country.  Stavropol is the capital of my small homeland.  I also 
could have drawn Nalchik, which is my birthplace. I consider Moscow to be more 
important to me than Nalchik. 
 
 
Figure 76: Map of Participant 61. 
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Participant number 61, a woman from Stavropol, sketched an interesting diagram.  She 
depicted her homeland as a house, with three places serving as a door, and two windows.  Again, 
her focus was on familiarity and comfort.  She explained: 
This is Stavropol, the city where I was born.  It is where I live.  It is where I study.  
You could say that it is my small homeland.  Dombay has mountains, it is one of the 
most beautiful places.  There is also this group of cities called Mineral Waters.  
Pyatigorsk, Kislovodsk, Zheleznovodsk… I like them, I like the rhythm of life there, 
I like their size.  It is very calm there.  They have got mountains and it is very 
peaceful.  I really like it there.  I would live there if I had the possibility to leave… I 
feel the same about the Caucasus as I do about Russia. 
   
 
 
Figure 77: Map of Participant 30. 
 
184 
 
Participant number 30 sketched an interesting map of Stavropol Krai, as part of the wider 
North Caucasus region.  She is from a village called Novoalexandrovsk, which she detailed on 
the map.  She also delineated Stavropol Krai into its various regions, demonstrating her 
awareness of Novoalexandrovsk‘s place within this sub-regional structure.  She is also quite 
certain about this area‘s belonging to the North Caucasus in terms of political rather than cultural 
geography: 
I do not have any relatives right in that region… well, in the republics anyway, I do 
not have any relatives there, but more or less it is a very important place for me.  I 
completely identify with this region, although it is actually not a Russian place.  I 
was born in the North Caucasus [in Stavropol].  Despite there being many 
nationalities in The North Caucasus, and I consider that Russians do not exist there 
in great numbers.   There are rules and weight (prav and vesa) in this region, so I 
consider it to be my homeland also, the North Caucasus… I drew Novoalexandrovsk 
and the city of Stavropol.  They are my two home cities, despite the fact that I live in 
Novoalexandrovsk, Stavropol is also native to me, I was born here. 
 
 
Figure 78: Map of Participant 174. 
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The Soviet legacy is still present in conceptions of homeland among the young 
generation in Russia, especially in terms of identifying birthplace.  Participant 174, a woman 
from Sochi, bases her sketch on her own birthplace and those of her parents.  She explains: 
We have got all of Russia, Sverdlovsk, and Stavropol.  Now, it is called 
Yekaterinburg.  I drew it because my mother was born in Yekaterinburg.  I drew 
Sochi because I was born in Sochi. My parents lived in Sochi.  My dad was born not 
far from Sochi.  I drew Stavropol because I live here now.   
 
 
Figure 79: Map of Participant 171. 
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People born in former Soviet republics other than Russia often include all, or part of these 
territories in their mental images of homeland.  Participant number 171 is a Russian woman who 
was born in Kazakhstan during the late Soviet period.  She identifies fully with Russia, using the 
word ―ours‖ when describing Russia, showing that her national identity is associated with her 
ethnic group rather than with her birthplace which is located outside Russia‘s borders.  She 
explained:  
Here is Russia, and a little bit of Kazakhstan.  Of course in comparison to our 
country it is small, but every country is small compared to Russia!  Here is the 
Caspian Sea.  I was born in Aktau.  I included Stavropol Krai because my parents 
live here, and my grandma lives here. It is an important place in my life at this 
moment.  Novosibirsk and Bryansk, these are the homelands of my parents, and their 
parents.  I have got lots of relatives there.  We have got a very friendly family.  We 
often visit each other. 
   
 
Figure 80: Map of Participant 170. 
 
Participant number 170 is a woman from Stavropol who left to study in St. Petersburg, 
but was visiting for the summer.  Familiarity with Russia‘s important federal cities does not 
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guarantee that Russians from the North Caucasus will automatically associate with them in terms 
of homeland.  Although participant 170 has had experience in a city important to Russia at the 
federal level, she thinks about her homeland in local terms.  She explains: 
This is Stavropol, it is my homeland.  I live in St. Petersburg now, but I consider 
Stavropol to be my home.  This is my house on Dvortetsev Street.  These are the hills 
where we walk, this is the forest where I meet with my friends. 
 
   
 
Figure 81: Map of Participant 192. 
 
Participant number 192, a woman born in Stavropol, self-identified as both Nogai and 
Cherkess.  She delineates three territories on her sketch map which happen to be where her 
parents were born: Karachay-Cherkessia and the Krasnodar Krai.  She first drew Karachay-
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Cherkessia, the added Krasnodar Krai in.  When I asked her to describe the map, she first asked 
to use the pencil with which I was taking notes, sketching something else and saying:   
Here I showed you three places.  The Republic of Karachay-Cherkessia, and the aul 
where my father was born.  I showed you Krasnodar Krai because that is where my 
mom was born.  The third place that is important to me is Mecca.  It is a place that is 
sacred to all Muslims, so therefore it is very important to me too. 
Participant number 192 was not the only Islamic participant to include Mecca in his or her sketch 
map.  However, what is perhaps most interesting about this map is that she regarded her parents‘ 
birthplaces as her homeland without paying any attention to her own birthplace, Stavropol.  
Based on the order in which she sketched her map, and lack of attention to geographical 
accuracy, the non-Russian Republic Karachay-Cherkessia was in fact the first place she drew, 
followed by Russian Krasnodar Krai, followed then by Mecca.   
 
Figure 82: Map of Participant 193. 
 
Participant number 193, a Russian man from Stavropol, paid close attention to the local 
scale, labeling three local places.  He explained: 
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This is my house where I live.  I live with my family, it is where those close to me 
often gather.  This is my university, where I study.  It is a place that I find smart and 
appealing.  And here is my work place.  It is not my favorite, but it is important 
because it is where I earn money and I spend a lot of time.  It does not even really 
matter that these places are in Stavropol, they could be anywhere in Russia.   
The most important elements of homeland to participant 193 were those with which he had much 
personal experience.  He also signified the importance of the Russian context, saying basically 
that the individual places in his homeland are generic and could exist anywhere in Russia.     
 
 
 
Figure 83: Map of Participant 128. 
 
Participant number 128 is a Karachay from an aul in Karachay-Chekessia.  This is how he 
described his sketch map: 
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This is the Earth, and this is Karachay-Cherkessia.  First of all, I am a human being, 
and The Earth is the homeland of all humans together.  Second, Karachay-
Cherkessia is my homeland, it is the most important place for members of my 
nationality and several other nationalities.  I was born here in aul Guruldeuk, I live in 
Ust-Djeguta, Dombay is our most beautiful example of nature.  Karachays are of 
course the most populous nationality in our Republic, but there are also Russians and 
other Caucasian nationalities.  It is not so important to me that Karachay-Cherkessia 
is part of Russia.  I for example and an educated person, and I know both English 
and Turkish.  As for me, I think I could do alright in a place where those languages 
are spoken, but Karachay is spoken only where there are Karachays, no one learns 
our language, so our homeland is important in this regard, it is ours.   
  
Although several participants drew a depiction of the earth with their conception of homeland 
within it, they all included other areas along with their countries or territories.  The view point of 
participant 128 is interesting notably because he feels a connection the entire planet; however he 
does not include other territories along with Karachay-Cherkessia.  There is no reference to The 
Russian Federation, and his opinions indicate that Karachay-Cherkessia is a separate entity, as he 
does not associate with any kind of place or territory that is inherently Russian.    
 
Conclusion 
 Perhaps the most important theme in the sketch maps was the frequency at which places 
important at the regional scale were included.  Regardless of the group breakdown, regional 
places were always the most popular element sketched.  I suggest that this trend is due most of 
all to familiarity with particular places.  Despite the fact that Stavropol and Cherkessk were the 
home towns of many of the participants, the two are important cities in the North Caucasus 
region because they are the capitals of their respective territories and the main centers of 
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economic commerce.  They present a sense of importance due to their political and economic 
status, however, they remain not as far removed as Moscow and St. Petersburg in terms of most 
participants‘ personal experience.  Most of the participants have spent the majority of their lives 
in the study area and over half of them have lived in one of these cities for an extended period of 
time at some point in their lives.   These two cities are also large population centers, meaning 
that participants not living there are likely to have relatives there.  As we can observe from the 
interviews, family connections are often considered when people from this area think about their 
homelands.   
 Those who emphasized the importance of Russian space tended to see regions, and local 
environments for that matter, as equivalent and interchangeable.  Using federal political borders 
to define one‘s homeland usually meant that participants did not put much emphasis on regions 
themselves.  Some said that living in the south was not particularly important because they could 
live the same way in any region of Russia.  Here, the idea of Russian space is important.  This 
notion also holds true for those who heavily favored local scale conceptions of homeland.  I 
expected people to choose local places due to the fact they felt intimately connected with some 
aspect of them, whether it be nostalgia for their birthplace or their family, or a variety of other 
sentimental reasons.  However, place affinity seemed not to be the main reason why they chose 
to associate with the local scale.  Instead participants made these choices based on familiarity 
and experience gained from everyday life.  Some said that they believed another Russian city 
would provide the same opportunities and an equivalent conception of homeland for its residents.  
What mattered in the end was that they were in Russia.  This opinion was notably present among 
male participants, who often favored local scale elements.     
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 Those who did favor a regional conception of homeland did tend to factor in aesthetics, 
usually showing an affinity for the regions climate or natural beauty.  Some had a problem 
associating with all of Russia due to its sheer size and many participants‘ lack of experience with 
the entire country was evident in their maps, as Siberia and the Russian Far-East were usually 
either not included or not sketched with the same attention to detail as European Russia.  
Participants favoring a particular krai or republic, The south of Russia (references to the 
Southern Federal District on maps were extremely rare), or the North Caucasus as their 
homeland usually commented on the unique culture of the region, saying that southern culture 
differed from in the north, particularly from culture in Moscow.  If participants from Stavropol 
claimed the North Caucasus as their regional homeland, they usually praised the areas great 
cultural diversity.  If participants from Karachay-Cherkessia claimed the North Caucasus, it was 
because the area was friendly to their ethnic groups and to Islam, and because of family 
connections.    
 Although Stavropol and Cherkessk were often included on the sketch maps by 
participants from their respective territories, the differences in the sketches from Stavropol Krai 
and those from Karachay-Cherkessia differ in other elements.  Most importantly, maps collected 
from Stavropol Krai were much more likely to include multiple scales, namely the federal scale. 
Many Russians included Moscow in their sketches, while leaving out Karachay-Cherkessia, a 
bordering territory.  In fact, some Russians were unsure whether or not to include the republics in 
their maps, as they questioned whether or not these territories were indeed Russian.  Maps from 
Karachay-Cherkessia were focused more on the republic than on all of Russia.  If the maps 
exhibited multiple scales, they were likely to show the regional and local scales, rather than the 
federal scale.  Republic status means something in terms of homeland for participants from 
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Karachay-Cherkessia, allowing them to separate their territory from the federal scale more 
clearly.  However, Stavropol Krai was also presented as homeland by some of its residence, but 
this line of thought was less common.   Federal borders appeared on maps of ethnic Russians 
more than did regional borders, whereas regional borders appeared on over twice as many maps 
from Karachay-Cherkessia as did federal borders.   
 I also noticed a correlation between Islam and drawing territory that is, as some 
participants put it, ―friendly to Islam.‖  Islamic participants did not often include Moscow on 
their sketches.  Those who did associated with it probably for material rather than philosophical 
reasons.  Mecca appeared on several maps, as did the moon and crescent, a symbol of Islam.  
Some said that they would be comfortable living in other Muslim countries if they had to leave 
the Caucasus.   Due this emphasis on Islamic space, it is logical that Muslims preferred to 
associate with the North Caucasus and with Karachay-Cherkessia more than with the Russia.  
Again, family connections and ancestry play a part in this trend as well.   
I expected titular status to play a larger role than it did.  I was surprised that the chi 
squared test did not indicate any significant trends between titular and non-titular groups.   The 
majority Russian population in Stavropol Krai did not yield the most meaningful results due to 
the fact that titular status is really more important in Karachay-Cherkessia because Russians have 
many territories.  Thus, I examined trends in Karachay-Cherkessia.  My original thought was that 
non-titular groups would focus less on the regional scale in terms of places and borders, since 
Karachay-Cherkessia is not their official homeland.  I also expected them to associate with the 
Caucasus in terms of including physical features.  Non-titular individuals did favor the federal 
scale, as titular participants were heavily favored the regional and local scales.  However, titular 
participants also favored landscape features in their maps.  Perhaps titular groups associated with 
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the mountains and other physical features because they ascribed these elements as their own.  If 
this is the case, non-titular individuals seem to agree.   It is also important to note that neither 
Karachays nor Cherkess have large populations of their own ethno-national groups outside of 
Karachay-Cherkessia.   
The results of this study indicate that there are many conceptions of homeland among 
people in the North Caucasus.  However, certain elements are usually factored into one‘s sense 
of homeland.  First, personal familiarity is important.  Participants included (with greater 
attention to detail) borders, symbols, and places with which they had either personal experience, 
or about which they gained knowledge through media, maps, and education.  Second, family 
connections and historical roots are important.  Often people included territories where family 
members live or were born, even though the participants themselves had little personal 
connection to them.  Third, different territories have varying meanings in the context of the 
North Caucasus.  Stavropol Krai has different meaning to its residents than does Karachay-
Cherkessia in that it represents Russian space, a majority Russian/Orthodox Christian population, 
and direct subordination to federal power.  Karachay-Cherkessia and the other republics 
represent non-Russian space, where Islam is the norm, and where traditional cultures exist with 
autonomy from Russian influences.  Finally, there is a great love of the local landscape that is 
held by all groups.  Perhaps it is the dramatic landscape of the North Caucasus that lead to the 
region‘s great diversity and free spirited reputation, but the landscape also constitutes something 
that the people of the North Caucasus have in common.  Being from the North Caucasus has 
definite potential to influence one‘s sense of ethno-national identity.     
 
 
195 
 
Appendix A 
This survey will not take longer than 5 minutes to complete.  It is very important for my research in ethnic 
geography.  Thank you for answering my questions. 
Please answer the following questions: 
Your ethnicity_______________ 
Your gender:   M     F 
Your father‘s ethnicity ___________________ 
Your Mother‘s ethnicity _________________ 
Your birth place ________________________ 
Were you parents born in the same region that you were? ___________________________ 
Where do you live now, and how long have you been living there? _______________________ 
What is your religion? ________________________ 
Do you attend your place of worship on a regular basis? ___________________________ 
Does either of your parents practice a different religion than you do? _______________________ 
Your native language _____________________________ 
Your father‘s native language_______________________ 
Your mother‘s native language______________________ 
 
Please indicate how important the following factors are you your personal ethnic identity (1- absolutely not 
important, 5—very important) 
Your place of birth      1 2 3 4 5 
Living in the Russian Federation     1 2 3 4 5 
Living in the Southern Federal District    1 2 3 4 5 
Living in the North Caucasus     1 2 3 4 5 
Residing in a particular Krai or Republic    1 2 3 4 5 
Religion        1 2 3 4 5 
The ethnicity of your ancestors      1 2 3 4 5 
Living amongst people of your ethnic group    1 2 3 4 5  
Living amongst people of different ethnic groups (not your own) 1 2 3 4 5 
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 Appendix B 
 
Significant Results from Multivariate Analysis of Variance Test (MANOVA) 
For the combined dependent variables, using the Wilks lambda criterion, there were 
significant multivariate effects on four of the independent variables: ―Nationality‖ (multivariate 
F [10, 322] = 2.75, p < .01), ―Gender‖ (multivariate F [10, 322] = 1.91, p < .05), ―Practicing 
Religion‖ (multivariate F [10, 322] = 2.26, p < .05), and ―Same Birthplace as Parents‖ 
(multivariate F [10, 322] = 3.19, p < .01).   
Effects of Nationality (Russian vs. non-Russian) on the dependent variables were further 
investigated in a univariate analysis.  There were significant nationality based differences 
between groups regarding ―Living in the Russian Federation‖ (univariate F[1, 331]) = 8.95, p < 
.01) and ―Heritage‖ (univariate F[1, 331]) = 3.88, p < .05).  Russian participants (M = 3.89, SD = 
1.67) ranked living in the Russian Federation significantly higher than non-Russian participants 
(M = 3.28, SD = 1.35). The scores regarding heritage were higher for non-Russian participants 
(M = 4.64, SD = .86) than for Russian participants (M = 4.08, SD = 1.24). 
There was a significant difference in how participants of the different genders answered 
in terms of the importance of heritage.  ―Heritage‖ (univariate F[1, 331]) = 13.10, p < .01) was 
more important for male participants (M = 4.72, SD =.72) than for females  (M = 4.30, 
SD=1.16).    
The type of religion that participants follow also matters in terms of how they responded 
to the dependent variables ―Living in the Russian Federation,‖ ―Living in the Southern Federal 
District,‖ ―Living in the North Caucasus,‖ and ―Living in a particular Krai or Republic.‖  ―Living 
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in the Russian Federation‖ (univariate F[1, 331]) = 4.44, p < .05) was considered significantly 
higher non-Islamic participants (M = 3.64, SD=1.45) than by those who are Islamic (M = 2.97, 
SD =1.65), indicating that Islamic participants think living in the Russian Federation less 
importantly than non-Islamic participants.  Living in the Southern Federal District (univariate 
F[1, 331]) = 7.16, p < .01) was also more important to Islamic participants (M = 3.64, SD = 1.47) 
than non-Islamic (M = 2.97, SD=1.46).  Islamic participants (M = 4.29, SD =1.25) favored 
Living in the North Caucasus (univariate F[1, 331]) = 6.23, p < .05) to non-Islamic (M = 2.89, 
SD =1.48), as was the case regarding living in a particular Krai or Republic (univariate F[1, 
331]) = 7.73, p < .01) as Islamic participants (M = 4.13, SD =1.34) favored this factor to non-
Islamic (M = 2.93, SD =1.48).  
Significant differences regarding the ―Practice of Religion‖ in terms of the importance of 
religious belief an in terms of living among other ethnic groups were noted.  ―Religious Belief‖ 
(univariate F[1, 331]) = 6.09, p < .05) was more important to practicing participants (M = 4.47, 
SD =1.07) than to non-practicing participants (M = 4.29, SD =1.27).   
Regarding ―Living Among Other Ethnic Groups‖ (univariate F[1, 331]) = 4.829, p < .05), 
practicing participants (M = 2.99, SD =1.07) responded that this factor was significantly less 
important to them than non-practicing participants (M = 3.29, SD =1.27). 
―Titular Status‖ mattered significantly in terms of ―Birthplace‖ and ―Living in The North 
Caucasus.‖  Those participants who were Titular (M = 3.51, SD =1.67) placed more importance 
on ―Birthplace‖ (univariate F[1, 331]) = 6.45, p < .05) than did non-Titular participants (M = 
3.17, SD =1.72).  The same was true regarding ―Living in The North Caucasus‖ (univariate F[1, 
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331]) = 4.22, p < .05), as Titular participants (M = 3.84, SD =1.50) ranked this factor 
significantly higher than did non-Titular participants (M = 3.12 SD =1.55). 
Having the same birthplace as one‘s parents was also significant in terms of how 
participants felt about place-based identity factors.  Birthplace (univariate F[1, 331]) = 17.18, p < 
.01) was given significantly more importance to those born in the same place as their parents (M 
= 3.74, SD =1.55) in comparison to those who were not (M = 3.08, SD =1.55).  Living in the 
Russian Federation (univariate F[1, 331]) = 4.44, p < .05) was also favored by those with the 
same birthplace as their parents (M = 3.67, SD =1.51) compared to those born in a different place 
(M = 3.37, SD =1.63).  Living in the Southern Federal District (univariate F[1, 331]) = 8.713, p < 
.01) was significantly less important to those not born in the same place as their parents (M = 
3.12, SD =1.58) when compared to the responses of participants who were (M = 3.54, SD =1.42).  
The same was true regarding Living in a Particular Krai or Republic (univariate F[1, 331]) = 
7.36, p < .01), where those with parents born in different regions than their own (M = 3.34, SD 
=1.59), noted this factor with significantly less importance compared to those born in the same 
place as their parents (M = 3.82, SD =1.41).  Responses from the two groups regarding heritage 
(univariate F[1, 331]) = 4.75, p < .05) showed that this factor was significantly higher for those 
born in the same place as their parents (M = 4.46, SD =1.08) compared to those participants who 
were not (M = 4.37, SD = 1.06). 
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